Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/9–1853: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret

Washington, October 15, 1953—7:43 p.m.

Topol 361. This is a State–Defense–FOA–BOB–Treasury message. Reference: Poltos 410 and 312.² Subject: Basic issues in AR.

1. UK Embassy has informally requested bilateral talks on basic issues we face in NATO AR. They see no further buildup (except German) over next few years and conclude we must concentrate on maintaining present level of forces, with less emphasis upon ultimate requirements and more on effectiveness of NATO as deterrent.

2. UK approach and issues you raised in Polto 410 discussed September 25 by Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Director FOA, Director Bureau of Budget, and Chairman JCS.³ There was general agreement that NATO needs new concept in order to provide basis for continuing present level of defense effort which all member countries are contributing to Organization. Without such new concept, there was danger that there would be substantial relaxation of defense measures and consequent weakening of alliance; at best, NATO would continue to drift and there would be no sense of enthusiasm or purpose in its activities. It was agreed that British were groping for such concept but that they had not yet hit upon right formulation.

3. Agreement was reached that it is of great importance to preserve our present gains in buildup and to maintain momentum established to date. This was viewed principally as matter of maintaining forces agreed to date, continuing improvement of these forces, and securing such moderate additions to present force levels as can be agreed as those which appear within countries’ capability to raise and maintain.

4. Finally, there was also agreement that interagency working group should be established to consider these matters further and report back to principals. At suggestion of Admiral Radford, it was also agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should first submit their views on this problem.

5. General U.S. position in NATO must derive from over-all reexamination of U.S. objectives and strategy nearing completion in NSC.⁴ U.S. concept of defense of NATO area is important segment of this whole picture. JCS views which are essential element of this concept will be forthcoming shortly and can then be considered in NSC or interdepartmental working group. Thereafter effort may be made to concert if possible US–UK approaches. Meanwhile USRO must proceed on basis of current assumptions and objectives re NATO AR. UK has been advised that U.S. views on reply to Makins under intensive study in Washington.

6. Thus, impossible at this time give you definitive guidance on all basic issues involved in 53 AR. However, can dispose of certain specific issues raised Polto 410 and suggest general line to be taken over next few weeks.

a. It is our considered judgment that establishment of preliminary 1956 force goals for planning purposes, thoroughly qualified to reserve positions of each government for future re-evaluation, is an essential part of 1953 Annual Review to be conducted in December. Continuation into 1954 of a situation where the only future guides for NATO force planning beyond 1955 are requirements that are generally recognized to be unattainable by considerable margin, or on other hand conclusion of 1953 Annual Review without establishing any planning force goals for 1956, would in either event contribute to the weakening of cohesion and sense of continuing combined strength and of affirmative direction for NATO.

In establishing the preliminary 1956 force goals, thoroughly qualified with all due reservations, it is our policy that each country should reach its conclusion without concentrated pressure during the AR process, and in the light of over-all security plans of NATO and a consideration of future economic prospects. In such consideration continuing economic or budget support assistance from U.S. during Fiscal Year 1955 to NATO members should not be anticipated, with possible exception of very moderate amounts for Turkey and Greece on the basis of their present armed force establishment and defense effort, and with further provision of Indochina aid for France. It is further anticipated that moderate amount of continuing end-item assistance for initial equipment, maintenance, replacement and modernization will be provided by U.S. but in amounts reduced from present levels, and with emphasis on establishment of defense production base in Europe to provide non-dollar sources of major portion of maintenance, replacement, and modernization requirements.

With this as background you should stress in NAC constructive value of present NATO buildup and high value of a sustained buildup within reasonable economic-political capabilities. It is apparent that long-lead time involved in presentations of budgets, planning of procurement, development of training and equipment programs, all require that preliminary 1956 goals must be set now even though they must and will be re-evaluated and modified during next year.

b. Entirely agree your proposed emphasis on economic and defense gains to date. Would appreciate your appraisal of prospect for getting helpful statements on economic prospects in OEEC report and NATO AR report, and any recommendations for action Washington might take to help. Re military progress are considering possibility of proposing recast of Trends in Soviet policy paper⁵ to include review NATO progress to date, effectiveness of NATO as deterrent and continuance of deterrent at least over short run while buildup continues. Your views this suggestion requested.

c. Standing Group is proceeding with preparation of a paper on 1956 force requirements for use in 1953 Annual Review. Paper is prepared on basis of forces in MC 26/2⁶ as general order of magnitude for SACEUR portion of 1956 requirements and of Estimates of Situation for Force Requirements for 1956 submitted by SACLANT and CHANCOM. This paper will serve as a basis for Estimate of the Risk submitted by the Military Committee to the Council for consideration in the 1953 Annual Review and for use in initial stages of the 1954 Annual Review. The U.S. position on requirements must await completion of process outlined in paragraph 5 above.

7. Realize that you will be pressed for certain answers during continuance second-round discussion of U.S. submission as reported Polto 459.⁷ We are preparing and hope send shortly general statement on U.S. defense plans and aid intentions.

Smith

1. Secretary Dulles was in London for a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom. Regarding this meeting, see the editorial note, p. 1709. This telegram, which was drafted by Vass and Kranich and M. P. Arth of FOA and cleared with Defense, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget, was also sent to London and Bonn.
2. Neither printed; regarding Polto 410, see footnote 2, supra. Polto 312 from Paris, Sept. 1, transmitted a preliminary proposal for proceeding with the Annual Review. (740.5/9–153)
3. No other record of the meeting on Sept. 25 has been found in Department of State files.
4. Presumably, this is a reference to the NSC 151 and 162 series then under study by the National Security Council. Regarding these documents, see the editorial note, p. 497.
5. Presumably, the paper under reference here is C–M(52)116 Addendum, dated Apr. 16, 1953, prepared for the April NAC meeting. A copy is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 143. Regarding its discussion at the NAC meeting, see Secto 6, Apr. 24, p. 373.
6. Not printed; a copy of this Military Committee report, dated Apr. 24, 1953, is in the NATO Registry files in Brussels.
7. Not printed; it reported that in the second-stage discussion of the United States Annual Review submission the most disturbing element to the examiners was the rotation of U.S. Air Force units resulting in a reduction in the forces based in Europe. (740.5/9–2453)