Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Atomic Energy”

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Arneson)¹

top secret

Washington, December 3, 1953.

Background Information re United States-United Kingdom Atomic Energy Relations With Particular Regard to the Sharing of Atomic Energy Information

1. The Quebec Agreement, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 19, 1943, which established the basis for wartime collaboration, provided, among other things, “that in view of the heavy burden of production falling upon the United States as the result of a wise division of war effort, the British Government recognize that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be considered by the President of the United States to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world.” More specifically, as regards exchange of information, the Quebec Agreement also provided:

“There shall be complete interchange of information and ideas on all sections of the project between members of the Policy Committee and their immediate technical advisers.

“In the field of scientific research and development there shall be full and effective interchange of information and ideas between those in the two countries engaged in the same sections of the field.

“In the field of design, construction, and operation of largescale plants, interchange of information and ideas shall be regulated by such ad hoc arrangements as may, in each section of the field, appear to be necessary or desirable if the project is to be brought to fruition at the earliest moment. Such ad hoc arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the Policy Committee.”

2. An Aide-Mémoire of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 19, 1944,² stated, among other things, “full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing tube alloys [atomic energy]³ for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.”

3. The successful use of the atomic bomb against the Japanese and the subsequent surrender in early September 1945 caused a new orientation in Anglo-American atomic relationships. The basic document—the Quebec Agreement—on which these relations rested had as its sole object the fruition of the atomic weapon project at the earliest possible moment as a measure of common safety during the war then being waged. The shift from a war to peace-time basis introduced a number of factors which had to be considered in the reorientation of Anglo-American atomic relationships. These were:

(1) The decision of the British to embark upon an atomic production program of their own in the United Kingdom for which they would need to obtain raw materials and industrial know-how.

(2) The realization of the impact of atomic weapon development on international relations and the urgent need to obtain security through international control of the destructive potentialities of the atom.

(3) Consideration of American legislation aimed at domestic control and development of atomic energy.

4. In the course of the Truman–Attlee–King conversations in November 1945, Sir John Anderson, who had accompanied the Prime Minister, met with Secretary of War Patterson and their respective assistants to discuss revision of existing agreements. From these discussions emerged a Memorandum of Intent which was signed by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King on November 16, 1945, stating:

• “(1) The signatories desire there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada;
• “(2) They agreed that CPC and CDT should continue in a suitable form; and
• “(3) They requested CPC to consider and recommend to them appropriate arrangements for this purpose.”^*

5. At subsequent meetings of the Combined Policy Committee efforts were made to work out a new agreement to supersede the Quebec Agreement and an exchange of letters between the President and the Prime Minister to the effect it was considered just and fair, and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world, that there should be no restrictions placed on the Government of the United Kingdom in the nature of development and use of atomic energy for industrial or commercial purposes. The American draft of the proposed new agreement provided that there should be full and effective cooperation between the three governments in regard to the exchange of information required for their respective programs of atomic development. As this draft was being considered by the CPC the American members raised the question of whether under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter it would be necessary to register the revised agreement with the United Nations Secretariat and also the effect the new arrangement, if made public, would have on United Nations negotiations for international control.

6. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom announced that it had decided to construct large-scale reactors for plutonium production in order to provide adequate supplies of fissionable material for use in research and for eventual industrial or military application. This development raised very sharply in the minds of the American representatives the question whether any new arrangement should permit the exchange of information which would facilitate the construction of plutonium producing reactors in a country as exposed as the United Kingdom would be in the event of future hostilities.

7. In order to bring the negotiations to an interim conclusion, the British proposed in April of 1946 that cooperation between the three governments, pending the outcome of the United Nations atomic discussions, should be based on conclusions recorded in the Minutes of the CPC.⁴ The United States members of the Committee, supported by the Canadian member, stated that the United Kingdom proposal did not surmount the difficulty presented by Article 102 of the Charter, since its effect was to change the basis of cooperation established by the Quebec Agreement and, as such, would have to be reported. The United Kingdom members pointed out that this left the Memorandum of Intent, agreed upon by the President and the Prime Ministers on November 16, 1945, without effect. Cooperation was neither full nor effective, and, in particular, the United Kingdom was not receiving the information from the United States it required for the execution of its atomic energy program. The American rejoinder was that nothing should be done which would in any way compromise the success of the discussions within the United Nations. At this juncture negotiations in the CPC were terminated and the matter was referred back to the respective governments.

