Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

CFM files lot M 88, box 166 “NATO Ministerial Meeting Paris 1953”

Statement by the Secretary of State to the North Atlantic Council ¹

secret

Paris, December 14, 1953.

Mr. President and Members of the Council. I am very glad at your invitation, Mr. President, to take this opportunity to complete the statement which I made this morning² by giving my impressions about our work here in NATO and the future prospects.

These annual meetings provide us with an opportunity to see our achievements and our tasks of the future in proper dimensions. We have, I think, concluded that the risk of Soviet armed aggression in Europe is less likely today than it seemed several years ago. That change is in good part due to the fact that through NATO we have stood together and we have built together, but also we are forced to conclude that the Soviet threat persists and probably will long persist. We know too that atomic weapons make that threat potentially more serious than was visualised when this Organization was formed. These facts confront us with a dual task. We must maintain and develop unity as a permanent condition rather than as an emergency device. Also we must constantly adapt our Organization to changing military potentials. There is always a danger that a coalition may relax and lose its cohesion if the peril ceases to seem imminent. That is what the Soviet leaders say they hope will happen. They openly proclaim their intention to promote our disunity by all the means at their command. In their view basic historical forces are working for them. They forecast that the Western scene will soon again be dominated by its traditional strife; then will come what both Stalin and Lenin have defined as the moment for the decisive blow. That should warn us, but do we really need that warning from that source? Even if the Soviet threat were totally to disappear would we be blind to the danger that the West may destroy itself? Surely there is an urgent, positive duty on all of us to seek to end that danger which comes from within. It has been the underlying cause of two world wars and it will be disastrous if it persists. We owe that duty not only to ourselves but to the cause of Western civilization which today is entrusted to our keeping. I recall that the Treaty under which we act commits us to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples. That is a noble cause which deserves our dedication. For many centuries Western civilization has been a productive and a creative force. Its faith has emphasized the spiritual nature and the worth of the individual and that has led to bringing increased dignity to womankind and to ending human slavery and bondage. Thus the West has been an uplifting force.

Politically the West has promoted government by consent. In many areas it has painstakingly developed the qualities which are necessary if self-rule is to be a blessing rather than a danger. The widespread peaceful evolution of our time towards increasing self-government marks the fruition, not the failure of Western ideals. Economically the West has been inventive. Its people have found ways to multiply many times the productivity of workers in both industry and agriculture. This has made it possible for many people to live and to live longer and live better. Intellectually the West has shared its own knowledge and stimulated the quest for new knowledge. Missionaries, educators, doctors, scientists and technicians have spread the ideals and practised a spiritual and intellectual freedom. How comes it that a civilisation which has so broadly advanced human welfare can now be seriously challenged by those who, beneath a veneer of sanctimonious theory, reproduce the degradation and exploitation of the Dark Ages? The answer is that the nations which have long led the West have so repeatedly fought each other that they have sapped their own vitality and diminished their authority and their prestige in the world. If the West cannot now build a safer home for its civilisation, then its statesmanship will be judged bankrupt and men everywhere will look elsewhere for leadership. What I say is nothing new. Every Western statesman of this generation has expressed that conviction. The West has immense potential strength but greater unity is necessary if that strength is to meet the challenge of our times. Such unity must take various forms responding to the differing needs and conditions. On the Continent an integrated European Community is essential to solve the problems of that area and also to provide a solid core for the wider Atlantic Community. These two structures will differ but they must be built together. Each is vital to the success of the other and each today, happily, is in fact being built. European leaders have created notable measures to advance the cause of union, the OEEC, and EPU, the Coal and Steel Community and the projected Defense and Political Communities. The American people have followed closely all of these projects. Some of our friends seem to think that we are only interested in the military aspects of the matter, that all we want to see is a recruiting of German forces. Of course, we do believe that it would be folly for the West to ignore any contribution that the German people could make to the common defence, but to portray the American people as interested only in German rearmament is totally false and a cruel caricature of the fact. The United States is primarily interested that European civilisation should survive and prosper—that cannot be without a European Community in which will be combined indissolubly the interests and the capacities of two great nations at the heart of Europe—France and Germany.

