751G.00/12–154: Telegram
The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State
2031. Repeated information Paris 653, Singapore 20, London 24, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. From Collins. Yesterday Malcolm MacDonald UK Commissioner General in Southeast Asia, accompanied by British Ambassador Stephenson, called on me and on Chargé.
We had extremely frank discussion introduced by MacDonald’s statement that he had come here to review situation in Associated States and specifically to see me and offer any help which he or British Ambassador could offer in supporting firmly determined policy of French, British and American Governments support Diem and effort create stable situation.
I outlined most recent developments including Diem’s present inspection trip South Vietnam and stressed our belief in necessity strengthen Diem’s Government, particularly in Defense, Interior, and Information Ministries. MacDonald entirely agreed my analysis situation and estimate of Quat as essential for Defense post. He asked whether it might not be better at present time while process strengthening Government underway to effect general broadening of Government, including introduction Ng Hiep in Public Health. He also advanced arguments for Tam in Interior, but did not push point unduly in knowledge Diem’s adamant refusal accept Tam. He finally agreed strengthening of Cabinet by stages better than attempt to make overall reorganization in face extremely complicated internal political situation.
I outlined to MacDonald six fields of activity in which I hoped get constructive action under way during my mission of limited duration:
- (1)
- Reorganization Vietnamese Armed Forces and establishment sound relations between Army and civil authorities.
- (2)
- Strengthening Diem’s Government.
- (3)
- Resettlement refugees and displaced persons.
- (4)
- Land reform.
- (5)
- Establishment of national assembly.
- (6)
- Financial and economic matters relating to direct aid.
I gave MacDonald round figures of my recommendations for Vietnamese force levels and costs US willing assume, and with regard FEC gave him a general idea of force level we might be willing support. I told him I collaborating closely with Commissioner General Ely and that US not attempting in any way replace France in Indochina nor willing accept responsibility for defense area which clearly remains in French hands.
I completed my outline with explanation my concept of strategic facts of life in Free Vietnam. I told MacDonald that my directive calls for creation of force large enough only to assure internal security, which with FEC would act as buffer to contain at least temporarily any aggressive action. In view of time available before election date mentioned in Geneva accords and tremendous amount of work necessary create strong Vietnamese Army I believed force 80,000 to 85,000 men realistic. However, the small size this force plus the French Expeditionary Corps, if established at a level consonant with amount of funds we willing put into its support, necessitates finding some other means guarantee safety of area, that other means being, I said, Manila Pact. That Pact must be ratified as soon as possible and at time of ratification, or shortly thereafter, declaration should be made by signatories announcing determination give it full support and resist any aggressive actions in Southeast Asia. MacDonald said British would like to have seen a pact with more teeth in it, and agreed my comments that pact to be of any use must present real threat to Communists.
MacDonald said that in conversations with President Diem he would support my recommendation of inclusion Quat in Cabinet and he and British Ambassador would be glad help wherever they could. However, he had two comments he felt he should make (1) He unhappy about our plans re reduction in size Vietnamese Army as he believes large Vietnamese Army one of essential prerequisites for recreation national morale, and (2) he believes British, French, Australian, and New Zealand representatives should get together soonest to outline military defense plans for Southeast Asia. To include Southeast Asian nations would be to invite press publicity on following day.1
- Collins and MacDonald held a subsequent meeting (Dec. 9), which was reported in telegram 2188 from Saigon, Dec. 10. (751G.00/12–1054)↩