Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

120.251G/11–2954: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State

secret

Saigon, November 29, 1954—5 p.m.

2004. Repeated information Paris 643, Phnom Penh, Vientiane unnumbered. From Collins. Deptel 2112¹ paragraph 1 D.

A. During remaining limited period of my mission I intend to concentrate on following major fields with view to achieving some concrete progress in each field:

1. Vietnamese Armed Forces:

(A) Agreement with French and Vietnamese on size, composition and mission of armed forces. In this regard I assume paragraph 3 B of Deptel 2126² constitutes approval of my recommendations contained in parts I and II, Embtel 1830³ as basis for further consultations.

(B) Assumption by chief, MAAG on 1 January 54 [55] of responsibility for training Vietnamese armed forces. In accordance instructions contained in Deptel 2046,⁴ I will not press for complete elimination of French trainers who, in any case, will be required in large numbers for next year at least. However, I interpret second subparagraph of paragraph 1, Deptel 2126 as approving my present view that we should not enter training field at all unless responsibility for this training be in hands of chief, MAAG under general direction of General Ely. O’Daniel must have authority to introduce American methods and to determine when and where American funds be expended to support technical and tactical schooling of officers, NCOs and specialists.

(C) Granting by French of full autonomy to Vietnamese armed forces by 1 July 1955. See part III, paragraph 1 Embtel 1830. French and US advisers to staff and command positions may have to be employed beyond 1 July 1955, but basic system we successfully employed in Korea must be used here under supervision of chief MAAG.

(D) Reorientation of army in support of government and vice versa. Diem has agreed to make inspection trip November 30–December 1 with Deputy Defense Minister Minh and Acting Chief of Staff Vy. They will visit area in South Cochin China recently liberated from Viet Minh, following which we hope Diem and Minh will make appropriate declarations of confidence in army and Vy will follow with declaration of loyalty of army to government.

(E) Employment of armed forces in pacification and rehabilitation of country.

(1) We hope proclamation by Vietnamese Government assigning to Vietnamese armed forces basic responsibility for pacification and internal security will follow Diem’s inspection trip and appointment of new Defense Minister (see paragraph 2 below). Proclamation would also reaffirm confidence of government in army and include directive to Defense Minister that armed forces would cease political activities. Re this last point, Defense Minister has already put stop to use of radio program “Voice of the Army” for anti-Government propaganda. Presidential directive would be implemented by general order to be published by General Vy.

(2) Detailed plans for employment of Vietnam forces for pacification mission now under study by special committee with representation from MAAG, French and Vietnamese armed forces. Deployment of one or more territorial battalions to each province to commence without delay.

2. Strengthening Diem’s Government:

Key Ministries which must be properly filled at once if Diem’s Government is to be strengthened are Defense and Interior, both now held by Prime Minister. As reported Embtel 1906⁵ I recommended to Diem that he appoint Quat Defense Minister. Diem has made indirect offer to Quat which latter is still considering. Meanwhile further analysis of primary tasks of Defense and Interior in the period immediately ahead have convinced me that primary missions of two Ministries are now basically identical: To establish and maintain internal security without which no other programs can hope to succeed. In interests of good administration and to avoid clashes between Ministries working for some time to come in essentially the same field, I have recommended to Diem, after consultation with Quat, that Prime Minister name Quat Vice Prime Minister for Defense and Interior, with separate deputies for Defense and Interior. Diem’s reaction was that such an appointment would entail complete reorganization of government which I said should be undertaken promptly. If new proposal not acceptable I will urge immediate appointment of Quat as Defense Minister with a suitable South Vietnamese as Interior Minister. I shall continue actively to explore with Diem and other members of his Cabinet further steps to strengthen his government.

3. Resettlement of refugees and displaced persons:

This is a long-range program involving considerable sums of money and a considerable measure of economic reorientation. Representatives of USOM are now discussing with French Deputy Commissioner General Bordaz, the more immediate problems involved under this heading. Further advices will be forwarded upon completion these preliminary talks.

