Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/9–2453

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Washington, September 24, 1953.

Subject:

• Meeting at 4 p.m. on September 25 with Messrs. Humphrey, Wilson, Dodge and Stassen on NATO Force Requirements.

Discussion:

The meeting tomorrow was suggested by Mr. Stassen to discuss certain issues raised in your proposed telegram to Ambassador Hughes on the need for a new approach in developing NATO force requirements. Mr. Merchant has discussed your telegram (Tab A)² and the Stassen redraft (Tab B) with Ambassador Hughes, with the result reported in Polto 410 (Tab C). In the meantime, Ambassador Makins has informally conveyed his Government’s desire to discuss this subject with us, and has indicated the general lines of their thinking (Tab D). Since we must quickly decide what to say to the British, it is proposed that the U.K. note³ serve as the basis for the discussion tomorrow. The other agencies have copies of the U.K. note, and are aware of our intention to discuss it.

The British propose a straightforward approach to the problem of the “gap” between foreseeable NATO forces and requirements. They conclude that no further buildup (except for German forces) is possible over the next few years. Therefore, we should concentrate in the future on preventing decreases in this force (which requires continuation of U.S. aid and OSP), and achieving maximum economies in its maintenance. So far as requirements are concerned, they simply say, “So long as an effective deterrent continues to be provided, the attainment of the full NATO force requirements becomes of less immediate urgency, though they must of course remain, as the ideal military desiderata”.

We are in general agreement on the U.K. formulation of the problem and NATO force prospects over the next couple of years. However, the British approach glosses over two fundamental problems which must be overcome before it becomes acceptable. We must convince our allies that an effective deterrent does exist for the time being, but that in the longer term further buildup will be required, over and above a German contribution. The exact dimensions of this buildup must await formulation of new requirements taking into account the effect of new weapons. But the only source available in the near future for substantially reducing the inevitable “gap” through increased NATO capabilities is a German contribution. A possible approach to these problems is outlined below.

The deterrent problem becomes more manageable when we distinguish the two different senses in which the concept is employed. There is an effective deterrent in the sense that the enemy is discouraged from attempting aggression in the NATO area. There is yet no NATO force capable of holding the entire NATO area in case of attack, i.e. carry out the “forward strategy”. So long as we possess the first kind of deterrent, we have time to complete the buildup; until we have closed the gap between our capabilities and requirements, we may be able to win a war but we cannot carry out the only politically acceptable NATO plan—the forward strategy.

The deterrent against aggression, of course, is the fact that our signing of the NAT made the real threat to NATO an attack on the U.S. The Russian dictators will not rationally launch aggression in the NATO area, unless reasonably confident of ultimate victory, i.e., victory over the U.S.

Until USSR can count on winning in a blitz against the U.S., or in a long war against the U.S., she cannot rationally undertake aggression in the NATO area. The time for aggression comes only when USSR believes she has so far overcome our present atomic and SAC superiority that she can eliminate not one but both of the effective deterrents of NATO today—the U.S. power to retaliate immediately against an attack on the U.S. or free Europe, and the demonstrated power of this country, once aroused, to harness its vast resources to the task of subduing any would-be world conqueror.

If we emphasize to our allies that the U.S. itself faces the greater threat, but, as our own actions show, we are confident in the effectiveness of our two basic deterrents, it should be possible to create a climate of belief in the effectiveness of NATO as a short-run deterrent, despite the shortcoming of the force in Europe as an effective deterrent to ground invasion in Europe. The very fact that the U.S. is not totally mobilized and has adopted a policy of moderate “stretchout” can be used as evidence of our confidence.

In this way we should be able to persuade our allies that the deterrent of U.S. power, harnessed through Article 5, gives precious time to complete the buildup. But this immediately raises the problem of persuading our allies that some further buildup is needed and warrants continued efforts.

