Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–1254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

top secret
niact

Washington, August 12, 1954—11:26 p.m.

552. For Ambassador from Secy. Mendes-France’s plans as reported urtel 603² have deeply shocked and disheartened me. I am most anxious that he fully understand their implications as I see them before taking any irrevocable action. Accordingly, please convey to him the following points from me.

1. Mendes-France has said that he would obtain French decision on question of German rearmament before adjournment of present assembly this summer. In our own plans and in our presentations to Congress, we have relied on this assurance and I have said I believed this assurance reliable. To impose a new delaying condition prior to completion of ratification process will be considered by all concerned here as final evidence that the last hope has proved vain.

2. The proposal to hold still another meeting with Soviets before completion ratification will be considered here as further proof of French unreliability. Berlin meeting, which was intended to satisfy European opinion that the West was seeking in every possible way to reduce tension clearly demonstrated Soviet fundamental purpose to block EDC and destroy defenses of West. If Mendes-France now proposes defer final action on EDC pending still another meeting, this country will be convinced that France cannot be counted on as a reliable partner able to reach decisions.

3. Implications of Mendes-France’s position as outlined to you are equally serious. It would undermine very basis of Franco-American relations and future of NATO alliance. His position seems to me to amount to this: That France is prepared to abandon EDC if Soviets will agree to unify Germany by free elections. This can only mean that France is prepared to agree to neutralize Germany as basis for unification. A neutralized Germany will completely destroy NATO defense plans. Military experts agree that no effective defense strategy can be based on a Europe from which Germany has been excluded. Consequently, if Mendes-France submits to Assembly views outlined to you he will be offering to sacrifice the basis of Western security for German unity. You also know our firm conviction that an attempt to neutralize unified Germany will be illusory and seriously menace European stability and security. This thesis has been keystone of Western policy. The Mendes-France proposal would split basic Western position and solidarity, thereby providing Soviets with opportunity they have sought for years.

4. Finally Mendes-France’s proposal would probably destroy Adenauer. Opponents his European policy will exploit Mendes-France proposal as supporting their thesis that German unity should have priority over EDC. Evidence French acceptance this thesis and further delay in EDC ratification will dismay his supporters and breed further disillusion regarding French intentions.

5. US remains firmly convinced that our common European policy is basic to Western security. This policy was clearly presented at Berlin. There is not slightest evidence that Soviets are prepared to accept German solution consistent with that security. Indeed their August 4 note states that under present conditions it is not possible to agree on solution of basic questions in Germany and merely holds out prospect of agreement on less important issues. If, as Mendes-France seems to feel, the Soviets may make some dramatic offer in near future, it will be soon enough to deal with that when it comes. The West should certainly not do its cause needless damage in advance.

6. It is of course not for me to pit my judgment of French political situation against that of Mendes-France. I feel, however, that he may perhaps under-estimate his own standing and prestige. It is my belief that respect which his decisive actions have won him abroad must also be reflected in French domestic opinion. If this is so, I believe that his forthright support of EDC, based on the fundamental reasons for its soundness, would carry the day despite determined opposition.

7. Note for Embassy London. Present these views urgently to British at highest level available in effort to secure their support of similar démarche to Mendes-France before noon Friday.³

Dulles

1. Drafted by Merchant and Bowie. Cleared by Tyler of EUR. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.
2. Supra.
3. In telegram 616 from Paris, Aug. 13, Dillon reported that the British Chargé, Reilly, who initially had no instructions to support the United States démarche, had been able to secure authorization from the Foreign Office “to express to Quai d’Orsay first reactions of official level of Foreign Office to the effect that London was ‘disappointed, anxious and alarmed’ by what Mendes-France had said to Dillon and Reilly yesterday”. (740.5/8–1354)