Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

611.93/12–651

Memorandum by the Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

New Delhi, December 6, 1951.

Subject: Early Observations on India

At lunch before leaving for New Delhi, I promised to give you an early report. I have delayed for several weeks because the situation here is so extremely complex, and because I wanted time to digest the avalanche of ideas, facts and impressions which have been crowding in upon me.

The views that I offer you now are the result of many conversations with our own people, with American newspaper men, officials from other embassies, government ministers, opposition leaders, labor leaders, and businessmen, plus personal visits with innumerable peasants, workers and other ordinary Indian citizens. I offer these views with considerable humility and with the certain knowledge that they will be modified up or down in the coming months.

What about Russia?

The position of the USSR in India has slipped rather substantially. A few years ago most Indian leaders not only admired the material achievements of Russia, but seemed inclined to disregard the ruthless methods through which these gains were accomplished. Soviet brutality was often explained away on the grounds that the Russians have always behaved brutally regardless of who happened to be running the country at any given time.

However, Jan Masaryk’s² inability to compromise with the Soviet Union had a profound effect, and since then mistrust of Russian objectives and dislike for Russian methods have been steadily increasing, recently at an accelerated pace.

Although we are disappointed at India’s attitude on Korea, there are few Indians who doubt that North Korea was the aggressor and that the attack was planned in Moscow. Vishinsky’s initial Paris speech,³ in which he denounced our disarmament proposals, was fully as shocking to people here as to people in other parts of the world.

Every top Indian official with whom I have talked has gone out of his way to condemn the Soviet Union and the Communist approach to economic, social and political problems. Nehru has been most emphatic in his statements to me on two occasions.

However, I do not mean to say that Russia is still not a powerful antagonist of the United States in India. Soviet propaganda is still alarmingly effective, particularly among the young people.

One of their best tools is paper-covered books which are provided free by the Soviet Government to Communist groups who sell them for three or four cents a copy. The proceeds go into the local Communist treasury.

What about the United States?

The attitude of the average Indian toward the United States is much friendlier than we might assume from reading Indian or American newspapers. I have talked to scores of peasants and working people, and I have yet to see anyone whose face did not light up when he heard I was from America. I have drunk many cups of tea in the homes of peasants who have been eager for every snatch of information about our country.

We have accumulated an enormous amount of good will in India over a long period of years. But this does not mean that many Indians are not critical of us, and sometimes bitterly critical.

There are several reasons for our differences. Perhaps the most important lies in India’s geographic position. With her two oceans and the steep Himalayas to the north, India considers herself happily protected from attack. This illogical sense of “security”, plus the overpowering nature of India’s domestic problems, keeps Indian leaders from facing up clearly to the problems with which we are contending. It induces them to rationalize away the danger of a Russian attack, and to tell themselves that the present conflict is at least partly created by our own fears and inexperience.

This, of course, does not add up and I believe that most intelligent Indians are at least subconsciously aware of this fact. Perhaps this explains their extreme sensitivity to American criticism. In all fairness we will do well to remember that the arguments of India neutralists of 1951 bear a striking resemblance to the arguments of many American isolationists of the 1920’s and 1930’s. In fact, the Indians are one up on us! We turned down the League of Nations while they are active in the U.N.

The Indians are intensely sensitive about their new independence. They fear that openly siding with us or accepting any aid with strings will subject India to influences that may impair its independence.

In addition to their uncertainties about the cold war, the Indians are disturbed by the racial prejudices which they are keenly aware still plague many sections of the United States. Perhaps the greatest single success of the USSR in India is the fact that many Indians are convinced that Americans can never accept the colored races as equals.

What about China?

In the coming years the danger from the Chinese Communists is likely to be much greater than from the Russians. In addition to their obvious advantages of geographic and historical relationship, the Chinese are much more skillful in dealing with India than are the Russians.

For instance, the Chinese Cultural Delegation, which is now visiting India, has shrewdly refused to take part in political discussions. As far as we know, the members have had no dealings with the representatives of the Soviet Union.

Several top Indian officials have told me that the Chinese representatives usually start a discussion of Indo-Chinese relations with a speech along the following lines:

“Let us not talk about the Soviet Union. We realize that you do not particularly like Russia or approve of her ways. We ourselves are grateful for the support that Russia has given us. But we assure you that Russia will never dominate China.

