330.13/9–1453
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)1
top secret
[Washington,] September 14, 1953.
- Subject:
- Urgent Interpretation of NSC Decision on NSC 112/1,2 “Possibility of a New U.S. Disarmament Proposal in the 8th General Assembly.”
Discussion:
- 1.
- The NSC on September 9, with the President and Mr. Dulles absent, approved the subject paper. This recommended that the U.S. introduce in this General Assembly a resolution generally reaffirming appropriate sections concerning disarmament from the President’s April 16 speech, particularly the relationship between progress in political settlements and progress toward disarmament.
- 2.
- Believing that the UN atomic energy control plan needed review, the NSC objected to voicing public U.S. support for it. Consequently, the NSC deleted paragraph 7 (a) (See attached paper).3 This issue was raised by AEC Chairman Strauss, who apparently was unaware his Agency is currently conducting a basic technical review of the UN plan at your request made in August.
- 3.
- The NSC action will prevent us from reaffirming past General Assembly resolutions referring to the UN atomic energy control plan as the basis for control in that field until a better or no less effective system is devised. This concept is in the UN Disarmament Commission’s terms of reference, which the U.S. sponsored. Such omission will immediately be noted by the USSR and our allies, and we can expect public and private queries whether we have changed our support of this concept.
- 4.
- In such event, the U.S. Delegation can reply either that the U.S. adheres to the past position or that it has changed its views. The latter reply, indicated as correct by the NSC action, cannot be supported by any new U.S. views since the AEC has not completed its review.
Recommendations:
- 1.
- You should urgently see Mr. Strauss and explain the untenable position in which we are left by the NSC decision of September 9, as described above.
- 2.
- You should suggest Mr. Strauss may have misunderstood the past U.S. public
position, namely:
- a.
- Any acceptable disarmament system must meet one test, that of effective safeguards to ensure the compliance of all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions and violations.
- b.
- We continue to support our past proposals as sound and effective, but are not inflexible in believing they are necessarily the only ones that would meet these criteria.
- c.
- We are constantly reviewing the disarmament problem; hope others will do likewise; and will seriously examine any promising new proposals made by others or will put forward new ideas as we develop them.
- 3.
- You should explain we are recommending the Secretary include these concepts in his speech, and ask Mr. Strauss’ concurrence.
- 4.
- If Mr. Strauss concurs in these concepts, you should also tell him we will inform the NSC of this language, and of the Department’s belief it is consistent with the NSC action on September 9.
- 5.
- If Mr. Strauss does not agree, we should take the matter up urgently with the President at Denver, because of its importance and because the U.S. Delegation undoubtedly will be queried on this matter before the President’s return. We would expect JCS support of our position.
Concurrence:
- S/AE—Mr. Arneson
- Defense—Adm. H. P. Smith
Non-concurrence:
S/P—Mr. Bowie believes that paragraph 2b should read: “Our past proposals have been designed to meet this test but we are not inflexible in believing they are necessarily the only ones that would meet these criteria.” He also suggests the Department should state its interpretation to the NSC without first securing Mr. Strauss’ agreement.