740.5/6–851: Airgram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
A–2396. For Spofford. Reference Depto 1096 June 8.2 Together with Deptel 5248, May 18 [15],3 the following represents an approved US intelligence estimate which, it is hoped, you will find useful as background information for your presentation.
1. Main basis for Sov fon policy:
USSR motivated by combination factors springing from its unique world position. As a state in system of states, USSR pursues pol conditioned by need to safeguard its national interests. As successor to Russian Empire, USSR inherits tradition of expansionism apparently inherent in its historical and geographical position. As totalitarian dictatorship, USSR ever driven to new conquests, internal and external. As center of world Communist movement, USSR irrevocably identified with increasing struggle for world revolution. USSR thus joins together national center of state power with international crusading ideology. Without either state power or ideology, Sov world position and policy would be decisively changed. Peculiarly dangerous nature of Sov aggression—its persistence, intensity, and scope—is principally product of association of USSR with communism.
2. Principal aims Sov pol in particular areas:
Sov pol in various areas must be considered phase of and subordinate to current Sov objective of undermining power position of US to end that US will be incapable, on one hand, of threatening security of USSR and its orbit, or, on other, of providing free world [Page 1598] with adequate support to make possible their successful resistance to Sov pressure. In pursuing broad objective of undermining US power position, USSR since 1947 has relied upon direct pressures rather than negotiations to achieve its aims. It has sought particularly through pressures and intimidation to make impossible US participation in European and Asian affairs by seeking destroy willingness and ability of European and Asian people to give US cooperation necessary for such participation. Aside from appreciation that undermining power position US necessary for further extension Commie revolution, USSR is immediately concerned over prospect of shift in balance of military power in being in Europe and Northeast Asia. In this connection especially concerned over West European rearmament in conjunction with US rearmament, prospective Japanese rearmament, grouping of anti-Commie powers under NATO or other regional pacts, and existence and extension of US overseas bases. No evidence that USSR is concentrating or will concentrate on either Europe or Asia at expense other. Rather USSR looks on Europe and Asia as intricately linked in the world power complex. Within this framework Sov pol area-wise evaluated as follows:
- a.
- Eastern Europe. Maintain control over satellites which at present appears complete; further Sovietization and integration of economies and military establishments into Sov system; continue utilization of productive capacity to strengthen Sov eco and war potential; use as advanced skirmishing parties in prosecuting Sov pol. Re Yugoslavia, Sov objective continues to be to secure elimination of Tito government and its replacement by regime subservient to Moscow. Sov policy for time being seems to call for continued reliance on economic, political, psychological, and subversive pressures. There has been no recent major change in Sov mil strength or dispositions that bear upon the likelihood of attack by Sov forces in 1951. However, satellite capabilities for initiating attack on Yugoslavia with little or no warning have increased, and satellite military preparations continuing. Although developments to date do not appear to warrant conclusion that Soviet or satellite attack will in fact take place in 1951, they do justify conclusion that attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 remains a serious possibility.
- b.
- Western Germany. USSR has ultimate aim of bringing under its control strategically important area and resources of all Germany. It regards any substantial part of Germany not under its control—particularly if associated with Western powers—as major obstacle to realization of its ultimate aims and as potential threat to its own security. USSR will not consider as satisfactory any solution of German problem that does not promise to bring all of Germany within its orbit. Currently USSR pursuing interim objectives designed further ultimate aim. Foremost is aim to undermine West German regime, forestall its rearmament, and prevent its political, economic, and military association with Western powers. In Europe USSR considers rearmament and control of West Germany as the [Page 1599] decisive immediate issue and is unlikely stand by idly until West Germany fully rearmed under Western aegis. Thus far, USSR has tried delay or prevent West German rearmament and secure control of area by constant pressure against Western Germans and Western Europeans and by exploiting differences among the Western powers. So far tactic has failed produce tangible results. Entirely possible that Kremlin may consider future efforts along similar lines will be equally fruitless—will, indeed, produce the opposite of desired results by increasing resolve and solidifying cohesion of Western powers. If so, basic shift in Sov policy might be anticipated. This could take form of either (a) decision to resort to satellite of Sov military action in some area of Europe, of (b) decision to offer genuine concessions in return for abandonment West German rearmament and general easing of tension. Sov rulers, however, have given indication that for moment at least they feel they do not have choose between these alternatives and continue estimate they have freedom of action. They appear believe that there are still open to them many means of accentuating and exploiting differences among Western powers, and are still able to apply greater pressure on Western peoples than can the Western powers on the peoples of Sov sphere. In any event, they have given numerous indications that they are not prepared, and do not intend, to make genuine concessions (i.e., give up an advantage they actually possess) to secure agreement West on German disarmament or on any other matter in dispute. Thus on basis present indications appears that any basic shift in Sov pol will be in direction more drastic action rather than compromise.
- c
- Western Europe. Immediate Sov objective is severance of ties between US and West Eur thereby destroying NATO and isolate US in Western Hemisphere. Methods employed (a) Communist Party agitation; (b) play upon general European fear of war including maintenance of military forces in forward areas capable of overrunning Western Europe; (c) thinly veiled threats of military action; (d) attempt to exploit “contradictions” over Far Eastern policy; (e) consolidation of GDR and its economic and political integration into East European orbit as means of pressure on Western Germany; (f) intense play upon West European fears of renewed German aggression; (g) efforts to neutralize Western public opinion through “peace movement.” At same time possibility cannot be discounted that Commies will attempt more systematic use of strikes, sabotage, and local violence.
