Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

611.91/11–751: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

New Delhi, November 7, 1951—11 p. m.

1661. For McGhee. Tuesday evening Nov 6, I had dinner with PriMin. In addition Mrs. Bowles dinner included Min Health Amrit Kauer, gov of Uttar Pradesh Sir Hormasji Lody, new Home Aff Min Katju. Immediately after dinner PriMin took me aside for talk and made fol points:

1. He hoped I understood warmth with which I had been greeted. This was important indication of basic Ind feeling towards US and hopes in official and non-official circles for better understanding and possibly closer working relationships. He disturbed over disagreements and irritations of past 2 years and said he hoped that together we cld make progress in creating different atmosphere.

2. He particularly anxious for me understand his personal attitude and that of GOI towards Sov Union and China. For some time he hoped Sov Union wld develop along different lines but in recent years he had become convinced USSR was aggressor national fol old Russian imperialistic pattern with assistance of new Sov-controlled force—world Communism. He said altho he did not believe Sov Union wld knowingly start world war he thoroughly understood our conviction that Red Army must be balanced in Eur by comparable force, unless unexpectedly Sov Union shld agree to practical and convincing program of disarmament.

3. Emphasized his total opposition to Commie idea which he said was diametrically opposed to his own philosophic beliefs and those of Ind people. He said he wld continue meet Communism head-on here in India whenever it attempted subversive or disruptive tactics. At present Communism was not problem in India but he did not underestimate its potential development particularly if the economy remained stagnant.

4. In his opinion China was much more complicated problem than most Westerners believe and even though we disagreed with him there shld be no misunderstanding about what he thought on subj. He then made following points:

a. Present Chi Govt is dominated by Commies who are trained in Russia. Some of these Commie leaders wld certainly put cause of Communism under leadership of USSR before interests of China itself, but perhaps an equal number wld not.

b. Central Govt had been successful in establishing law and order in all but few sections of China and rumors of large guerilla concentrations in south China were wishful thinking. Chi people now had order and peace first time 40 years.

c. However, social, econ and polit structure of China was in early process of formation; many non-Commies held important posts both in Central and Provincial Govts; and no one, incl Central Govt itself, cld be sure exactly what shape China wld take in next 5 years.

d. From the many reports he recd from all over China there was gen agreement Chi people were working extremely hard. He said that concept of 400 million people working hard and in determined way was in sense utterly frightening. Great good might result—also possible this development held major dangers for all of us.

e. Said Chi Commies had often acted with great cruelty and total disregard for life which shocked Inds fully as well as US.

f. China potentially aggressive and expansionist but at present she lacked resources do more than she was doing. Perhaps with thought in mind that we were considering attack on China proper, emphasized that defensive ability of China today is far greater than in 30’s when Jap had difficulty in penetrating even divided China.

5. Stated that his China views were very different from Panikkar’s.¹ He stated Panikkar usually succumbed to whatever situation he was in. In fight for Ind freedom Panikkar had represented some of most reactionary princes in Ind and pleaded their cases with apparent conviction. Had been sent to China riot as leftist Amb to new Commie regime but as man whom PriMin believed wld get along with Chiang Kai-Shek When Commies took over, Panikkar’s views as in past had changed abruptly, and today tended dangerously idealize Chi scene. For this reason Panikkar was being sent Paris where he wld have opportunity talk with others and perhaps absorb some of our own fears of Sov expansionism. PriMin jokingly stated that after 2 months in Paris Panikkar might change into ardent opponent of Commie viewpoint.

6. PriMin emphasized he did not accept Panikkar’s present views about Chi nor was he in any way blind to potential dangers which might be developing in China. In his opinion China in next 10 or 15 years cld go either way. He earnestly believed however, best hope was an attempt to divide Russia and China—or if this not possible at least modify Chi viewpoint thru outside contacts and thus convince Chi did not need depend entirely on Russia.

7. Thought it likely Russia wld attempt use China by urging it into further adventures other parts Asia. However, stated Chi had been hurt in Korea and wld hesitate embark on other adventures likely involve further fighting.

8. He expected see Chi embark on vigorous program to convince other Asiatic nations they had developed successful econ pattern which wld raise living standards. Already much evidence such an effort being planned and he thought in some quarters it might prove persuasive, particularly if it were entirely divorced from polit arguments. Suggested this approach was being followed by Chi cultural delegation now in India which had steered clear Sov Emb and ref used answer all questions touching in polit points. He stated it was quite possible China’s econ gains in next few years might considerably exceed those of India. China has taken much better care of her soil. Inds living in hotter climate less able take long hours in fields which Chi endure with relative ease. China’s industrial resources were more fully developed thru long Jap occupation of Manchuria. The $300 million loan from Russia had included much valuable equipment. However, India had certain advantages China lacked, including better transportation system, better-trained admin services and protective wall of mountains to north which made heavy mil establishment unnecessary.

