Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/4–353: Telegram

No. 64
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

top secret
priority

Washington, April 8, 1953—2:25 p.m.

1592. Department believes time has come to attempt impel Burma and China in direction practical solution as matter entirely separate from UN action, and to this end considers some contact must be established. Most feasible approach appears preliminary meeting presumably in Burma near scene of operations but possibly in Thailand between Burmese and Chinese military men to discuss only immediate current problems. While eventual objective would be evacuation of at least some of hard core Chinese troops now in Monghsat area, immediate aim would be consideration physical problems and establishment orderly procedures as prerequisite to further steps toward solution, including if possible agreement to temporary suspension heavy military action in Monghsat area or at least delimited zone thereof and elimination causes local friction.

Rangoon, Taipei and Bangkok are requested give views re feasibility such approach soonest. Rangoon is requested broach this possibility with GOB and make clear our belief that no real start can be made until at least informal contact is established. Such action should be begun regardless developments in UN.

For your information, Barrington and U Kyin² paid protocol visit April 6 and former alluded to some questions your 1924³ of which he was generally informed before departure. Re withdrawal in “one-month period” Department mentioned general lines of above paragraphs and stressed need for concrete start separate from UN developments, pointing also to Formosa’s condition that mutual cessation hostilities must precede any tangible accomplishment. Barrington’s personal reaction was that contact might be feasible if limited to military men discussing practical problems and outside diplomatic channels.

Barrington and U Kyin had envisaged Monghsat group withdrawal to Thai border which almost adjacent Monghsat, and disarmament at border. Indicated GOB felt it important not slacken operations during presumptive negotiations but believed if KMT were engaged in clearcut withdrawal no more than token operations would be necessary.

Dulles

1. Repeated to Taipei, Bangkok, and USUN.
2. U Kyin, Burmese Ambassador to India, was in the United States as a member of the Burmese Delegation at the U.N. General Assembly.
3. Document 61.