Editorial Note
The basis of a possible approach to Stalin or Vyshinsky by Ambassador Kirk on some urgent specific issues regarding a Korean armistice was set forth in telegrams 224 and 225 to Moscow, September 28; see supra). On September 30, Counselor of the Department of State Bohlen, then in Tokyo on a special mission with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar N. Bradley, conferred with Bradley and General Matthew Ridgway (the United Nations Commander in Korea) on the timing of Kirk’s projected conversations. In telegram 658 from Tokyo, September 30, Bohlen reported on the conference as follows:
“Unanimously agreed that such conversation wld be very desirable but shld be handled in such way as not to create impression we were eager because of weakness for armistice. It was felt therefore that while conversation in Moscow wld be very desirable it might be unwise for above reasons for Kirk to go to Black Sea area in order to have interview.” (611.61/9–3051)
In telegram 232 to Moscow, October 1, the Department of State concurred in the Bohlen–Bradley–Ridgway view of the undesirability of Kirk’s travel to the Black Sea to visit Stalin and directed Kirk not to request to see Stalin and confine any possible approach to Vyshinsky. The Department suggested that Kirk take up local Embassy problems separately with Gromyko or Zorin. (611.61/10–151) In his telegram 562 from Moscow, October 2, Kirk agreed with the Bohlen–Bradley–Ridgway views but suggested that an impression of weakness could be avoided and greater weight conferred upon any remarks he might make to Vyshinsky if at least a pro forma request to Stalin were made. (611.61/10–251) In telegram 239 to Moscow, October 2, the Department of State promptly rejected Kirk’s suggestion:
“We do not desire give greater weight to contemplated approach, if finally approved, than by your oral comments to FonMin and, therefore, prefer that you not request to see Stalin. We believe purpose your comments will be adequately served if during substantive conversation with Vyshinsky you specifically request your views be transmitted to PriMin.” (611.61/10–2151)
[Page 1653]Telegram 249 to Moscow, October 3, transmitted formal detailed instructions to Kirk, cleared within the Department of State and by the Department of Defense and approved by President Truman, regarding the Ambassador’s projected discussion with Vyshinsky on the Korean armistice negotiations. (611.61/10–351) Supplementary instructions were sent to Kirk in telegrams 250 and 253 to Moscow October 4. (611.61/10–451) For Kirk’s report on his conversation with Vyshinsky on October 5, see telegram 586 from Moscow, Document 812.
For full documentation on the formulation of Kirk’s instructions regarding his conversation with Vyshinsky, see volume VII, Part 1, pages 970 ff.