“Nor need we waste our time discussing Communism. We realize that you dislike this system of Government, and although we believe your feeling is based on misunderstanding, there is no reason for us to argue about it.

“The most important thing is our relationship to each other. China and India are the two biggest nations in the world. Together we have one-third of all the world’s people.

“Moreover, we are both Asian nations which have been forced for centuries to endure the oppression of the white races. We are both new nations with huge agricultural and industrial problems.

“So let us not argue about politics. Instead, let us work together as friends and neighbors in the solution of the tremendous common difficulties which we both face.”

This speech is dangerously effective because it tells the average Indian exactly what he wants to hear, i.e., that China is not controlled by Russia, that Communism is not particularly important to the Chinese, and that China is seeking only sympathetic understanding and open communications between the two largest Asian nations. The great majority of Indians who are not fellow travelers are deeply disturbed by the brutality with Which the Chinese are seeking to “solve” their problems. But they are inclined to blame these excuses not on Chinese Communism but on the traditional Chinese indifference to human suffering. This neat rationalization, however, is already somewhat less effective than a few months ago.

What if China succeeds?

As you know, reports on what is actually happening to the Chinese economy are contradictory. However, it is dangerous for us to assume that hateful ideas are necessarily unworkable.

We will be wiser, I believe, to base our plans on the probability that within five years the Chinese Communists will have accomplished enough in some areas to provide their propaganda experts with some very persuasive material, and that they will make skillful use of such material.

If in this same period the Indian economy is allowed to stagnate, the contrast between the rosy reports which will be pouring into India from the North and the hard continuing fact of Indian poverty and misery could readily create a most critical situation.

This potential danger may be increased by the long range weakness of Indian leadership. Mr. Nehru and his associates, who have been brought up in our own democratic tradition and who, in spite of our disappointment at some of their actions, are personally dedicated to those traditions, will then be five years older and probably less effective. There are only a few younger men of established ability to replace them.

Moreover, for the last few years the present Government leaders have been coasting to a large degree on the loyalties developed during the long fight for independence. Unless there is a definite improvement in the well-being of the average Indian citizen, these loyalties will gradually wear thin.

In this unstable kind of setting we would surely see the rapid growth of Communist organizations throughout India. If these organizations in their early stages were organized with a minimum of violence and threats, they could be vastly more effective than the Communist Party is today.

If they were able to convince even a sizable minority of the Indian people that the Communist Government was moving rapidly ahead in China, while the Indian Government had failed, the present democratic society could rapidly disintegrate. Since there is no strong second man available, the death or serious illness of Mr. Nehru would speed up this process considerably.

Clearly, if India should go, the whole vast area from Cairo to Tokyo would be in grave danger. Southeast Asia would be outflanked to the East and the Middle East would be outflanked to the West. We would be cut off completely from some of the world’s richest resources, and eventually faced with a dangerous increase in Communist manpower.

The Encouraging Side

There are many encouraging factors with which to balance this drab picture. One of the most crucial of these is the determination of the Indian Government, in spite of its faults, to solve its problems, and to solve them in a democratic way. As long as Jawaharlal Nehru lives and keeps his health, a revolutionary upheaval in India is unlikely.

Equally important, there is a great deal of ability in many Government departments. The finances of the Indian Government are sound; there is a good transportation system, and huge quantities of natural resources, including perhaps the largest and richest iron ore deposits in the world.

Moreover, all over India are many pilot plants which have already demonstrated what can be accomplished through a concentrated and well organized effort to raise health standards, increase food production and gradually eliminate illiteracy.

If the Indian Government with our assistance can build solidly on this pilot study experience, there is a reasonable chance that the Indian economy will begin to move ahead in such a way that within the next five years each citizen will see an improvement in his living standards and the evidence that a better life is attainable under democratic government.

An accomplishment of this kind would give the Indian Government and the Indian people a tremendous sense of confidence and achievement. Sooner or later, this in turn might have a substantial effect on China.

If cultural delegations can come to India to describe the gains of Communist China, cultural groups can also go to China to describe to the Chinese people how India is creating a better life for its people. If democratic India succeeds, the present India–China relationship, which now offers such a potential threat to the West, may eventually work to our advantage.

Can we afford to write off China?

In my opinion, this latter point is tremendously important. If we are to succeed in the present conflict, we must not only avoid the loss of more territory from the Free World; we must consider how we can recoup at least some of our losses.