It would be difficult for me to exaggerate the anxiety with which our people await the consummation of this historic act. Also we have been more than mere observers. Our concern has been demonstrated through membership here in NATO, through close co-operation with the OEEC, through vast material contributions for economic aid and the stationing in Europe of substantial ground and air forces with strong naval support. Much has been done to make Western Europe a healthy and co-operating area but decisive steps remain to be taken. These steps must involve something more than treaties between sovereign states. Mere promises for the future are not enough to bury a past so replete with bitter memories. The need is for Europe to move onward to more complete and organic forms of union. Some profess to fear that if the European Defence Community is established then the United States will abandon military support of Europe. That is a baseless fear. At Bermuda, President Eisenhower joined with Prime Minister Churchill and the President of the French Council, M. Laniel, to say that if the European Defence Community is created within the framework of the Atlantic Community and I quote “it will ensure intimate and durable co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States forces and the forces of the European Defence Community on the Continent of Europe.”³ If, however, the European Defence Community should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart so that they will again be potential enemies then there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonising reappraisal of basic United States policy. If Western Europe is to develop a political, economic and military unity which includes France and Germany, that must happen soon. There are powerful forces which are now at work to draw together the six nations of the Community and Britain and the United States stand ready to supply their firm support. Unless unity is achieved soon different and divisive forces may take command. These separatist forces will also be found in the United States. It may never again be possible for integration to occur in freedom although it might be that West Europe would be unified as East Europe has been unified in defeat and servitude. French statesmanship with strong support that includes Germany, has brought the project of the Defence Community out of the stage of nebulous planning and into the concrete treaty which is now on the verge of realisation. None of us ignore the difficulties which surround the taking of the final steps, none of us ignore the fact that the EDC Treaty raises new problems for the future, but also we see that the Treaty will end a relationship that breeds suicidal strife, and create a new relationship that promises lasting peace. The EDC Treaty, despite possible inadequacies, decisively poses a fateful choice. The United States, and I believe all the world, see it as a symbol of Europe’s will to make it possible to achieve our common goal, of safeguarding our freedom, our common heritage and the civilisation of our people. The creation of a European Defence Community is part of the task, also it is our conviction that we must make an enduring unity of this Atlantic alliance. That conviction is deep and strong with us. Even with the tremendous up-surge of strength which achievement of top-level unity would give it, our Atlantic area would not be impregnable without the close co-operation of all the NATO countries of Europe and North America. We in the United States know that we need the added strength which Western Europe can alone provide, and I am confident that others feel the same need. EDC and NATO complement and reinforce each other; the two can create reasonable insurance against war.

Let me turn now to NATO and our NATO problems. First of all we can observe gladly that NATO already possesses strength. It has gone far since it began. Three years ago this month, when General Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, he had available to him less than fifteen combat effective divisions. The weakness in air and naval forces were [was] equally appalling. Today, General Gruenther and Admiral McCormick have available approximately eighty divisions in varying states of effectiveness, and there is very substantial growth in air and naval craft. President Eisenhower, who has had some experience in these matters, believes that the NATO troops now present create a formidable problem to any aggressor.

In the second place, we have here developed fellowship. Fourteen nations have here found the habit of working together. Our Annual Review is an institution which is unique in the history of alliances. Never before in peacetime have sovereign nations opened the top secret documents of their ministries of defence to the scrutiny of other countries, no matter how closely they were allied. Never before have nations taken recommendations from an international body concerning the length of military service, balance of forces between military services and other equally delicate problems, and, what is even more revolutionary, accepted these recommendations, often in the face of contrary domestic political considerations. In this connection I want to pay tribute to Lord Ismay and his staff for their vital contribution to the task of welding our Alliance. Again we are breaking new ground by the creation of a group of public servants who owe their allegiance not to any one of our fourteen member countries but to all of us collectively. It is their difficult responsibility to look at matters of vital national interest from the viewpoint of the Alliance as a whole and to provide leadership and imagination in reconciling national and collective interests. Under the wise guidance of our Secretary General they are discharging their tasks admirably.

