751G.00/12–154: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
2290. From Heath. I saw Bao Dai yesterday. He was obviously pleased over his decision to dismiss Hinh. He regretted that Hinh’s actions had made this necessary but Hinh’s intemperate press declaration against the Diem government “right in my (Bao Dai’s) face” left him no alternative. He had told Hinh that when the latter arrived at Paris he should keep his mouth shut and that he, Bao Dai, would arrange a reconciliation between Hinh and Diem. Hinh had acted childishly and “impossibly”.
In accordance with Deptel sent Paris 1964,1 I emphasized there was no change in U.S. policy toward Vietnam and explained that Diem received our support because he represented nationalist and anti-Communist elements and because of his personal honesty. Bao Dai said that he was firmly supporting Diem but now that he had settled the Hinh problem it was up to Diem to make good.
He knew both Diem’s virtues and his weaknesses. His virtues were his honesty and the fact that he represented an ideal. His weaknesses were his distrust of people, his unwillingness to delegate authority and his desire to keep all the strings of administration in his own hands. Diem should now form a new government not based on a union of sects and political parties but enlisting capable, honest nationalists irrespective of their party or sect affiliations. He thought that Diem should certainly include Quat in the government and give him real authority, perhaps as Minister of Defense. There were a number of Vietnamese nationalists in France and in Vietnam who are now somewhat ashamed of their “fence-sitting” and are really anxious to serve Vietnam in its hour of peril.
Bao Dai said he had no idea what tactics Ho Chi-Minh would employ at this time but he was certain that the latter would try every means, fair or foul, to swallow South Vietnam. He believed that Mendes-France for the moment was sincerely determined to aid in the preservation of free Vietnam but remarked that in the latter’s entourage there were many who favored a policy of peaceful coexistence and collaboration with the Vietminh. He considered Mendes-France, however, to be too intelligent to try to play a double game at this time, playing both free Vietnam and the Vietminh, since that would alienate American support of France.
[Page 2328]Bao Dai said that he had no immediate plans to return to Vietnam since his return must be “carefully prepared”. He was “bored to death”, however, with staying in France and wanted to return to Vietnam as soon as it would be appropriate. He remarked that his son had now entered military school in France and was undergoing severe discipline with good spirit. I told him that it was my government’s belief that he would exercise his authority more usefully by remaining away from Vietnam at this juncture.
Bao Dai was very scornful over the efforts to promote Buu Hoi as either Prime Minister or a sort of viceroy. He said this was a maneuver of certain French interests. Buu Hoi was not a bad man and was a good scientist but utterly incapable politically and with no following in Vietnam.
I said to Bao Dai that the President’s idea of sending General Collins as special representative would help solve expeditiously many of the problems now confronting Vietnam. Bao Dai said he had a pleasant memory of the General’s visit to Vietnam in 1951.
Last night I spoke with Luyen, Diem’s brother and Ambassador at Large. Luyen said that Bao Dai had decided to get rid of Hinh some time before but had delayed action until he was certain that Hinh had no real following in the Vietnamese Army and was not backed by the French Government.
Luyen said that he favored Bao Dai’s return to Vietnam and in the relatively near future. Bao Dai should return not as an absolute ruler but as a sort of constitutional monarch. However, Bai Dai would be allowed to govern directly the high plateau region in South Vietnam peopled by various non-Vietnamese hill tribes. Diem had promised Bao Dai that latter could govern the crown lands. Luyen insisted, as he has before, that Bao Dai was not the profiteer that the foreign press and rumor considered him to be. Luyen said that most of the exchange transfers had benefited members of Bao Dai’s entourage such as Nguyen De, Giao and Buu Loc and that Bao Dai really received only the “crumbs of such transactions.” He asserted that Tran Van Huu, De, Buu Loc and Giao had larger fortunes than Bao Dai.
In conclusion, Luyen told me that he had just intimated to the French Government that the appointment of Daridan as successor to General Ely as commissioner general would be unwelcome to the Diem government since Daridan, rightly or wrongly, was considered in Vietnam as opposed to Diem.