751G.5 MSP/11–2754: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the Department of State1
304. Repeated information Saigon 314, pouched Paris, Bangkok, Vientiane unnumbered. We have heard that JCS have decided drastically [Page 2312] cut total US financial support for military forces three Indochina states, apparently largely in Vietnam. Although without confirmation authenticity this report, I should like to suggest that total aid be apportioned so as to permit modest increase Cambodian armed forces next year.
Cambodian 1954 budget provided $40 million (1.4 billion piasters) for armed forces which permitted army of some 33,000 men, by US standards poorly and diversely equipped, badly trained, and incoherently organized, but nevertheless an army imbued with fighting spirit which repulsed Viet Minh invasion. For 55,000 man army they told Geneva conference was minimum for “effective defense” this country, Cambodia now budgeting preliminarily $108 million (3.8 billion piasters) for calendar 1955. Cambodian budget figure for their own contribution to both 1954 and 1955 budgets is 535 million piasters ($15 million) annually which for 1955 would mean a US or French contribution of $93 million, if it were decided their 1955 military program were sound.
While there may be excellent reasons for decreasing our overall expenditures in Indochina, I feel strongly we should help Cambodians achieve 55,000 man goal, which was figure tabled before military committee Geneva conference and thus not likely to be challenged by ICC.
Vietnamese problems are different from those of Cambodia. It cannot be too often repeated that term “Indochina” is now a romantic fiction, although it formerly served French as convenient expression for Asian colonial holdings. Cambodia differs from Vietnam ethnically, linguistically, culturally, and spiritually and an age-old antipathy separates the two. To consider Cambodian problem as part of Vietnamese problem under rubric “Indochina” would in our opinion lead to possible serious errors in future US evaluation this area. In fact, Department might concur that future telegrams re “Indochina” refer explicitly to Vietnam, or Cambodia, or Laos.
This nation has potential and will to defend its own territory within framework of any Southeast Asian defense structure and is a small but useful asset. For a relatively small expenditure here we can help to anchor Thailand’s southeastern flank and plug Communist osmosis into southern Laos. In terms of military posture, geographic situation, racial and cultural ties we must consider Cambodia in same frame of reference as Thailand. In view of sums we are expending in latter country to build effective defense force and unified shield against subversion, it would seem common sense take similar precautions in this country which fits geographically into south Thailand like a baseball in a catcher’s glove. If, after Dien Bien Phu and Geneva, there is in Southeast Asia a viable psychological defense line south of Chinese border it is now Mekong River west of which are Thailand and greater [Page 2313] part of Cambodia, and to east the mountainous spine of Laos. In fact, we may in future find that political watershed between Chinese and Indian influence will be that of Mekong.
With a port on Gulf of Siam, which FOA/W has approved in principle (Usfoto 4)2 and visiting Congressmen Vorys and Richards seem to favor (Embtel 291)3 Cambodia can be economically independent of South Vietnam. As suggested in Embtel 221,4 Cambodia’s logical ties and ones which must be primarily considered by a successful US policy are with Buddhist countries of South and Southeast Asia. We now suggest this compatibility also makes practical geopolitical sense, and can be exploited with a minimum of expenditure and effort as adjunct to substantial American program already being forwarded in adjacent Thailand.
In consequence, I recommend that as a preliminary figure $80 million be made available in calendar year 1955 for economic support of Cambodian armed forces. This figure does not cover MDAP assistance which presumably could be made available from extensive stocks now in Vietnam which apparently will not be required in their entirety by Vietnamese armed forces.
Despite fact Cambodian Government has budgeted only $15 million for next calendar year on defense account, we are hopeful that government can be prevailed upon to double this contribution in view of anticipated refund of receipts from Vietnamese customs debt settlement. This would more than take care of deficit between overall figure of $108 million for ARK in calendar year 1955 to which we now recommend that US contribute $80 million, subject to MAAG scrutiny as outlined below.
Embassy despatch 68 of August 28, 19542 provided a detailed breakdown of 55,000 man army contemplated by Cambodian Government for 1955. We have been promised detailed financial breakdown of this total in near future, and will promptly submit our analysis of this when it is received. However, we are severely hampered in our technical evaluation by our lack of military staff here. Sole Army Attaché cannot physically handle this very large task. We need prompt establishment of a MAAG if we are to discharge our responsibilities in undertaking financial support of armed forces. It should be set up here, at least skeletally, before January 1, 1955 deadline for commencement of direct US aid.
Under present JCS directive a MAAG is not to be established here unless Cambodians agree to phasing out French instructors. Such agreement has not yet been reached largely because Prime Minister, [Page 2314] who is only man in government capable of reaching a decision by himself, is desperately ill and Minister of Defense has no real capacity to reach a decision on this important policy issue. We are accordingly hampered by local circumstances from negotiating this JCS directive, although I feel confident that once we can reach responsible ministers who in turn can present issue to King, assurances conforming to JCS desires can be expected from Cambodian Government.
This does not, however, answer immediate and pressing problem which is: How are we in our stewardship of taxpayers’ money to evaluate Cambodian military needs and be prepared economically to meet those needs by January 1 deadline without at least some military staff to screen these requirements and to set up an estimated show-force-basis before the pay master begins to pay?
In effect, we have been talking about two kinds of MAAGs: One for normal logistics functions and for screening of ARK requirements under our new responsibility to provide direct economic aid to that army, and the other, military training mission. I believe it should be to latter that JCS requirement re phasing out French should apply and not to former. In fact, as Embtel 2555 makes evident, we hope to rely on French technical assistance in providing direct economic aid to Cambodia. In consequence, I should like authority to negotiate establishment of a MAAG for screening and logistics functions immediately with training function to be assumed later provided Cambodian Government agrees to eventual phasing out of French instructors.
In sum, we need (1) earmarking of $80 million for calendar 1955; (2) a logistics and fiscal MAAG before end of this year; (3) eventual little MAAG training component.
Please instruct.
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Telegram 291 from Phnom Penh, Nov. 24, is not printed. (951H.541/11–2454)↩
- Telegram 221 from Phnom Penh, Nov. 3, is not printed. (790.5/11–354)↩
- Not printed.↩
- Telegram 255 from Phnom Penh, Nov. 15, concerning the aid program for Cambodia, is not printed. (851H.00/11–1554)↩