No. 774
661.00/4–2551: Despatch
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (
Kirk) to the
Secretary of State
1
top secret
No. 626
Moscow, April 25,
1951.
Ref: Embassy despatch 514, April 25, 1950.2
Subject: Embassy Estimate of Soviet Intentions
In accordance with established practice I have the honor to transmit
herewith a report entitled “Soviet Intentions”, prepared by the
Embassy political and economic officers and the Attachés of the
Defense Department, as indicated on the first page thereof. This
report constitutes an effort to analyze Soviet intentions as of
April 25, 1951, in the same manner as did the report on the same
subject transmitted with the Embassy’s despatch under reference for
April 1950.
It should be noted that, while the enclosed report constitutes the
best efforts of the Embassy to analyze the various aspects of
international developments and conditions which are presumed to
influence
[Page 1576]
Soviet thought
and thus to point in some measure to conclusions in regard to Soviet
intentions, the sources of information available to the Embassy are
consciously restricted by the Soviets, and the importance of
imponderables in an estimate of this kind is consequently immensely
enhanced.
Briefly summarized, it is the Embassy’s belief that as of the spring
of 1951 the Soviet leaders continue to consider the Soviet Union as
engaged in a total war with the Free World; and that basically they
continue to estimate that they can capitalize in the tactical
execution of their designs on the various social changes and
economic dislocations which have resulted from World War II. They
are employing numerous weapons and instruments of policy to attain
their war-like objectives on four separate but interlocking fronts,
namely, political, psychological, economic, and military.
Politically-psychologically Soviet efforts are concentrated on
mobilizing neutralist, defeatist, uncertain sentiment among the
peoples of the world to exert pressure on the Free World
governments, designed to undermine the determination of the Free
World, and consequently the ability of the Free World governments,
to resist communist imperialism firmly. By and large, Soviet efforts
to exert that pressure take the form (1) of a world-wide “peace”
campaign devoted to portraying the Soviet Union and its satellites
as the champion and rallying point for peace, and (2) of increasing
tensions and turmoil in the Free World by subversive and
war-of-nerves tactics. Economically, the Soviets are continuing
their major effort to increase their military-economic potential,
both in the USSR homeland and by consolidating the productive
capacities of their satellites. Militarily, they have committed to
direct aggression the military forces of subservient regimes and
have covertly supported such aggression by the diversion of military
materiel, etc. They may be expected to continue to do so in any area
where they calculate such action as unlikely on balance to result in
global hostilities. At the same time they appear careful to avoid
the direct commitment of their major strategic reserve, the armed
forces of the USSR, apparently on the theory that they are not
sufficiently confident of the successful outcome under present
circumstances of a prolonged military struggle with the Free World;
and in the conviction, according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, that
continued pressures of other types on their enemies will eventually
create a situation more favorable to the engagement of their
ultimate weapon.
In this latter connection, however, it should be carefully noted that
a misjudgment, on our part, of Soviet thinking might overlook the
possibility that the Kremlin leaders could estimate 1) that their
present relative military position gives them superiority sufficient
to warrant the risk of an all out military effort at this time, or
2)
[Page 1577]
that the growing
Western defense efforts, which at a minimum seem likely to reverse
the imbalance of relative forces in the next few years, might bear
sufficient promise of continuing indefinitely to eliminate the
prospects of the Soviet situation improving in the foreseeable
future. In either event, and particularly if the Politburo believe
that the Free World would inevitably endeavor to destroy the
Communist citadel as soon as it became strong enough, the Soviets
might determine that their interests dictate the precipitation of
armed hostilities against the West without delay.
In considering the probable present posture of Soviet intentions, we
have been particularly mindful of the evolution of the Free
World-Communist struggle during the twelve months since the last
report. Politically and psychologically, it seems clear that the
clarification of the issues in Free World public consciousness has
cut considerable ground from under the various communist forces, as
implements of USSR policy, throughout the West. Divisive efforts
have on the other hand been notably successful in Asia and
intimidation, etc., seems to have borne some fruit both there and in
certain sections of the Middle East. Soviet efforts to capitalize on
these developments are reflected in the impetus it has given, during
the period, to the “World Peace Movement” and to subversion, notably
in the exploitation of nationalistic aspirations in Iran, and other
areas. Economically, the Soviets have continued and augmented their
buildup of the Soviet military machine. However, ostensibly on the
ground that Western defense efforts have artificially postponed the
anticipated United States economic collapse, the Soviets have
changed their attitude (at least temporarily) and no longer claim
that such a depression is imminent. Militarily, it seems clear that
the united Free World’s counter to the challenge of communist
aggression in Korea has disrupted the Soviet’s timetable in Asia. In
Europe the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty has reversed
Soviet momentum and has deterred the USSR from offensive action to
date.
