600.0012/2–854
The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1
Dear Cabot: We appreciate the problem with which you may be confronted as a result of Molotov’s disarmament proposals in Berlin. However, we would suggest that your rebuttal line be somewhat different from the one you recommend in your letter of February 2.2
The difficulty with a statement that we would agree not to use atomic weapons except in “self-defense” rests in the ambiguity of the term “self-defense”. If, in the event of another Korea, we choose to retaliate directly against the source of aggression with atomic weapons, would that be “self-defense”? This is the type of [Page 1359] situation we have to envisage in the light of Secretary Dulles’ speech of January 123 in which he said:
“… Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. …
“…The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. …”
The Secretary’s speech is, of course, based on recent decisions taken in the National Security Council.
We think the Soviet proposal to outlaw the use of atomic weapons can best be met in the following way. First, we should repeat our past assertion that we will not use atomic weapons or any other type of military force for aggression in violation of our Charter obligations.
Second, what the world wants is agreement on an effective disarmament program, not merely an agreement to give up the use of a particular weapon while continuing to stockpile it. This latter argument has been effective in the United Nations in defeating this type of Soviet proposal, particularly in connection with our own disarmament efforts.
For the time being at least, it would not be possible to ask Vyshinsky why the Soviets did not cooperate with the President’s plan of December 8. The Soviets have not yet rejected that plan, and discussions on it are now going on in Berlin.
As soon as we know what if any decisions are taken on this problem at Berlin, we will, if you agree, elaborate the foregoing suggestions for use by you as appropriate.4
Sincerely,
- Drafted by Popper and Meyers of UNP.↩
- Supra.↩
- For the full text of the speech by Secretary Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York, Jan. 12, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 107–110.↩
On Feb. 9, Lodge responded as follows:
↩“Dear Dave: Thanks for yours of February 8. It is all very sensible. If Vyshinsky raises the question, I will plan an immediate rejoinder as briefly as possible, as follows:
“‘I am delighted to assure the Soviet Representative that, of course, we are glad to agree not to use atomic weapons for aggression or for any other violation of our Charter obligations for that matter, and I hope that he will indicate his willingness immediately to have his country join in a thorough-going international inspection system of all atomic facilities, whether in his country or in my country or in any other country where it is pertinent to do so. While we are glad to agree that we will not use the atomic weapon for aggression or in violation of our Charter obligations, I would point out to him that we wish to go further—that what we seek is an agreement on an effective disarmament program, not merely an agreement to give up the use of a particular weapon while continuing to stockpile it.’” (600.0012/2–954)