All Americans are deeply conscious of Russia’s success in forcing satellite relationships on Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Because of this, many of our people are convinced that Russia must inevitably succeed in imposing this same kind of relationship on China.

This easy assumption may be incorrect. Indeed, against the background of the cold war, China may be much more important to Russia than Russia is to China.

For several centuries European Russia has had the advantage of a weak and divided China at her back door. This situation is now gradually changing and no man can foresee the implications. A China of growing strength which is even slightly wobbly in its attitude toward the Soviet Union would be a source of grave danger to the Politburo. A strong and unfriendly China would force the Politburo drastically to modify its present policies towards the West.

Certainly we cannot compromise our attitude towards China as long as Chinese soldiers are killing United Nations soldiers in Korea. But neither can we disregard the possibility of dramatic shifts in Asian alignments in the years immediately ahead. To assume that America must permanently accept a tight Soviet-Chinese partnership seems to be dangerously defeatist.

Undoubtedly such a partnership exists today, and for the present it is unlikely that we can do anything to modify it. However, “time marches on”, and it is my belief that a major long term objective of our foreign policy must be directed towards modifying China’s present ties with the USSR and gradually easing her into a more independent position.

If India grows economically stronger and more confident of the practical benefits of democratic government, she may become the most effective force in accomplishing this shift—even though she continues to vote against us occasionally in the U.N.

Undoubtedly the odds are against such a development. But I am sure you will agree that every facet of this complex situation must be examined carefully and that the possibility of favorable Indian and Japanese influence on China over a period of years cannot lightly be discarded.

What can we do?

This brings us to the question of what specifically we can do to improve the situation here, and what should be our general attitude towards the present Government.

The elections will be completed by the end of January and the new Government will then be established for the next five years. Undoubtedly Nehru and the Congress Party will win a substantial victory.

For this, I believe, we should be thankful. The principal alternatives are the Socialists and the conservative Jan Sangh.

The Socialists for the most part are honest, idealistic and vigorously anti-Communist. But their program is basically unworkable.

A few Americans have looked with interest towards the Jan Sangh and its associated parties, because certain Jan Sangh leaders have been critical of Nehru’s “neutralism”. In my opinion, however, the success of the Jan Sangh would be disastrous.

Their ideology is almost as racist as Hitler’s. They advocate turning India into a communal Hindu State with a much “firmer” policy towards Pakistan.

If the Jan Sangh should elect a majority of Parliament (which everyone agrees is not possible) the likely result would be renewed clashes between Hindus and Moslems, an intensification of the Kashmir dispute, and the creation of the kind of political, social and economic conditions which would turn many Indians towards Communism.

For all of these reasons I believe we must place our bets for the immediate future on Mr. Nehru and his associates. This means that we should do everything possible to win their confidence in us, and to demonstrate our respect and admiration for the many good things which they are doing.

We must also re-examine our objectives in India and our concept of India’s role in world affairs. We have all regarded India as a country which, by all odds, should be a full partner of the Western World in the struggle against the Communist bloc, but which for some perverse reason refused to support the Free World countries in their efforts to deal with the aggressor powers.

It seems to me altogether unlikely, unless World War III breaks out or China makes some aggressive move southward, that India will openly support the free world in a manner that would place her against her great neighbor, China. Any aggressive effort to pressure India with a different position will be ineffective and eventually may alienate a people and a government which are now basically sympathetic to our objectives and opposed to totalitarianism.

We will make much faster progress if we let India know that much as we disagree with her we respect her desire to remain aloof for the present, and that our only wish is to help her to help herself (without strings) and to maintain her independence.

Such a policy towards India will create far better feeling towards America and eventually it may enable us to draw her to our side. It can even be argued that our long range interests will be better served if India is allowed to remain in a position which will enable her to exert and effective modifying influence upon Communist China, with the chance that she may eventually act as an intermediary in a great effort to wean China away from the USSR and back into a working relationship with this Western World. We should not overlook the fact that India fears China’s close relationship to the USSR about as much as we do and that an independent China is her primary objective.

If we will accept these relatively modest immediate objectives there is every chance, with a few assists from Vishinsky, and some tactfully handled personal relationships, that we can improve the situation here much faster than now seems possible.

But we must stop showing petty irritation at individual Indian actions, no matter how much we disagree. We must be patient, respectful, and above all we must ourselves accept India as the foremost Asian nation.