8. There ensued a lengthy exchange of telegrams between Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman. The Prime Minister took the view that the British, having voluntarily given up work on atomic energy projects in the British Isles during the war, were now entitled to information which would assist them in solving more expeditiously problems impeding the development of the program they had initiated following the conclusion of hostilities. He complained that the Americans appeared willing to cooperate in the raw materials field where substantial benefits accrued to the United States, but that they were far less willing to cooperate in fields where it was felt primarily benefits for the time being would flow from the United States to the United Kingdom. President Truman said he did not understand that the proposal set forth in the November 16 Memorandum of Intent that there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada was intended to mean that the United States was obligated to furnish to the United Kingdom in the post-war period the designs and assistance in construction and operation of plants necessary to building of a plutonium producing reactor. He said that no one had informed him that this was the intent and he had not signed the memorandum with this understanding. He stated that the words “full and effective cooperation” applied only to the field of basic scientific information and were not intended to require the giving of information as to construction and operation of plants whenever it was requested.

9. While the situation remained in this stalemate, the raw materials supply situation was becoming acute. An interim allocation arrangement arrived at in July of 1946 provided that all new ore as it became available for allocation should be split 50–50 between the United States and the United Kingdom, this allocation being made without prejudice to establishing a different basis for allocation in subsequent years. As a result of this, interim allocation stocks were accumulating in the United Kingdom far in excess of current needs, whereas the United States program requirements were not being fully met.

10. In November of 1947 it was decided, after full consultation with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to reopen negotiations with the United Kingdom, the objectives being the following:

(1) Tidy up the war-time agreements.

(2) Secure a disposal of the stockpile in the United Kingdom.

(3) Secure a satisfactory share of Belgian Congo production.

(4) Restrict storage in Britain to the amount which could be used in current projects.

(5) Obtain British support in negotiations for uranium with South Africa.

11. The results of the negotiations are embodied in an agreed Minute of the Combined Policy Committee termed a Modus Vivendi, dated January 7, 1948. The Modus Vivendi has governed United States-United Kingdom-Canadian relations in the atomic energy field from that date to the present. Its principal provisions are:

(1) The Quebec Agreement was superseded.

(2) The Combined Policy Committee was continued as the body for dealing with atomic energy problems of common concern, its powers being as follows:

(a) To allocate raw materials in accordance with such principles as may be determined from time to time by the Committee taking into account all supplies available to any of the three governments.

(b) To consider general questions arising with respect to cooperation among the three governments.

(c) To supervise the operations and policies of the Combined Development Agency (formerly known as the Combined Development Trust).

(3) It was recognized that there were areas of information and experience in which cooperation would be mutually beneficial to the three countries and it was therefore agreed that cooperation should continue in respect of such areas as may from time to time be agreed upon by the CPC and insofar as this is permitted by the laws of the respective countries.

12. Under the Modus Vivendi satisfactory allocations have been made from time to time under which the United States consistently obtains most of the uranium ore available for allocation. British stocks have been reduced to current operating needs and the combined efforts of the two countries in securing additional sources of supply have greatly increased the tonnages available to both the United States and the United Kingdom programs. With respect to exchange of information, 9 areas of cooperation were agreed upon in which exchange of information continues. In practice, the United States has been more restrictive in this exchange than the United Kingdom would like. The inhibiting factor, of course, as far as the United States is concerned is the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

1. A covering memorandum from Arneson to Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State, reads: “Herewith are two copies of ‘Background Information re United States–United Kingdom Atomic Energy Relations with Particular Regard to the Sharing of Atomic Energy Information’ which you asked me to prepare this morning.” The covering memorandum indicates that copies were also sent to Bowie and Merchant. This paper was presumably prepared for the Bermuda Conference.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, pp. 492–493.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. The Combined Policy Committee (CPC) was originally established under the Quebec Agreement to supervise the agreed arrangements for cooperation. The Combined Development Trust (CDT), a body subsidiary to the CPC, was established on June 13, 1944, as a combined ore procurement body. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. For documentation on discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom on atomic energy during 1946, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, pp. 1197 ff.