It is believed that the principal deterrent to Soviet temptation to
commit the Soviet military might in an all-out attack against the
West has been, and will continue to be, the degree to which the Free
World has been able to rearm itself, and to stand united in the face
of the communist menace. In my view the key to the maintenance of
the current uneasy balance and the further betterment of the
situation in favor of the forces of freedom, is the determination of
free nations to remain united, and to increase their resistance
forces rapidly, to the extent necessary to convince the Politburo
that a major military adventure against the Free World can have no
chance of success.
[Page 1578]
We must, however, bear in mind that serious inroads upon the Western
World’s sources of raw materials are threatened in the Asian and
Middle Eastern areas. Were we to lose our supplies of tin, rubber,
bauxite and petroleum (to name a few critical items) derived from
Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, not only would our war reserves
be definitely curtailed, but our ordinary peacetime commerce be
disrupted to a dangerous degree. The current situation in Persia
whence petroleum and its products are ceasing to flow into the
normal channels of trade, is a matter of grave concern to the normal
life of Western Europe. For the Western World to be denied access to
such primary products is one thing, but to have the Soviet Union be
their recipient is quite another matter. Tactics of this sort are
incipiently as menacing to our whole position, as more overt
actions.
In my view, the center of gravity of malignant danger to the United
States still lies in Western Europe. It is to that highly
industrialized and organized area that our most vital interests are
tied, because, quite apart from natural and cultural predilections
for preserving a free Europe, we have with that part of the world
more concrete and selfish interests at stake. Our economic life is
there geared to a similar system of free enterprise, whose
obliteration would spell disaster.
While, as was pointed out last year in my covering despatch, we tend
in analyses of this sort to accentuate the elements of strength
accruing to our enemy, yet it is important to reemphasize the
ruthless realism that exists in the Politburo’s approach to
international problems. There is no sentiment of gratitude, no wish
to compromise, in their attitude—when they are strong. Now they are strong, and will only commence
to adjust to events when we are strong.
Therefore, we, the Western World, must continue energetically to
increase our actual strength in order that our voice shall be
listened to with respect.
Also, we must be firm in our attitude on vital matters concerning the
national interest, showing a united front to the Communist
World.
Lastly, we must be consistent in our foreign policies, with no signs
of faltering or wavering. It is necessary for our country to
understand the threat which menaces our national life, and to accept
the burden of continuous readiness to resist all attempts, both open
and hidden, to undermine our free democracy.
(It will be appreciated if the Department will transmit copies of
this despatch and its enclosures to Ambassadors Gifford, Spofford, and Bruce, and to High Commissioner
McCloy. Also, to the
Departments
[Page 1579]
of Defense,
Army, Navy, Air, CIA, and to General
Eisenhower.)
Enclosure
Report Prepared by the Embassy in the Soviet
Union
top secret
[Moscow,] April 25,
1951.
Soviet Intentions
[Here follows a detailed table of contents including the names of
Embassy officers who drafted the various sections.]
i. conclusions3
In the course of the continuous war for the seizure of world
power and for the establishment of its brand of world communism
which has been waged by the Kremlin ever since the Bolsheviks
moved in as the masters of Russia—a struggle such as envisaged
by the doctrines of Lenin and Stalin—the Soviet leaders now
find themselves in a stage of their campaign which calls for the
attainment of maximum gains from the favorable power position
which developed for them during and immediately after World War
II.
Apparently recognizing that they lack sufficient industrial
potential to assure victory in a long struggle with the Free
World countries and facing quick and disastrous retaliation in
the form of an atomic attack for any direct military move
against the leading Western powers, they appear, on the one
hand, to be desirous of avoiding a world conflict requiring
irrevocable committment of the large Soviet military machine,
but on the other hand, to be willing to accept serious risks
along this line in their endeavor to carry the present tide on
either to full victory, or to a maximum improvement of their
physical position in the face of invincible opposition from
their enemies.