4. Land reform:

The question of land reform is likewise of very long range, but it ties directly into paragraph 3 above and certain aspects can and should be undertaken immediately. The government is said to own about 270,000 hectares of land some part of which is suitable for settlement by refugees. In addition there are sizeable tracts in the south now uncultivated or in zones being recovered from Viet Minh. A USOM–Embassy group is studying urgent phases of this program and should be ready to make recommendations soon. Meanwhile serious consideration is being given also to means of implementing excellent study made for USOM by Mr. Fippin which recommends far-reaching readjustment of land tenure and utilization pattern.

5. National Assembly:

My observations to date have convinced me that it is imperative to set up soonest some kind of National Assembly to give Diem Government some measure of democratic backing and to provide training ground for political leaders. One plan for a National Assembly is now before the Cabinet. I am assigning Embassy officers to follow this question closely and advise me with respect to recommendations I should make in order that whatever Assembly is formed it may reinforce other aspects of program outlined herein.

6. Financial and economic:

(A) Country team committee has under urgent study problem of implementing direct aid to Vietnam in accordance with President’s letter of October 23. Committee will propose soonest for Washington consideration exchange of notes with Vietnamese Government covering MDAP phase of direct aid, auditing controls we wish install, provision for US participation in drawing up military budget and problems of foreign exchange control arising under direct aid.

(B) While no specific program for propaganda and public information is listed above, our USIS Mission … is actively assisting Vietnam Ministry of Information in development of information program in support of specific projects listed. Ministry of Information agrees strengthening and some psychological warfare activities developed by Vietnam Army General Staff should be transferred either to Ministry of Information or President’s office.

(C) In implementation of joint instructions to Ely and me (Deptel 2055),⁶ I informed Ely November 26 about my desire to concentrate on subjects listed above. We have agreed to begin meeting today November 29 to discuss these subjects plus others Ely may wish to add.

Our method of working will be to assign individual officers of respective staffs to be primarily responsible for reaching joint position with regard to these matters. Ely and I will come into discussions as may be necessary to resolve differences developed in course of discussions by subordinates. In connection with above procedures I was happy to note Secretary’s views as outlined in paragraph 1 C, Deptel 2112. At times it is necessary for members my Mission deal directly with Vietnam Government, informing Ely later.

(D) After agreement has been reached with the French on policy and procedures for the implementation of programs in the fields indicated above, the Vietnamese Government will be invited to have representatives meet with us for the purpose of advising them in the execution of such programs. In the event that agreement with the French cannot be obtained in any of fields indicated, it will be necessary, after consultation with the Department, to negotiate directly with appropriate Vietnamese authorities to achieve necessary objectives here.

(E) Short-range elements of program should be implemented as a matter of urgency and be followed up as soon as possible by execution of long-range programs.

(F) Difficult now suggest date for judging results of crash program. Measures should be under continuous review and changed as needed. Though it is realized that early judgment of results is desirable, in order to allow adequate time for various facets of program to bear fruit, it is felt that initial formal judgment should be reserved until after first of year. If Secretary or his deputies attend proposed meeting SEATO Bangkok, January, suggest this might provide opportunity meeting here at that time to discuss program and review its chances of success.

(G) New Subject:

I informed Ely November 26 (Usfoto 646)⁷ that US proposes make $100 million available for FEC support calendar 55, subject to further consultation with Congress and subject to Ely–Collins and two governments mutually agreeing on what is to be done in Vietnam. Ely expressed disappointment and stated that this would require complete review military program. On November 27 one of his officers informed me that Ely would not conclude minute of understanding on Vietnamese forces until impact of cut in FEC support could be studied. This may delay to some extent our carrying out proposals concerning these forces made this telegram and in Embtel 1830.

Kidder

1. Dated Nov. 24, p. 2303.
2. Dated Nov. 26, p. 2306.
3. Dated Nov. 15, p. 2250.
4. Dated Nov. 19, p. 2271.
5. Dated Nov. 20, p. 2272.
6. Dated Nov. 20, p. 2274.
7. Not printed.