Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/12–1553: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State ¹

secret

Paris, December 15, 1953—11 a.m.

Secto 4. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting²

Item II—Consideration International Political Situation.

1. At close Monday a.m. session UK Foreign Minister congratulated staff on valuable Soviet trends paper,³ noted as yet no real evidence Soviet basic hostility changed, but tactics more flexible, perhaps more intelligent. In building up NATO as deterrent force thanks is due to US for weapons, indispensable and generously given. NATO alliance must take stock of what high quality forces can be maintained with up-to-date equipment over period of years, maintain lead in new weapons, at earliest date get German defense contribution through EDC.

2. Turkish Foreign Minister urged NATO to recognize Soviet change tactical, their arms build-up continuing. He, in role Cassandra, noted peace offensive began only after Korea and NATO build-up. NATO countries should give priority to defense build-up, and find solutions on economic front through NATO and OEEC. NATO, through united efforts, should fill gaps and build up vulnerable points. Turkey hoped for an EDC as soon as possible and welcomed possibility of a Trieste solution.⁴

3. US Secretary State then outlined an analysis of Soviet position noting at outset according estimates Soviet Union not likely initiate immediate attack, which gratifying, if true. NATO should use breathing spell not to stop, but to strengthen unity. As background for estimates Soviet trying satisfy domestic front by internal measures re agriculture, more consumer goods. Also has problem re discontent in satellites which has direct military bearing (i.e., lines of communication) and handling relations with Communist China. Although Soviet has made great progress in atomic weapons development, NATO world has large quantitative superiority. On foreign policy front Soviet trying maintain status quo on Germany, Austria, Korea and attempting create division among western allies. President Eisenhower’s recent proposal at UN⁵ another US effort to bring about concerted action, but initial Soviet reaction unfavorable.

4. Reconvening in PM session Secretary State made key speech (copies by airmail) on need for European community as solid core to an Atlantic community.⁶ He underlined US interest and participation in development of European unity, and US hope in early realization of EDC; US conviction of importance of NATO not only as a military force but as growing fellowship among 14 nations and forum for exchange of views. He then touched on US contribution in men, matériel and funds, careful consideration being given to annual review recommendations (on which Mr. Wilson would report more fully under Item V⁷) new importance of air defense of North American Continent, and related AR matters. Secretary State informed Council President has decided to ask congressional authority to provide NATO more information on atomic weapons.

5. Danish Foreign Minister stressed need for expanding Western European economy on long-term basis. He called forthcoming Big-Four meeting decisive step in relexation tension and believed, if it failed, then there would hopefully be no doubt in his people’s mind where blame lay. If no progress on Germany was made, EDC then of particular importance.

6. Italian Pella then made plea for equality of Bermuda⁸ and non-Bermuda powers and cited forward steps in council consultation. NATO must face Soviet with dynamic common front. At Berlin, if it takes place, Germany, settlement of Austrian state treaty issues should be solved.

7. Norwegian Foreign Minister supported US representative in his praise of permanent council activity, shared Danish views on Big-Four meeting, underlined importance of EDC as only way to raise German defense contribution so vital to protection Norway’s southern flank.

8. Belgian Foreign Minister expressed general views risk is global matter, did not favor stopping military effort but should seek to negotiate guarantees. He expressed full support for Eisenhower UN proposal, EDC, and entrusted Big-Three with Berlin negotiations in “name of NATO alliance”.

9. Canadian Foreign Minister expressed strong support for EDC, touched on North American continental defense as part of NATO defense, but indicated Canada would not cut back on its commitments to Western Europe.

10. Greek Foreign Minister said Berlin talks of great interest.

11. French Foreign Minister pulled out all stops re difficulties facing France in ratification EDC, citing Indochina drain, and need for presence of allies as balancing factor. (Alluding to his opening speech in Secto 1.⁹) If all French forces in Indochina back, he noted, progress on EDC might be easier.

12. Italian Pella then noted Italy has given full support to EDC concept over past three years, but ratification discussions are now difficult as long as Trieste unresolved. He did not want to raise Trieste issue at such delicate moment in negotiations. Italy nevertheless fully subscribes to need for policy of European integration.

Bidault, in concluding Item II discussion, called for next session December 15, 11 a.m.¹⁰

1. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Bonn, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.
2. Paragraphs 1–3 complete the report on the first session in the morning of Dec. 14; for a report on the earlier part of this session, see Secto 3, supra.
3. A copy of C–M(53)164, “Report on Trends of Soviet Policy, April to December, 1953”, dated Dec. 5, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 171.
4. Documentation on Trieste is presented in volume viii .
5. Documentation on President Eisenhower’s speech at the United Nations on Dec. 8 regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy is presented in volume ii .
6. Paragraphs 4–12 of Secto 4 cover the afternoon session which was held at 3:30 at the Palais de Chaillot. A verbatim record of this session, C–VR(53)54, is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, “NATO Ministerial Meeting Paris, 1953”. The full text of Secretary Dulles’ speech, in which he stated inter alia that if EDC did not become effective, it “would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy”, is printed infra.
7. Item V: Final Report on the 1953 Annual Review; regarding the discussion of this item, see Secto 7, Dec. 16, p. 471.
8. For documentation on the meeting of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Dec. 4–8, at Bermuda, see pp. 1710 ff.
9. Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 169)
10. For a report on the third session, on the morning of Dec. 15, see Secto 5, Dec. 15, p. 469.