They appear to be intent on carrying this program forward in the
present period under a general strategy calling for propelling
the momentum of Communist Chinese civil war successes forward by
force of arms in an effort to expand the portion of the world’s
natural resources under their control through the conquest of
undeveloped areas of the Far East and at the same time to
institute an attrition process which could have a decisive
influence on the
[Page 1580]
development of a revolutionary situation in the advanced
industrial countries of the West.
An essential arm in carrying their plans forward is their
diplomatic and psychological offensive which plays upon the war
weariness of the peoples of the world and the fear of a new war
generated by military conflict in the East and sabre rattling in
the West and offers salvation along the path of popular
imposition on Free World governments of the announced objectives
of the Soviet “peace” policy. A characteristic feature of the
Soviet Government’s political activity in the post war period
has been its persistent practice of attempting to make a direct
approach to the peoples of the Free World over the heads of
their governments and its concurrent unwillingness to deal with
those governments as if it considered them capable of committing
their countries to a future course of action.
A significant feature of the past year’s developments is the
intensification that has occurred with respect to both aspects
of this grand strategy. In the Far East Communist forces are
engaged in conducting extensive military operations against a
coalition of the leading Free World countries. In the Free World
itself the diplomatic and psychological offensive has reached
new heights in an endeavor to arouse the people to take the
management of their affairs into their own hands. The rapid
rearmament of the United States and the quickening efforts to
rearm Western Europe have, however, injected into the situation
a new factor which was probably not fully anticipated and have
shed some doubt on the possibility of continuing intensification
of dual forces of this strategy, particularly the one involving
military operations, without risking armed conflict on a world
scale, which the Kremlin does not appear to desire. Such a risk
is now greater at each sensitive point along the Soviet orbit
perimeter. Hence the Kremlin’s freedom of action has been
somewhat circumscribed by the recent course of events and the
time brought nearer when it must decide to take the full risks
under this policy or alter it. What signs are available to the
Embassy seem to indicate that the Kremlin intends to carry on
along the lines of this strategy, generating as much turmoil as
possible in the Free World but probably directing its
troublemaking activities to the points and issues which entail
the least risk of irrevocable commitment of the Soviet armed
forces. It probably feels that there is a large area still open
to it for extending covert military support to other Communist
armies in Asia, perhaps enough to be decisive for victory
there.
There are among the year’s developments many which could lend
encouragement to the Soviet rulers in pursuing the policy they
seem to be following now. The assembling of a force in Western
[Page 1581]
Europe that
would be strong enough to attack them is proceeding very slowly
in spite of what improvement there may be in the defensive
capabilities of that area. It has been demonstrated that there
are issues which afford prospects for breaking India and other
Asian and Arab nations away from the Free World bloc if
skillfully played upon. Popular pressures in England and France
have forced on three reluctant governments agenda talks for a
prospective meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four
powers. The Chinese question and Middle East oil have given rise
to difficulties suggesting a potential cleavage between the
United States and the United Kingdom themselves.
An impression that the Soviet leaders do not expect to cast the
die for good, at this time at least, is left by what appears to
be the present stage of progress in certain of their important
programs. Large economic projects and agricultural changes are
planned for the USSR for the next few years. The peace movement
is just passing out of its formative stage and moving on to a
more ambitious and specific course of action. The psychological
indoctrination of the Soviet population for war against their
recent allies seems still to be in an early period of
development. None of these signs, of course, is conclusive.
The question of whether time, as calculated in terms of the next
few decades rather than the next few years, is working on their
side or not, is undoubtedly a vital consideration in Soviet
plans for the future. Both their fundamental doctrine and their
practical experience with the economic development of the USSR,
as they interpret them, may well impel the Kremlin rulers to
feel that they can consolidate and develop the resources of the
area they already control more effectively in the long run for
their purposes than can their enemies. They seem to count on
centralized planning and a complete, ruthless control of a huge
disciplined labor force to enable them to concentrate energies
toward building up their economic military potential more
effectively than the Free World governments. In the same way,
they can work toward consolidating their control over Eastern
Europe to the point where the ability of the Free World to use
its future assembled power to prosecute successfully a cold war
against them in that area would be greatly impaired.