In the third place, NATO is more than a military organ. This is an important fact. I recall that Senator Vandenberg, whose Senate resolution initiated the idea of American participation in this Alliance, said “NATO cannot survive unless it becomes more than just a military alliance”. Believing that, we have watched with great interest, and we have encouraged the close contact which our Permanent Representatives have maintained here in Paris with reference to the political aspects of foreign policy, and as a concrete example I mention that during the successive exchange of Notes with the Soviet Union in the past months we and our British and French colleagues have benefited greatly from the points of view expressed by our NATO partners.⁴ United States favours developing the non-military aspects of our task.

And in the fourth place, I would say that NATO has achieved a sustainable basis. Our studies convince us that the members of NATO can provide the resources for an adequate defence, including a wide range of new weapons, and at the same time permit a steady improvement in the living standards and general welfare of our peoples. To do this, we must put our military expenditures on a sound basis which we can sustain consistently with steady economic and social advance. And let us not forget that that itself is a security measure—it nullifies Communist subversive efforts against the free zones; also, it creates a striking contrast with despotism and thus confronts the Soviet rulers with a dilemma at home.

And in the fifth place, let me make clear that United States stands ready to do its part in carrying out the tasks which lie ahead. We are trying to play our proper role in building our common defence, and in that connection I will mention certain specific items. We have contributed our forces to those under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. From our production we have provided a major share of the equipment required for the forces of our Allies. Our Congress has appropriated 14½ billion dollars for military aid to Europe, by far the greater part of which has been aid to NATO. In this connection I shall have to note that the sum I mention, 14½ billion, includes funds appropriated for the current fiscal year. 50% of this current amount, which is designed for the military strengthening of prospective members of the EDC, can be made available only to the EDC itself. That is what Congress prescribed. Some 3 billion dollars of the 14½ billion mentioned is being spent for the production of equipment from European plans. This helps both to arm NATO forces in Europe and at the same time provide dollars to strengthen their economies. We can, I hope, say that we have been a good ally, and I can assure you that we intend to continue as such. We have considered carefully the recommendations of the International Staff with respect to the improvement of United States forces committed to NATO. As our Secretary of Defence, Mr. Wilson, will report to your later, we are prepared to go a long way to meet these recommendations.⁵ In addition to our contribution to the defence of Europe, we are taking steps for the defence of the North American continent, which you will recall is part of the NATO area. In this matter we are acting in close co-operation with Canada. You will recall that this Council on December 17, 1952, approved a Military Committee recommendation that it was necessary to provide a degree of protection for the essential elements of North American war-making capacity. It was at that time pointed out that by 1956—I hope it will not be sooner—that by 1956 the Soviet Union might have a formidable atomic potential against North America and, I quote from the report, “adequate defence for this area thus becomes essential in order to permit NATO to accomplish its military objectives”. The temptation to aggression would be great if the aggressor could, by an initial blow, knock out the industrial power of North America. We recognise that no feasible defence against strong air attack could prevent serious damage to our cities and industries. This was stressed by President Eisenhower in his address of last week to the United Nations.⁶ However, it is possible to secure a substantial measure of protection and thus ensure our capacity to retaliate massively; that capacity we believe could not be destroyed. We believe that the measures which will prevent that destruction, reduce the likelihood of war because they assure the deterrent effect of immense capacity to retaliate upon any aggressor against our Alliance. One of the essential tasks ahead is to increase the effectiveness of NATO forces by the gradual replacement of outmoded weapons with new and better weapons. The United States is prepared to do its share in attaining this objective. We included in our 1954 request to the Congress, funds to finance a contribution towards further modernising the equipment of NATO forces, using weapons developed both by us and our allies. We expect to continue this policy in requests for funds for the coming fiscal year. We accept the fact that financial and material contributions from the United States may for some time continue to be necessary if NATO forces in Europe are to be maintained at a high state of combat efficiency. We expect, however, that this contribution can steadily decrease as European economic strength increases. We are fully prepared, furthermore, to review our contributions during the course of future Annual Reviews.

