Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/4–953: Telegram

No. 65
The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Taipei, April 9, 1953—6 p.m.

1069. No implication intended my telegram 1060, April 8¹ that Chinese Government “may have abandoned” position of denying clearance to Burma flights and can only assume from wording Department’s telegram 806, April 8² that Department basing conclusions on … reports which Embassy may or may not have seen.…

. . . . . . .

Re substance of latter I have had no intimation Chinese Government intends to abandon compliance with three demands Department’s telegram 616, February 24. However, it unsafe assume Chinese Government willing continue such compliance indefinitely without reference to Burmese action in UNO or to military situation in Burma. As indicated last paragraph my telegram 1060, April 8, Chinese military incline to opinion Burmese program aid Communists. Are exploiting US intervention to obtain closing Thai frontier and shutting off flights from Formosa as means improving their military position. While press campaign here less virulent than in Burma, due probably to government control, further bitterness already engendered by reports of Chinese forces being chewed up as result US influence. Many months since anything has so exacerbated Chinese-American relations as this Burma affair.

Essence first paragraph Department’s telegram 801, April 8³ conveyed to Foreign Minister who will discuss with Chinese military and give me reply. His initial reaction was that such military contacts probably inappropriate while case before UNO. Secret military discussions behind back of GA while matter under consideration in New York would not be conducive to favorable results he thought. Foreign Minister then expressed tentative opinion Burmese should first withdraw their complaint.

Department’s telegram 803, April 8⁴ arrived after my talk with Foreign Minister today but content will be communicated to him soonest. Frankly I doubt likelihood Chinese Government consenting to publicity for agreement in principle now, particularly in absence of action by Burmese to withdraw UNO complaint and/or agree to cease fire.

Rankin

1. Telegram 1060 reported that Rankin had learned the source of the report relayed in Document 63, that the source had made no suggestion of Civil Air Transport planes being involved, and that the possibility that other planes would be commandeered was only speculation. The Foreign Minister assured him that he would continue to oppose sending any support to Li Mi’s forces and that he had the full cooperation of the Commander in Chief of the Chinese Air Force. (690B.9321/4–853)
2. Telegram 860 requested Rankin to clarify whether or not the Chinese Government had abandoned the position taken in Yeh’s statement of Mar. 7 that no clearance would be given to any flights from any airfield on Taiwan to the area occupied by Li Mi’s forces. (690B.9321/4–853)
3. Printed as telegram 1592 to Rangoon, supra.
4. Telegram 803 instructed Rankin to urge the Chinese Government to make public the “message” it had authorized the United States to transmit to the Burmese and Thai Governments. (690B.9321/3–3153)