Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 714

249.1111–Oatis, William/11–251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Briggs) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret
priority

Praha, November 2, 1951—3 p.m.

368. By “reasonably satisfactory” (Embtel 366, Nov 1¹) I mean that mtg with FonMin Siroky yesterday probably represented essential first step in direction negot Oatis release. It established Czechoslovak interest in reaching settlement. It paved way for early further discussion. It failed produce any commitment or to encourage belief path ahead likely be short, smooth or easy.

Discussion maintained on my part within framework Deptel 259, Oct 31² very prompt transmission of which by Dept much appreciated. I began with ref Prochazka talk with me last July re exchange of persons,³ and Secy’s interview with Prochazka on Aug 29.⁴ I recalled that Secy had said no need for relations remain at present low point and that it wld be to mutual interest both countries improve them. In that connection I said US recognizes importance from point of view Czechoslovakia avoid appearance acting under pressure, but Min shld recognize equally important from US point of view avoid appearance “paying ransom for Oatis” (latter point referred to repeatedly throughout conversation). That being understood, I continued, my govt was interested learning Siroky’s views concerning proposal to exchange persons.

FonMin’s initial response unpromising. He said in effect “Oh, so it is Oatis again. I had understood you wished talk about broad field of relations, on which basis appointment agreed to, notwithstanding treatment my Amb recd at White House⁵ and on visit to Secy Acheson”. He then launched into lengthy abusive propaganda piece: Czecho injured party rejects US attempts intervene domestic affairs, US violator principles international law, Oatis case only pretext for US measures hostile Czecho, etc. etc. to which I replied that unless FonMin willing proceed on assumption I already familiar with his govt’s views and hence no need enlighten me with speeches that character I did not think we wld make much progress.

If he persisted along that line, I said I in turn wld insist on answering his statements and also on restating my govt’s views on arrest and imprisonment of Oatis as per my statements to him on that subject last July. However, I said I wld prefer to take for granted his understanding of Amer views and he shld take for granted my understanding of Czecho’s position. Thereafter conversation went better, not greatly assisted, however, by Dilapidk and Marmoset with local CP button whose translating attentions convince me recent FonOff purge must have liquidated last competent interpreter.

Without attempting recapitulation of mtg lasting three hours 30 minutes, my main impressions are as fols:

(1) Siroky’s denunciations and forensics probably shld be largely discounted. He may have been “making character” in order inform govt colleagues “I told Amer Amb where to head in”, or quite likely conference room “wired for sound” and Siroky now has record his stout defense Commie bastions. Also likely this part of Commie technique seeking to goad, exasperate, wear down and wear out the opposition. Possibly of interest that Siroky omitted denunciations of Oatis as spy which has formed so large part previous conversations. Also Siroky’s attitude when interview ended extremely affable.

(2) Idea that proposed exchange of persons, taken by itself, wld represent solution was rejected. Siroky declared that with all US publicity concerning measures taken against Czecho, release Oatis without removal measures wld constitute “yielding to pressure”.

(3) There was lengthy argument whether, as Siroky insisted, Oatis was “merely pretext US actions hostile Czecho,” or as I insisted “obstacle removal of which essential as first step toward improvement relations.” We failed agree and I am not sure Commies may not in fact have convinced themselves, in their distorted dialectical way, that their interpretation is accurate. If so this may be of interest in connection further discussion of removal of measures.

(4) US measures fully as effective, and probably more effective, than we ourselves had previously believed. At one time or another during conversation Siroky mentioned and separately denounced every measure taken except prohibition US citizens coming Czecho, (which possibly of no interest to Czechs) and denial Ger travel permits to Czechs (which he may not connect with Oatis). He put special emphasis on “econ discrimination” particularly (a) obstacles preventing export Czecho products to US (i.e. consular invoices), (b) GATT measures and (c) CSA overflights. His purpose was, of course, to try to smoke out whether US willing make deal involving cancellation of measures.

(5) Belief Czecho perhaps more interested in solution than FonMin willing to admit likewise indicated by:

a. Ready assent to suggestion for further mtg, fol clarification to Emb by Washington of what US might do about removal of measures.

b. Fact that length of mtg resulted initiative Siroky who, had he not been seeking settlement cld readily have broken off discussion on several embittered occasions, and

c. Siroky’s reply that rather than have next mtg with acting FonMin (in Siroky’s absence UNGA Paris) it shld be arranged between him and me inasmuch as he wld probably shortly return from France or be commuting back and forth.

(6) In accordance with Dept’s instrs I refrained from indicating what US might be prepared to do about removing measures. However, in effort avoid futile discussion problems on which we cld not agree, I did find it necessary declare we are not willing discuss VOA, RFE or GATT as any part Oatis negotiation.

Fol tel submits suggestions for Dept’s consideration in drafting further instructions.⁶

Briggs

1. Telegram 366 briefly reported that Briggs had a reasonably satisfactory meeting on November 1 with Foreign Minister Široký which might provide the basis for negotiations leading to the release of Oatis. (249.1111–Oatis, William/11–151)
2. Not printed, but see footnote 10, supra.
3. See despatch 17 from Praha, Document 691.
4. See the Secretary’s memorandum of conversation, Document 706.
5. See footnote 3, Document 704.
6. In his telegram 369 from Praha, November 2, Briggs recommended that Široký be informed, at the next negotiating meeting, of the steps which the United States would take in connection with the release of Oatis. The steps mentioned by Briggs were generally those enumerated in paragraphs D, 1 and D, 2 of telegram 363 from Praha, supra.