Strengthening the Indian Economy

The tactful and persuasive handling of our relationships with Mr. Nehru and his associates will help. But that in itself will not be enough.

If I am correct in assuming that the condition of the Indian economy three, four or five years from today may be a decisive factor in determining whether or not Communism takes over this part of the world, we must also do everything possible to assist the Indian Government in reaching the very reasonable objectives outlined in its new Five Year Plan.

At present we have only the modest appropriation of $54 million which will be allocated through the TCA here in India between now and June 30. I have suggested unofficially to Mr. Nehru and the Planning Commission that this money might be spent through a public authority or corporation separate from the regular agencies of government.

This public authority would have all the prestige and power of the Indian Government behind it. But its advantages as an independent agency would be very great. For instance, it would enable us to short circuit the overburdened government departments and achieve greater mobility and efficiency. In addition it would separate off our American contribution so that the result of our efforts could be clearly seen by our own Congress as well as by the Indian Government and the Indian people.

In order to tie this program closely to the Indian Government’s own economic efforts, I suggested that if this authority were set up, the Chairman of the Planning Commission might act as chairman, with an able full-time Indian administrator backed by a competent staff and American consultants.

If the Indian Government will move vigorously ahead with land reform programs designed to give the peasants a stake in the new India, and if they will face up to the need for much more private investment and the steps which are necessary to get it, the economic outlook will improve. If in addition we can induce Congress to back the proposed Development Authority with some $300 million annually for five years, there will be a good chance of success.

Tangible clearly evident economic gains in all parts of India will mean that democracy has scored a spectacular success. The Indian people and their government will be reassured as to the practical benefits of a democratic approach, and hence in a position to argue far more effectively with Communist China.

Need for a Stronger USIS

In addition, we must improve our information program. Much of our information work in the East has been based on experience gained in Europe where the problems are vastly different. Here in India we are dealing with sensitive people somewhat unsure of themselves, proud of their new freedom, and inclined to look on us as bragging white men with no understanding of their culture and history.

These attitudes can be broken down with a surprising speed if we will only present our own beliefs with honest humility, and make the Indians themselves reason out the world conflict in their own minds. Any attempt to force our own analyses upon them by blunt accusations is doomed to failure. Dynamic black and white statements about the cold war are viewed with suspicion. Harsh charges against the USSR are greeted with the question “Why do you fight Communism by copying the arrogance and bad manners of the Russians themselves?”

I believe I have convinced several important Indians on the following points through a quite different approach, and softened up a great many others:

A. “We Americans look on the disarmament race as wasteful and totally unnecessary. As President Truman has stated on many occasions, notably on October 24, 1950, before the United Nations,⁴ we are willing to invest a major part of any savings from our present armament program into a broad development effort to raise living standards in all parts of the world, and particularly in India.

“The Politburo seems fearful of this development, and I wonder if this is not a major reason why they have been unwilling to disarm? Ideologically, the USSR has every reason to prevent badly needed assistance from going to India, Indonesia, Africa, South America, and other underdeveloped areas. According to the Russian thesis, these countries must remain poor if they are eventually to go Communist. You will notice that they won’t even contribute to World Health, the Children’s Fund or UNESCO.” (In other words, “Moscow is responsible for the fact that India has not been getting the aid which she so desperately needs. If you Indians dislike this situation, why not send your complaints to Stalin?”)

B. “The Chinese and American people have always been good friends. But the Russians are determined to keep the Americans and Chinese from being friendly in the future.

“One of the basic reasons why the Politburo forced the North Koreans to attack South Korea was the Soviet belief that this would frighten the Chinese, and eventually involve them in a conflict with the West. Of course, we cannot recognize China or make any deals about China’s entry into the UN as long as our soldiers are being killed in Korea. But every American wants peace on a decent reasonable basis. If peace is not forthcoming in Korea, I believe it will be because the Russians know that once the fighting stops, other problems between China and America may eventually be solved.”

(In other words, “The Russians are determined to maintain the conflict between America and other Western nations and China. The Russians cleverly and deliberately created the present unhappy situation in Korea and they are continuing to irritate it for their own selfish gains.”)

C. “The French would have been out of Indo-China long ago if it hadn’t been for the Communists. The record shows that we Americans have consistently opposed imperialism. We don’t like to see the French remain in Indo-China any more than we wanted the British to remain in India or the Dutch in Indonesia.

