Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

216. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, June 2, 1957—noon.

6633. Herter from Stassen. USDEL Disarmament No. 240. Responding to Deptel 8429.² No “paper of U.S. proposals” has been presented to the Soviets or the subcommittee as yet. Detailed negotiations with other states on the new U.S. proposals have not yet been initiated.

2. The British, French and Canadians have been thoroughly consulted on the outlines of the new U.S. position, and NATO has been consulted at the Council session in Paris on the outlines of the new U.S. position.

3. The Western Four agreed on the desirability and necessity of beginning to talk informally with the Soviets regarding the direction in which the U.S. was willing to move and to further explore the potentials for further Soviet movement and the lines of their position.

4. This necessity to begin talking with the Soviets became particularly acute after the stories from Washington that the new U.S. proposals had been thoroughly reviewed with Chancellor Adenauer.³

5. If the USDEL had further delayed any talk with the Soviet Delegation there was danger of a complete breakdown in the atmosphere and the potential for a careful and constructive negotiation in line with the new U.S. decisions might have been lost.

6. The informal memorandum used as a talking paper⁴ in the first broad talk with the Soviet Delegation clearly specifies its limited character, this was reaffirmed in the talks, and the vital necessity of not having the Soviet Delegation misunderstand the direction or extent of potential U.S. movement made the handing of a copy of the talking paper an imperative procedure.

7. The only procedural issue that has arisen with some members of the French and UK Delegations stems from their contention that it is not possible to use the talking paper approach when conferring with the Soviet Union and their contention that the Soviets will use such a talking paper from a strictly propaganda standpoint to embarrass the USDEL. Our response to this has been three-fold.

a. The paper has been carefully drafted so as to contain more propaganda advantage to the U.S. than to the USSR.

b. If the Soviet Union now takes a propaganda only approach this is a cheap and quick way of finding out that they do not have a serious intention of negotiating a sound agreement.

c. There is no other feasible way of proceeding in such a complex subject than to be able to pass informal working paper language to prevent misunderstanding that can otherwise arise from oral conversations translated to a different language.

8. Moch knew and approved in advance of the USDEL talking to the Soviet Delegation. Presumably Paris 6149⁵ reflects an erroneous briefing of Pineau by someone in the Foreign Office and does not reflect any view of Moch.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–257. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.
2. Supra.
3. See Document 205.
4. Printed as Document 212.
5. Telegram 6149, June 1, transmitted Pineau’s “strong objection” to Stassen’s handing of the memorandum by the U.S. Delegation to Zorin and his insistence “on importance fullest consultation among four powers before any proposals submitted to Soviets.” (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–157)