There has been a great deal of speculation about the impact of new weapons, particularly tactical atomic weapons, on the NATO defence programme. This is a field in which we must rely upon our military advisers and I know that they are finding it difficult to come up with precise answers to problems concerning which there has been no actual military experience. There are, however, certain things which the United States can do to make their task easier. To this end, the President has decided to ask Congressional authority to make available to NATO more information about atomic weapons. This additional information, we are convinced, will help our military advisers to perform the new task which is proposed for them, namely to provide us with a new statement of requirements of NATO forces. This reference to requirements leads me to make this observation. NATO must, in all of its military planning, take account of the need of sound economies. The determination of military requirements is an important and an essential task. However, no nation and no alliance has ever provided in peacetime all the forces that its military commanders would like to have. In deciding on the actual forces to be made available, we must take account of various other factors. We must balance the cost of adequate military security with the capability of a strong economy to pay the bill, and this must all be reckoned, not on the basis of a short all-out effort for a limited period of time, but for the long pull, not knowing when, if ever, the critical moment may appear. It means the creation of a flexible and continually modernised system of defence and the control of its costs within limits which we can long afford to maintain. We all in NATO must assure our security, not only for today, but for tomorrow and thereafter and for as long as may be required until the way is found to real and lasting world-wide peace. And I must also add this thought, in all of our planning here we must remember that the East also has its claim. Stalin proclaimed that the East was, as he put it, “the road to victory and the West”. The military contributions made and to be made by NATO nations in that area deserve sympathetic recognition here; I refer particularly to France. By next spring, when we shall presumably meet again, historic decisions will have been taken which may substantially affect the character of our task and open up new possibilities. These possibilities in part reside within the European Defence Community, in part they reside within the framework of our own Treaty Organization, in part they reside within the larger framework of the United Nations Charter. I need hardly remind you that the United States seeks not merely regional strength, but it seeks global security.

President Eisenhower last week expressed to the General Assembly of the United Nations the hopes and the aspirations of the American people, and I think that they are the same as the hopes and the aspirations of all the peoples. He invited all who possess atomic weapons to sit down together, in whatever privacy may be useful, in order, as he put it, “to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death but consecrated to his life”. He suggested practical ways by which this change could come about. I can assure you that the United States pledges itself to work unceasingly, not merely on the negative though essential task of defence, but also on the creative efforts which will permanently dispel the danger. Freedom derives its greatest security from the capacity of free men constantly to improve their environment by inventive thinking and applied effort. In this respect there lies before us in Continental Europe, in the North Atlantic area and, I like to think, in the whole world, a vista of promise. We work here as we must work on the daily tasks, we can draw strength from the prospect that when next we meet it will be in strengthened fellowship and with new hope.

1. The source text is an extract from the verbatim record of the afternoon session, C–VR(53)54, a copy of which is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, “NATO Ministerial Meeting Paris, 1953”. Another text of Dulles’ statement was released to the press following the session. It is the same in substance as the source text, except for the omission of the five points on NATO and numerous minor textual differences. A copy is printed in the New York Times, Dec. 15, 1953, p. 14.
2. Regarding Dulles’ statement in the morning session, see paragraph 3 to Secto 4, supra.
3. For the text of the communiqué of the Bermuda Conference, see p. 1838.
4. Documentation on the notes under reference here is presented in volume vii .
5. Regarding Secretary Wilson’s statement, see Secto 7, Dec. 16, p. 471.
6. Documentation on President Eisenhower’s speech at the United Nations on Dec. 8 on the peaceful uses of atomic energy is presented in volume ii .