“But for the time being at least, the Communists don’t want the French to leave Indo-China, so instead of allowing the people of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos to deal with the problem, as the Indonesians and Indians dealt with theirs, they stage an invasion from the outside. This makes it necessary for the French to remain and for us to support the French.”

D. “We Americans were isolationists for many generations. We had two great oceans to protect us and were convinced that European conflicts need never affect us. This belief was so strong that after the First World War a little group of people in our Senate was still able to prevent us from joining the League of Nations.

“Because of our unwillingness to participate in collective action against Hitler, the Second World War started and, in all honesty, we Americans must assume a considerable share of the responsibility.

“But we have learned from, our mistakes. Today we realize that any aggressor is a danger to the entire world. That is why we are determined to establish a position of power which may bring the Russians to their senses and eventually result in the easing of present tensions.” (Most Indians are quick to recognize the similarity between American attitudes of the 1920s and 1930s and their own present attitudes. It is rarely necessary to belabor the point. They usually get it themselves.)

Conclusions

A negative “Let us see if we can hang on” attitude towards Asia in general and India in particular is defeatist, unnecessary and dangerous. We must not only maintain friendly relationships with those Asian nations which are still open to us, but we must consider the means by which we can loosen China’s present partnership with the USSR.

There is no indication that such a development is likely at present. But there are several potentially favorable factors, and the stakes are no less than the opening up of Russia’s vulnerable rear door, and the forcing of basic compromises on the Politburo which otherwise seems impossible under any circumstances short of a long and costly war followed by a clear-cut military victory.

As far as India is concerned, we should accept the fact that if she moves in our direction it will be in several stages—from her present cool neutralism, to benevolent neutralism, to the kind of association which we deeply desire.

For the time being we should be less concerned with India’s statements and attitudes, and more concerned with the crucial importance of her present Government’s effort to build an economically stable, confident, democratic society.

India’s success will buttress every free government in Asia. Moreover, it will vastly increase whatever chance there may be of breaking down the Russia-China partnership.

The effectiveness of our efforts in India seems to depend on a series of “ifs”:

If we can muster the patience and understanding necessary to deal with this sensitive situation, (and this requires a truce on sharp criticism and angry charges),—

If we can work our way into the confidence of Indian leaders and particularly Mr. Nehru,—

If the Indian Government will itself face up to its economic problems and start to make the tough decisions which it now often seeks to avoid,—

If able Indian administrators can be found to carry out the development programs which are so badly needed,—

If we can develop in our own country sufficient understanding of this crucial situation to enable us to maintain effective policies,—

If Congress will provide the $200 to $300 million which will be needed each year to achieve the objectives of the Indian Five Year Plan,—

If we can get an honorable end to the war with China without further embittering India and other Asian people,—

If we can improve our information service which is now trying to ride several different horses at once.

What are the chances of success? Excellent, if only we can hurdle this series of “ifs”. But probably less than fifty–fifty if they become too much for us.

A major share of our wealth and energies is today directed towards closing the open door to Soviet aggression labeled “Europe”. It is absolutely essential that this effort succeed.

But the Asian barn door marked “India” may for the long haul prove to be of equal importance, and in one sense an even greater test of our competence to deal successfully with the forces of Communism. Indeed, Lenin once said, “The road to Paris and Western Europe may lie through Peking and Calcutta”!

These views are my own. I submit them in all humility for whatever they may be worth. I may say, however, that they are broadly shared by most objective and thoughtful observers here in Delhi—American, European, and Asian.⁵

1. This memorandum was sent as an enclosure to a letter of December 6 from Ambassador Bowles to the Secretary of State, not printed (611.93/12–651).
2. Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1940–1948.
3. Reference is to the remarks of Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister, at the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, November 7. Text in U.N. document A/PV. 336.
4. For the text of President Truman’s address before the United Nations General Assembly, October 24, 1950, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry Truman, 1950 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 683.

5. In acknowledging this memorandum, Secretary Acheson wrote to Ambassador Bowles on January 14, 1952 as follows:

   “Thank you very much for your memorandum ‘Early Observations on India’, enclosed with your letter of December 6, 1951, which I have read with more than usual interest. The memorandum shows clearly that you have applied yourself to the study of Indian problems with gratifying energy and acumen.

   “I am looking forward to discussing your views and proposals when you come to Washington. In the meantime I am circulating the memorandum to interested officers of the Department.” (611.93/12–651)