In the light of all the above, therefore, it is likely that the
Kremlin will proceed during the next year to continue to
generate turmoil in its effort to set Free World peoples against
their governments and to improve its power position with respect
to them. This will probably involve further military action in
the Far East primarily with Chinese forces supported
substantially but unofficially by the USSR with the expulsion of
UN troops from Korea, the
conquest
[Page 1582]
of Formosa
and expansion into Southeast Asia as major objectives. Elsewhere
along the periphery of the Soviet orbit Iran, Yugoslavia and
Germany are the principal foci of attention and any faltering in
Free World unity and determination might tempt the Kremlin to
move at these points. It will continue and perhaps increase its
psychological endeavors to isolate America from the rest of the
world, slow down and stop defense preparations in the NATO countries and prevent German
and Japanese rearmament. Meanwhile, it will probably continue to
build up its own armed forces and those of its Eastern European
satellites in the event their participation in a military clash
becomes necessary or desirable.
The above conclusions stem from interpretations placed by the
Embassy on developments and statements known to it. There are
certain intangibles in the situation which could invalidate the
reasoning behind these conclusions. It may be, for example, that
behind the shield of concealment the Soviet rulers have
developed the means for overcoming what appears to be a
disparity of long term potentiality in favor of their enemies,
or perhaps, the means for successfully warding off a heavy
attack with atom weapons. It may be that there are rash elements
in top policy positions who favor casting caution to the wind
and yielding to the temptations to use present military
superiority to solve the immediate difficult problems. The men
in the Kremlin may even feel that the present build up in the
military strength of its Free World opponents means that an
attack upon them in this current epoch is inevitable and that
their greatest hope for survival lies in moving now. In their
psychological warfare they do, indeed, keep this concept very
much alive.
As indicated, the Embassy’s main concern has been to endeavor to
assess as accurately as it could the information available to it
and present in this paper the results of this assessment.
ii. analytical summary4
Political
In the Far East the Kremlin is utilizing the popular national
aspirations of dependent peoples to follow up the momentum of
Communist victory in the Chinese civil war with armed conflict
elsewhere. Because this is in any event an armed revolutionary
struggle the Communists have in this area been able to conduct
overt military hostilities and the situation is such that they
are in general inhibited rather by the size of opposing armed
forces in the field
[Page 1583]
than the risk of precipitating general conflict. The check to
their advance in Korea has confronted them with the decision
either to amass greater strength in the area for an endeavor to
strike a decisive blow or to postpone a military showdown to a
more propitious moment. All visible signs point to an
inclination on their part to the first alternative which will
certainly involve increased Soviet material support to the North
Koreans and Chinese armies. More direct Soviet support would
entail very grave risks of precipitating a world clash. With its
diplomatic, psychological and economic weapons the Soviet Union
is continuing to try to inflame antagonism on the part of the
Asiatic peoples toward the advanced Free World countries of the
West and to prevent the resurgence of a strong Japan aligned
with the Free World. The Chinese Communist conquest of Formosa
and expansion into Southeast Asia, although undoubtedly retarded
by events in Korea, are probably still part of the Communist
program in the East.
In Europe the Soviet leaders are bent on exploiting the war
weariness of the Western European peoples and playing upon the
anxious longing for peace. They are energetically attempting to
ignite a flame of popular protest against governmental
rearmament policies that entail burdensome sacrifices and to
exacerbate natural divergencies between governments stemming
from both their regional and world interests. Germany remains
the main problem. Here for the time being Soviet preoccupation
has shifted from the national scene where civil war was
threatened as a consequence of unsuccessful attempts at peaceful
unification to the international scene where a rearmed Germany
is pictured as a menace to both East and West. On the whole the
Communists have concentrated during the past year more on a
psychological offensive in Germany than on the employment of
physical pressure tactics as previously. The threat of violence
has shifted instead to the Balkans where Yugoslavia is
confronted with rapidly expanding satellite armies and being
subjected to an intensive propaganda barrage and numerous border
provocations. Possible aggressive satellite action here cannot
be discounted but the military preparations going on can also
serve to generate war fears as a foil for the peace movement or
can represent the development of a buffer force for the long
range defense of the Soviet orbit. Finland, because of its
strategic position, constantly receives Soviet attention.
However, the situation with respect to that country is such that
the USSR could absorb it at will and would probably only do so
as a prelude to further military action in Europe.
South Asia and the Middle East have been the scene of important
Soviet political successes in the recent period. The split
between India and the leading Western powers over China and
Korea
[Page 1584]
is indicative
of the potentialities for Soviet exploitation of divergencies of
interests in the Free World. The association of other Asian and
Arabic nations with India during the crisis over Korea
highlights further this weakness in Free World unity. What may
be of even greater significance in the short run is the
extension of Soviet influence in Iran following the conclusion
of a trade agreement with that country, an influence which may
be extended further as a result of difficulties between Iran and
Britain over the former’s intention to nationalize the
exploitation of its oil resources. In all the countries of this
area the USSR is playing heavily upon economic difficulties and
nationalist and religious movements to expand its influence.
