228. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State1
4709. For Secretary’s Eyes Only. From O’Shaughnessy.2 Trimble being absent today on official business in Frankfort I called on Chancellor Adenauer to give him the substance of the Department’s 3443 June 4.3 After a perfunctory greeting and before I could say a word, [Page 605] the Chancellor, who seemed extremely agitated and upset, launched into a long tirade against what he described as a paper which Mr. Stassen had given to the Russians and knowledge of which had come to him, Adenauer, through the French. The paper, a sixteen-page document containing thirty-five points, was, in his estimation, a complete sell-out of the Western position to the Russians and, he said, even embodied a proposal to the effect that “the Americans were prepared to give away all of their bases,” in order to reach agreement with the Russians. I replied that I had no knowledge of such a paper, and managed at this juncture to give the chancellor the substance of the Department’s 3443. He said “that is all very well but Mr. Stassen’s utterances and his paper are in complete contradiction to what the Secretary had assured me in Washington”. I told him that the Secretary had specifically mentioned in the communication which I was to give to him, the statement that he stood by the commitments he had made to the Chancellor in Washington regarding phase one. Adenauer then said that he was comforted to hear this and could believe it only because of his strong faith and trust in you, but that he still could not reconcile Mr. Stassen’s utterances and his “paper” with what he, Adenauer, believed to be US Government policy.
Again reverting to the so-called Stassen paper, he said that it was bound to leak to the press, that there would be interpellations in the Bundestag, and that he would be in a position of having said that US policy was one thing when what came out publicly was another. He inferred that he would look as if he had been duped. This, of course, would have a disastrous effect in the coming electoral campaign.
At this point he summoned Blankenhorn,4 who had been recalled from Paris, and Grewe,5 who had been recalled from leave, and asked them their views. As it turned out, Blankenhorn did all the talking and the Chancellor had Blankenhorn’s remarks summarized in writing in the following form:
Begin verbatim text.
“At NAC meeting. May 29 Stassen gave general report on status of disarmament negotiations without presenting content of his proposals which are to be made in coming negotiations with Soviets. Stassen confined himself to presenting two questions to NATO: 1. Do 15 partner states want air inspection zone extended over Europe? 2. If this is the case, do NATO partners want Western Members of U.N. Subcommittee in London to make appropriate proposals to NAC?
[Page 606]“It was agreed that consultation in NAC would continue June 56 with British and Canadian Members of UN Sub-committee present. On this occasion both questions were to be answered.
“48 hours after first consultation, Stassen transmitted to his three Western partners a 16-page proposal which went far beyond that which was discussed in NAC. As was confirmed to us in London, Stassen presented this proposal as ‘informal memorandum’ to Zorin on Friday.
“French Govt protested against this step by Stassen in Washington June 1.7 State Dept responded to this protest by saying it knew nothing of this action by Stassen.8
“Today further consultative meetings were to be made. English and Canadian members of London Sub-committee were to appear in NAC but did not appear. Consultation is to continue tomorrow afternoon in NAC.”
End verbatim text.
The Chancellor then said he too would like to make some remarks in writing and dictated the following:
Begin verbatim text.
“Ambassador Blankenhorn today wrote me the substance of the paper which stassen presented to his Western colleagues in London Sub-committee as American proposals. A substantial part of these proposals is in direct contradiction to statements made to me by Secretary Dulles in Washington as the intentions of American policy and in contradiction to several points set forth in the joint Washington declaration.
“In the event that Mr. Stassen presented these proposals not only to his Western colleagues but also to chief of Soviet delegation Zorin, even if semi-officially, as proposals of American Govt, then it must be stated that these proposals are in large part in contrast to that which was stated in the Washington conversations and which was expressed in the joint Washington declaration.”
End verbatim text.
Oddly enough, after handing me these two pieces of paper, he made Blankenhorn sign his contribution and also signed his own. I assume this was done to emphasize the importance he attached to these remarks.
The Chancellor then produced a copy of a letter to you, the text of which he asked me to telegraph. The text is in immediately following telegram.9 The original will be delivered through the Ambassador in Washington.
[Page 607]The meeting lasted a little over two hours and I can truthfully say that I have never in the past three years seen these three men as upset and distraught as they were this evening.
As I left, the Chancellor expressed the earnest hope that “Washington could furnish some statement which would clear up this mess”. Also that Ambassador Perkins would be in a position to clarify matters at the NAC meeting tomorrow.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/6–557. Secret; Niact.↩
- Elim O’Shaughnessy, Consul General in Bonn.↩
- Telegram 4868 to Perkins in Paris, repeated to London and Bonn as telegram 3443, June 4, reported that United States did not want to be the advocate of a European inspection zone in any first step disarmament agreement and preferred to defer to its NATO allies on that point. The telegram, drafted by Dulles, concludes: “We have given Chancellor Adenauer definite assurances that we would not seek any application of first phase to Europe as against his judgement on question of whether this would or would not advance German reunification. We must be scrupulous in adherence to this.” (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–357)↩
- Herbert Blankenhorn, German Ambassador at NATO.↩
- Wilhelm Grewe, Chief of Political Division, German Foreign Office.↩
- The NAC meeting was postponed until June 6. A full summary of that meeting is contained in Polto circular 16 from Paris, June 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–757)↩
- No document indicating a French protest in Washington on June 1 has been found in Department of State files. A French protest, transmitted to Washington in telegram 6149 from Paris, June 1, is briefly summarized in Document 216.↩
- No formal response has been found in Department of State files.↩
- See infra.↩