- d
- Far East Overall policy (a) elimination Western influence, and (b) establishment people’s democratic regimes throughout area. Commies openly acknowledge their basic tactic is “armed struggle” in Korea, Burma, Indo-China, Malaya, and Philippines. Although definite possibility of attempt to extend armed struggle to India, Pakistan, Thailand, Afghanistan and Indonesia, present tactic is apparently alternatively to woo and apply pressure. Heavy reliance appears being placed on possibility of neutralizing non-Commie elements through agitation under such slogans Asia for Asiatics, defeat of Western imperialism, satisfaction of nationalist aspiration, threat of renewed Japan aggression. Tendency is to allow Chinese Communists to assume spokesman role for Communist movement [Page 1600] these areas. Re China, no evidence of Moscow–Peiping friction or disagreement, rather coordination of policies and activities. USSR appears support unconditionally Peiping demand for admission UN, part in Jap treaty, possession Formosa. USSR, like Chi Commies, seems uninterested Korean settlement except on terms calling for withdrawal UN troops and satisfaction Chi Commie non-Korean demands listed above. Strong indications if becomes militarily necessary Sovs will increase mil support Chi Commies and North Koreans in Korea with unacknowledged supply planes, heavy equipment, and personnel. USSR would almost certainly participate defense China, especially Manchuria, in case UN attack, but not necessarily resort open war over issue. Re Japan, Sovs and Chi Commies object is eliminate US influence and prevent reemergence Japan as strong power, particularly in alliance with US. Central concerns at present are peace treaty and rearmament which are treated as indissolubly linked. Peiping has asserted “will never tolerate” while Moscow has used hardly less veiled language. Strong Sov and Chi Commie implications of applicability of Sino-Sov treaty case West continues present policy. Some justification invocation treaty already provided by Peiping–Moscow charges US use Jap troops and industrial production for “aggression” in Korea. Sovs have capability major attack on Japan without further preparations but no indications of intention of imminent move. USSR utilizing Far Eastern developments in effort accentuate “contradictions” among Western powers, and possibility cannot be discounted that threatening posture reflects not so much intentions as hope of maximizing division in West camp.
- e
- Near and Middle East Kremlin currently seeks to neutralize area by undermining Western influence. Methods include: (a) encouragement of nationalist sentiments; (b) blaming Anglo-American imperialism for all area troubles and concurrently supporting first one then another local inter-state rivalry; (c) play upon fear of war including maintenance of sufficient force in being to overrun area. Current policy toward Iran particularly illustrative these tactics, Moscow having avoided any indication of intent to interfere in explosive situation so that full brunt of intense nationalism directed toward UK and US. At same time unexpressed threat of Sov intervention ever present. Meanwhile, Moscow seeks to build up local political followings as first step toward ultimate establishment people’s democracies.
- f
- Colonial and Dependent Areas. Basic Sov policy calls for removal of Western influence. It supports all movements of national independence, with concurrent attempts by local Communists to seize control these movements. Sov prop and spokesmen in UN try to appear as champions of colonial and dependent peoples and cause maximum embarrassment to West. Exploitation of colonial issue concentrated more in Asia than Africa.
- g
- United Nations. USSR regards UN merely as instrument its foreign policy adapted to serve three basic and overlapping objectives: (1) protection fundamental Soviet stated interests; (2) aggravation of all differences in non-Sov world; (3) world-wide propagation of Sov propaganda. USSR and satellite attitude toward UN recently marked by increasing cynicism and possibility Sov withdrawal [Page 1601] cannot be discounted. World Peace Council may be designed as ultimate successor UN. At the least, WPC will be used in attempt to offset unfavorable decisions and policies UN.
3. Methods of USSR to achieve aims:
In pursuit its several objectives, USSR will rely on cold war tactics so long as these promise reasonable measure of success. However, inasmuch as Sov objectives inevitably impinge on interests of West in vital areas, grave danger exists that war will result. Moscow over past year has shown increased willingness to risk general war. In belief that ultimate object cannot be fully obtained without general war with Western powers, or in belief West is preparing attack on Sov sphere, Moscow may deliberately provoke general war at a time when, in its opinion, relative strength of USSR is at maximum. This might be at any time between now and the end of 1952. From point of view of mil forces and eco potential, USSR now in position to conduct general war of such scope and duration as to enable it overrun land mass of Eurasia. While intelligence lacking to permit valid prediction whether USSR would actually deliberately provoke general war, Kremlin’s continued intransigence and relentless pursuit basic objectives indicate that grave risk of general war already exists. Estimated that this risk increases as issues directly affecting USSR security arise, notably issues related full-scale West German or Japanese rearmament and establishment Western military bases on Sov periphery.
4. Factors determining Sov pol:
Dept considers USSR not tied to timetable but conducts policy according to opportunities available and evaluation its capabilities against Western capabilities and reaction. Since Sov policy geared to fill any power vacuum, Sov moves have generated Western reaction which in turn generates Sov counteraction. Beyond this, USSR sensitivity over security makes likely strong Sov reaction to Western moves that appear to Kremlin as threat to USSR itself or its empire.