The Kremlin has used its participation in the United Nations to
obstruct the easing of points of friction in the Free World and
to use the UN’s prestige in an
effort to mobilize world public opinion against the policies of
the non-Soviet governments represented in it. The USSR’s failure
to prevent effective UN action in
Korea and its failure to frustrate action within the
organization to diminish the power of the veto has of necessity
changed its attitude to UN as it
now functions. The Soviet pronouncements on the subject imply
that the Kremlin still prefers to enhance the prestige of the
USSR through restoration of its position in the UN. However, the defeats of the past
year have been accompanied by rapid development of the peace
movement and the World Peace Council which is portrayed as
constituting a forum more representative of the will of the
peoples of the world than UN in
which the major problems affecting “peace” are to be examined.
The next General Assembly will no doubt serve to clarify the
relationship of the WPC to UN and
Soviet intentions regarding them.
Psychological
The morale of the Soviet people will probably have a decisive
bearing on Soviet intentions only when it reaches one extreme or
the other of buoyancy or depression. Under present circumstances
its movement to an extreme would probably take place only as the
result of a crisis abroad. No signs have manifested themselves
during the past year that there has been any significant change
in the morale of the Soviet people. Although there is evidence
of much discontent, the applied and latent police control is
almost certainly capable of assuring popular acceptance, passive
though it may be, of present Soviet policies.
Economic
The USSR appears to be making steady progress in developing its
economic resources and improving its industrial might. It also
is going ahead with the integration of the satellite areas into
a coordinated
[Page 1585]
development of the entire Soviet orbit area. This progress may
not be as rapid as planned but it is almost certain that the
orientation is toward greater concentration on those aspects of
the economy that contribute to building up the sinews of war and
thus such signs as dropping living standards in certain
satellite areas may not be representative of the general
strength of the economics of the various countries. However, the
Soviet Union is still far from the attainment of the production
goals described by Stalin
in his speech of February 9, 1946 as essential to assure the
Motherland against all contingencies. There is reason to believe
that the Soviet leaders feel capable of developing their own
resources within the next decade perhaps to a point where such
defense of the USSR at least could be made regardless of the
intentions of the Free World countries.
Agriculture
Total grain production for the year 1950 was approximately the
same as that attained in 1940 but livestock herds are now
appreciably smaller than they were just before the war. However
the population to be supported by Soviet foodstuff production is
greater now than it was then. The relationship of the supply and
demand for foodstuffs on the whole Soviet orbit area is not
known but there is no evidence available to the Embassy to
suggest that there is surplus production in the satellite areas
sufficient to alter the above picture for the Soviet Union
radically. Certain large scale programs are under way, namely
collectivization of agriculture in the Eastern European
satellites and the consolidation of small collective farms into
large ones in the USSR, which may eventually sharply improve
efficiency in agriculture and result in increased strength in
this sector for the support of military operations if the USSR
becomes involved directly in them. The carrying out of these
programs entails certain social readjustments which may react
unfavorably on current production and the Soviets probably do
not expect to reap real benefits from them for several years.
They can, however, be abandoned if circumstances require that
efforts be concentrated on immediate production and upon
relieving the cause for broad disaffection on the part of the
rural population.
Military
Taking the military picture into consideration, the Soviet Union
has large mobilized strength in the shape of its own and its
satellites’ armies capable of achieving substantial initial
success in military operations. It could probably over-run
continental Europe (except Spain) and the Middle East in
offensive action. It could, on the other hand, probably
successfully defend the fortress of the USSR for a protracted
period. Deterrents to its employment on the
[Page 1586]
initiative of the Kremlin are
the great likelihood that an unfavorable balance of resources
creates strong likelihood that it could not stave off disastrous
defeat in a long war and the certainty that a damaging atomic
attack could be launched against it by the United States in
immediate retaliation to any move. At the rate at which military
strength is being reassembled in the Free World countries it
seems that a superiority of Soviet armed might will diminish
over the next year or two to a point where its employment would
not be productive of effective offensive action. Thus the
temptation to use this force offensively can be expected to
diminish in this period except as an act of desperation based on
the belief that an attack on the USSR by the West is inevitable
in this current epoch.
[Here follows the detailed body of the report, comprising 64
pages in the 73-page typewritten original.]