9. PriMin traced step by step almost week by week development present China situation. Early Sept 49 it first became evident to him and his govt Commie Chi Govt in control China. Described his talks and agreement with UK FonMin Bevin on his (Nehru’s) way to America and latter talks with Acheson. Stated Acheson had understanding of his views but had given no indication US prepared recognize new Chi Govt. PriMin then described subsequent convs with UK and their mutual desire have announcements of recognition come before meeting of Commonwealth nations in Colombo Jan 50. In his opinion no question but that No. Korean attack was act of pure aggression. Confident that Russians had instigated attack and Chi had known about it. Did not believe, however, Chi intended take active part. He understood why we thought pattern of Chi thinking on subj seemed totally illogical and therefore must be impossible. But fact it was illogical did not mean it was untrue. His belief Chi had developed genuine sense of alarm from day UN crossed 38th parallel. His belief Chi troops began move into Korea immediately after that, even though actual contact was delayed 3 weeks. Described his concern re Tib in detail. After his protest, China delayed then cleverly trained Chi Tibs for actual occupation and dug up half forgotten treaty giving them right to garrison part of Tib. Chi Commies in Tib had so far acted with restraint but he clearly recognized danger of infiltration and was on lookout for evidence. Said Chi had been on point opening broad negots several times between Dec 50 and Malik’s statement in June but that each time unforeseen event changed their minds. His belief Chi badly wanted peace in Korea but that they wld not pay too high price for it. This he said was again not matter of logic understandable to West but matter of intense pride.

10. This presentation took more than hour. PriMin completed by stating he did not expect us accept his views now altho he wld like have us understand them so that it quite possible the new China wld develop into explosive dangerous force and that in this case US wld appear to have been right. He said however, that there was at least good chance that future development of China cld be guided into different channels and that he earnestly believed that best interests of India, US and entire free world (he used word “free”) lay in policy keeping China door open. In his opinion world had nothing lose and much gain in any effort split Chi and Russia, or if that impossible at least to modify China’s willingness swallow Sov line completely.

11. I then told PriMin I wld like opportunity outline Amer viewpoint and explain some our own reactions to sit in Eur and Chi. I retraced briefly ground covered in my press conf statement of Nov 5 in which I outlined our 1945 hopes that coming of peace and development of UN wld make large armaments unnecessary. Described uneasiness we felt over our failure obtain agreement on atomic bomb and further concern over unwillingness Sov to establish a reasonable peace in Eur or disband its army. Emphasized it was not until Korea however, that we were really awakened. Since that time our policies had been based on determination build counter-force to Russia in Eur and convince Sov Union and Chi we wld oppose further aggression by force, while always holding door open for negots and talks. Stated that this necessarily led to occasional conflict between our moral principles, in which we deeply believed, and development of a mil and polit program designed balance power of Sov Union, and it was with extreme regret many Amers accepted some of compromises which had become necessary. One such compromise was Indochina where we felt dominating factor was danger of Commie victory directed from fon country, while Inds believed dominant issue was failure of Fr to leave countrys as Dutch had left Indonesia and Brit. Said we were inclined to feel that India and other eastern nations were apt concentrate energies too much in fighting a nineteenth century imperialism which already dead or rapidly dying while under estimating power of new Russian imperialism with its spearhead, world Commie movement. Nehru said he did not feel this analysis was just and he understood fully our fears of Russian aggression which he had expressed to me earlier in conv and that he shared our fears completely. I then traced our own internal arguments over question of Chi extending back to war period. I reminded him US opinion was sharply divided on question of recognizing Commie Chi but action of Commie Chi in Korea had completely united our country in opposition to recognition at this time. Said that once an armistice was signed new developments might be possible, but that we clearly cld not make a deal or commitment of any kind.

12. I then opened up question of fon aid and Point Four program in gen terms. Said that Point Four proposal had caught imagination of Amer people as well as imagination of under developed countries but our hopes and plans sharply curtailed by events of last 18 months. Pointed out that Sov Union if it wished cld ease tensions which now troubled world and made necessary huge waste of mil preparedness. He asked what kind conditions necessary for easing of present armaments race and I expressed personal belief that armistice and honest peace in Korea plus rational solution Ger and Aust problems wld help create entirely new atmosphere in which present arms load on both sides wld inevitably be reduced. Added this wld make possible considerable increased aid to under developed areas and that this wld be particularly important in India in view his concern over future progress of Chi and possible dangerous polit repercussions here. Altho we wld do our best under any circumstances, key to major aid program lay in Russian attitude toward peace. At that point PriMin called to telephone and told of death Chief Justice Supreme Court Kania. PriMin obviously deeply disturbed and Mrs Bowles and I soon left. He followed us to door to say he had been gratified by our conv and hoped to continue it on future occasions.

Bowles

1. K. M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in Peking, 1948–1952, was a member of the Indian Delegation to the Sixth U.N. General Assembly in Paris, November 6, 1951–February 5, 1952.