The answer lies in the fact that the effectiveness of NATO as a deterrent is a function of our atomic superiority. The deterrent has an effect until such time as Russia possesses the means to so cripple the U.S. through sneak attack that we will be unable to launch the devastating counter blow which likewise would result in their ruin. Given our ability to launch a massive atomic counterattack, it is conceivable that the time may never come when Russia can assume safety from a counter blow. In any event the deterrent is presumably effective until such time as the Kremlin itself decides that it can successfully deliver an initial atomic attack sufficient to saturate our defenses and cripple our potential. When that time comes we may well reach a stalemate in strategic atomic warfare, either de facto or de jure. At that time aggression by conventional or tactical atomic weapons becomes tempting, inviting the taking of greater risks, and Europe is therefore vulnerable unless there is an effective deterrent force in being.

Of course, we are as concerned as our allies with the success of the forward strategy, since our own ultimate security is at stake. Therefore, there should never be a suggestion of a withdrawal to a peripheral strategy, even though our allies must realize that the American people will be increasingly hard to convince if our allies lose all momentum. Instead, the problem is to make the Europeans realize that it is their problem as much as it is ours. They should be made to answer the question: How much of Europe do you wish to hold, rather than liberate? Given the present NATO forces, the alliance can safely count only on holding critical areas in Europe. If our allies would prefer to defend the entire area, that means carrying out the forward strategy. This in turn means a German contribution—swallowing the bitter pill of EDC—and additional effective forces. It should be emphasized that the survival of the Governments (if not the peoples) of our allies depends upon the success of the forward strategy. Should the other deterrents fail or disappear, and the NATO force prove inadequate as a barrier to the aggressor, they do not survive.

It will hardly be possible to create the climate of hope we need unless we can additionally convince our allies that there is a real possibility of closing the force gap. As your telegram indicated, there are ways in which NATO requirements can be brought down within range of capabilities, through more realistic evaluation of enemy capabilities, taking account of counter measures, and more effective utilization of allied resources. Not only are present NATO estimates of Soviet capabilities suspect because of recent developments within the Iron Curtain, but there is also inflation inherent in the approach taken. Account is not taken of allied counter action (i.e. strategic air attack) on the enemy’s capability of waging war in Europe. Since attack in the near future inevitably involves U.S. retaliation, such an estimate is unrealistic. Certainly, the enemy does not evaluate his own capability under such an assumption.

Similarly, there are grounds for believing that we are not planning on the use of our full capabilities. As is pointed out in your telegram, national attitudes as reflected in NATO planning has tended to assume maximum threat at all places at once, and are characterized by a static defense philosophy. In addition, we must shift our sights to 1956 and calculate our force requirements on the basis of our expected capabilities in new tactical weapons at that time. Whether or not we anticipate a stalemate in strategic bombing, we must be prepared to face, and counter, tactical atomic warfare. The truth is that NATO now is aware that political and economic limitations mean that force requirements based solely on the use of conventional weapons are unattainable. We must discover, and promptly, whether the injection of our new weapons’ capability eliminates this dilemma. Agreement to provide the necessary information and instructions on new weapons to General Gruenther is urgently necessary and should be considered by the NSC as soon as possible.

Recommendations:

1. Notify Ambassador Makins of our willingness to undertake civilian-military discussions on this subject within the near future.

2. Designate a State–Defense Working Group to prepare a position paper for such a meeting, to be considered by the heads of the attending agencies at a subsequent meeting. The position paper should include a positive program of action in NATO to conclude successfully the 1953 Annual Review, and obtaining Ministerial action in December to assure the development of a new estimate of requirements.

1. The memorandum was drafted by Vass and concurred in by Bowie, Arneson, and Nolting.
2. No tabs were found attached to the source text nor have Dulles’ telegram or Stassen’s redraft been identified further. Polto 410 from Paris, Sept. 18 (740.5/9–1853) confirmed the desirability of proceeding with the 1953 NATO Annual Review on the following basis: (1) concentrate on improving the strength of NATO forces through 1954 and 1955, (2) emphasize economic and defensive gains to date, and (3) agree to press ahead on more fundamental factors affecting NATO’s strategic position and objectives regarding forces that should be created to achieve NATO’s goals.
3. The British note under reference has not been identified further.