249.1111–Oatis, William/10–1151: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1
priority
239. US has now put into effect almost every available measure in its serial course of action to exert increasing pressure on Czech [Page 1418] regime in effort obtain release Oatis. Still plan take up Oatis case in Third Comite GA mtg at Paris and as last resort Czech assets might be blocked in spite all problems associated with this step. Now that measures taken are evidently exerting their influence, press attn this issue has lessened, and freedom train incident, which has proved further irritant in US-Czech relations, liquidated, believe time arrived for US initiative with view to exploring possibilities of settlement Oatis case.
Amb Prochazka has failed get in touch with Dept since his mtg with Sec Aug 29.2 His only move re Oatis case was press conference at Emb here Sept 253 precise purpose which still unclear. While in our opinion Czech auths wld like extricate themselves from uncomfortable situation which they have gotten into, provided means can be found for avoiding appearance yielding to our pressure, they may themselves make no move for some time and we desire always assume initiative whenever occasion opportune.
US initiative now involves two chief problems, (1) nature of approach and (2) place of discussion considering détente along fol lines:
“It seems unfortunate to us, as it may also to Czech Govt, relations between two govts have reached so low an ebb. It wld be in our mutual interest for those relations to improve, and there is certainly no need for them to remain as they are. For our part we desire to see those relations improved and are willing to take steps toward this goal should same spirit animate Czech Govt. There are certain stumbling blocks but we think it possible remove them. We are therefore open to any suggestions which Czechs may have for improving present situation and they may be sure we will give their suggestions most careful attn with hope reaching favorable outcome.”
This approach may be sufficient for opening move, but if circumstances warrant we might proceed further:
“One of stumbling blocks to better relations continued detention of Oatis and Hvasta. Let us agree not to discuss reasons for detention but confine ourselves to find way solve existing problems in view benefits accruing both countries from solution. In this connection [Page 1419] we wld like to refer to possibility favorable development which Amb Briggs mentioned as Amb Prochazka was leaving Praha, namely, exchange Oatis for Czech natl imprisoned US Zone Ger or of broader possibility involving Oatis and other Amer natls such as Hvasta for Czech prisoners in our custody. We wld like pursue this suggestion again and ascertain whether Czech Govt responsive to this possibility favorable development which cld then lead to other steps (such as removal our economic pressures applied since imprisonment Oatis).”
Proposal for exchange prisoners seems only apparent means for us to advance as device save appearances for Czechs in release Oatis. However, appreciate it may encourage all Commie regimes to conclude they may in future obtain return one of their prisoners in our hands by arresting one our natls. Ur comments this point particularly desired.
Uncertain whether better make such move here or at Praha. Prochazka has clearly interested himself this problem and apparently enjoys confidence his govt. If, however, he should be called in for mtg at highest level, development wld be extensively publicized so that it might be more difficult for Czechs react favorably. If discussion initiated here by Asst Secy, Czechs might infer matter not of top importance to this govt. Dept, moreover, considers it preferable as gen rule for such business to be conducted with satellite govts by our missions abroad rather than here with their dipl representatives. On other hand difficulty of mtg Siroky on any responsive basis is recognized.
Before reaching any conclusion as to manner and place of taking this initiative wld appreciate ur views.4
Meanwhile in order not prejudice outcome such discussion believe it advisable defer projected note re access Oatis ur 298 Oct 11.5
- Drafted by Vedeler (EUR/EE) but not otherwise cleared.↩
- See the Secretary’s memorandum of this meeting, Document 706. As is pointed out in Briggs, Farewell to Foggy Bottom, p. 107, Ambassador Procházka never returned to the Department of State after his visit of August 29. He left Washington in October to serve with the Czechslovak Delegation at the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly in Paris.↩
- Procházka held a 2-hour press conference for American newsmen at the Czechoslovak Embassy on September 25. In the course of the conference, Procházka maintained that Oatis was not being held for ransom, but he did indicate that negotiations for Oatis’ release could be held if American trade restrictions against Czechoslovakia were relaxed. (Department of State Wireless Bulletin, No. 234, September 25, 1951, p. 13)↩
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In telegram 325 from Praha, October 22, Briggs replied that an approach to Foreign Minister Široký might reveal whether events had matured sufficiently to make an early settlement of Oatis’ case possible. He added the following cautionary observation:
“Believe US handling this case has demonstrated that Amer citizen cannot be abandoned with impunity and consequently that exchange of prisoner for Oatis shld not encourage Commie regime use device arresting US citizen to obtain release prisoner in US jurisdiction.” (249.1111–Oatis, William/10–2251)
↩ - Not printed.↩