Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–1354: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

top secret
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Paris, August 13, 1954—1 p.m.

614. Reference Department telegram 552.² I saw Mendes-France this morning and went over with him carefully the first six numbered paragraphs of reference telegram. He replied as follows to each paragraph:

1. He stated that his position, as outlined to me yesterday, did not constitute a new delaying tactic. He said he was moving just as rapidly as he could to obtain ratification. He said that the situation in the French Parliament was very difficult on this subject, and that his present best estimate was that there were between 300 and 310 votes against EDC as of now. He stated he felt that even with such changes as might be agreed upon at Brussels, there would still probably not be a majority for EDC unless it was possible to show that France’s decision in favor of EDC is a peaceful one and does not shut the door on negotiations. He feels that only by placing the ratification of EDC in a context where it is used to force the Russians to show their cards and to put them “au pied du mur” can ratification be assured. He repeated what he had said yesterday that two or three of the anti-EDC Ministers in his Cabinet had said that on this basis and this basis only would they support and vote for EDC.

2. Mendes said he was not proposing to hold another meeting with the Russians. What he was proposing was to make such a reply to the Soviet notes as would force them to clarify their position. In order to clear the way for another meeting he repeated what he had said yesterday that the Russians must give clear proof of their good intentions by proposing something new. He then mentioned the three subjects listed at the end of the first draft of the working group’s paper, i.e., agreement to sign an Austrian treaty, or agreement on free elections in Germany, or real progress on disarmament. He emphasized that the Russians must give such clear proof before a new meeting could be called and if they made no such concessions there would be no meeting as far as he was concerned. He then said that he is not deferring action on EDC. He said he is proceeding as he had planned and will put EDC to the French Assembly as a question of confidence in his government. In other words, he will stake the existence of his government on passing the EDC, and therefore he wants to have some chance of a successful result.

3. Mendes said he could not understand how Department arrived at the line of thinking contained in this paragraph. He said he is not in favor of a neutralized Germany. He also said that he had always felt, and still feels that Germany, whether united or not, must be politically and militarily tied to the West.

4. Mendes said he felt that if the French Assembly should reject the EDC, Adenauer would be in grave difficulties in Germany. However, if the French Assembly should pass EDC, he felt that this could only result in strengthening Adenauer’s position. He further said that if he could arrive at a Franco-German agreement at Brussels and have this agreement ratified by the French Assembly, he thought it would strengthen both his own and Adenauer’s positions, and in this respect their interests were identical.

5. Mendes said he fully agreed that there was no present evidence that the Soviets are prepared to make any of the concessions required. He referred to his talk with Molotov at Geneva³ which had been wholly negative in this respect. He said that this is why he is not prepared to go to a four-power meeting under the present circumstances. In order for him to change his mind regarding a meeting, he would have to have (1) passage of EDC in first reading by the National Assembly and (2) a new proposal from the Russians equivalent to the acceptance of one of the three alternatives proposed in the last draft of the working group paper.

6. Mendes said he was afraid that the US over-estimated his personal prestige when it came to the difficult decision of EDC. He said that discussions in the Cabinet showed that his personal prestige did not count for much in this matter. He asked me to emphasize to Washington the extreme difficulty of the Parliamentary situation regarding ratification. He said again that if the treaty came to a vote as is, it would certainly be rejected. He said that such rejection would, he was afraid, put an unbearable strain on the Western alliance, and therefore, his whole effort was directed to finding a way to achieve ratification. He then re-emphasized the fact that his proposal did not contemplate deferring the entry into force of EDC and stated that in any event, French ratification process would be completed before that of Italy. He emphasized that what was important was the decision of the French National Assembly on first reading. He said that after the Assembly had once voted, everyone will know where France stands. He said he is hopeful that constitutional reform will be enacted before consideration by the Assembly on second reading, and will remove the right of the Senate to require a constitutional majority on second reading in the National Assembly. He also is hopeful that there will not be a constitutional majority against the EDC in the Senate. In any event he emphasized that he felt that the decision of the French Assembly on first reading would show the world where France stood and would be a great step toward clarification of the international situation.

After completing this response to reference telegram, Mendes reiterated the difficulty of his Parliamentary situation. He said that of the 59 Socialists who were against EDC, only 7 would change their position as a result of the action of the party congress. He said that he might get another 2, 3 or 4 to change their positions for personal reasons but that at least 48 Socialist votes would be cast against ratification. He would also lose a very substantial number of votes on the right. The total of what he would lose would be far larger than what he could gain from the MRP. He reiterated that he felt that the most telling argument for ratification, and in fact the vital argument, will be that the Russians must be forced to show their cards and that the only way to achieve this result is for France to ratify EDC.

In order to make sure that there had been no misunderstanding, I showed Mendes a copy of Embassy telegram 603⁴ which he read with care. He said that it accurately reflected his position with one slight exception. This is, that he does not propose to answer the Russian note “around the first of September” but rather during the first 10 days of September, and specifically after the French Parliament goes on vacation.⁵

Dillon

1. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.
2. Supra.
3. Documentation on the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina is presented in volume xvi .
4. Dated Aug. 12, p. 1026.

5. In telegram 630 from Paris, Aug. 13, Dillon reported that Reilly had told Parodi, based on instructions from London, that Prime Minister Churchill wished to associate himself with the remarks which Dillon had made to Mendès-France, as reported in the source text (740.5/8–1354).

   In telegram 566 to Paris, Aug. 13, Dulles stated that the United States was far from reassured by Mendès-France’s explanations, but that for the time being did not think it would be useful to approach him again (740.5/8–1354).