Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 716

249.1111–Oatis, William/11–2251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Briggs) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret
priority

Praha, November 22, 1951—7 p. m.

410. Meeting today with FonMin Siroky on Oatis case registered substantial progress, including counterproposal on part Czecho, and there now finally seems reason hope for early settlement.

I began as directed Deptel 263, November 5¹ by restating exchange of prisoners proposal, which I advocated as reciprocal arrangement meeting criteria of “no pressure on Czecho” and “no ransom by US” important to our respective govts. I added that once exchange effected, Emb could then resume handling Czech merchandise export documents thus restoring market previously worth $2 million per month but now lost to Czecho because of Oatis detention.²

Siroky’s attitude then and throughout meeting conciliatory and reasonable, with cork in bottle of Commie abuse and no histrionics. He replied “Czecho agrees case should be settled and also agrees to exchange basis, provided other matters we feel are items of discrimination against Czecho are taken care of”. Did my ref to Czech export trade, he inquired, mean that all obstacles to such trade adopted since Oatis arrest would be removed? I said yes.

Min then brought up CSA overflights and GATT, declaring they also should be part of arrangement and that settlement should be contingent on return status quo ante-Oatis with respect those two matters also.

There followed rather lengthy argument in which I maintained that whereas obstacles to Czech exports to US were unilateral matter, which US Govt could and was willing as part Oatis settlement to revoke, both CSA and GATT were multilateral questions, in regard to which US unable to speak for other countries. Furthermore, I said GATT had nothing to do with Oatis (Siroky declared that it did and referred to a US memo to GATT organization which he said supported his view). To Min’s suggestion that “Well, you persuaded them in the first place; therefore, you ought be able unpersuade them,” I reiterated that US Govt unable speak on behalf other govts and that in any case (recalling that Siroky had looked distinctly unhappy at earlier ref to $2 million trade loss per month) such negots might require some time.

After further fencing about unilateral and multilateral Siroky finally dropped demand for CSA overflight and GATT solutions simultaneous with exchange of prisoners, provided US agrees as part of settlement to negotiate with Czecho immediately after settlement, seeking solution these two problems, and also provided new and additional unilateral point is included. This new unilateral point, obviously inserted in light discussion US ability handle unilateral matters expeditiously (and also in effort Siroky’s part obtain maximum benefits), refers to “freeing Czech frozen assets” and specifically to steel mill,³ in sense that mill ought either be shipped to Czecho or if not, then amount advanced by Czecho should be returned.

I counted new item by (1) indicating it has nothing to do with Oatis and (2) implying this issue might cause my govt raise issue of Czecho failure to settle nationalization claims, total value of which was probably greatly in excess value steel mill. I said I was not trying connect those two issues, but to point out that Min’s suggestion for inclusion of matter extraneous Oatis might result in complications.

Siroky thereupon restated his views in form fol counterproposal which he requested I convey to Dept:

Czecho agrees to settlement Oatis case on basis exchange of group of US prisoners in Czecho for equal number Czech cits imprisoned in Ger, provided:

1. Simultaneously US discontinues measures preventing export of Czech merchandise to US, and

2. Simultaneously “as sign improved relations” US either releases Czech assets frozen in US, or else returns money advanced by Czecho (this point referring specifically to steel mill), and

3. It is agreed that fol exchange, US and Czecho will negotiate with a view to solution of questions of (a) CSA overflights and (b) GATT.

Dept will observe that during conversation with Fon Min there was no ref to (1) embargo on US exports or (2) permits for entry of Czechs into Ger, or (3) US prohibition on travel US cits to Czecho.

It was agreed that pending receipt Dept’s observations on Siroky counterproposal, Emb and FonOff would begin preparation of exchange of prisoners lists, and I accordingly arranged for Counselor Thompson to meet with Lenhard, chief Amer Section for that purpose.

When I again brought up access to Oatis, FonMin said “Yes, you ought to have access to prisoner,” but he then argued that “visit might result in leak” (Siroky apparently remains much concerned over danger premature publicity), and furthermore, “Oatis should not be told of release negots until their successful conclusion”. Min requested I not press matter “because I hope you can soon go to him and say ‘Mr. Oatis, you are free’.” Considering our primary object is in fact release prisoner, and also considering improved atmosphere today’s meeting, I accordingly did not persist.

Additional comments will be cabled tomorrow.⁴

Briggs

1. Supra.
2. For the Ambassador’s later version of the conversation on this point, see Briggs, Farewell to Foggy Bottom, p. 108.
3. Regarding the steel mill under reference, see footnote 9, Document 713.
4. In telegram 411 from Praha, November 23, Ambassador Briggs outlined a negotiating course for the next meeting with Široký. (249.1111–Oatis, William/11–2351) Telegram 276 to Praha, November 24, observed that Briggs’ suggestions were substantially the same as those set forth in telegram 275 to Praha, infra. (249.1111–Oatis, William/11–2351).