Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 592

663.001/12–1551: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Donnelly) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Vienna, December 15, 1951—noon.

2060. For Perkins and Williamson. Pls inform the Secy that in accordance with his suggestion to me in Rome, three Western HICOMs here have consulted re tactics for next meeting Aust treaty deps. Fol are recommendations which we have now agreed upon (Embtel 2037, Dec 13²), and which are being sent London and Paris by Brit and French HICOMs:

• “1. Timing: Latest proposal suggested by US chairman is for mtg of deps on Jan 21, preceded by preliminary discussion between Western deps on Jan 18. On reconsideration Aust Min of Fon Affairs has no objection, and from local point of view nor have we.
• 2. Tactics: as preliminary step Sovs shld be confronted with present draft treaty (Western powers wld then make it clear that if Sovs were prepared to sign the present treaty, Western powers wld go long way to meet them on outstanding articles. Aust Govt wld wish us to be ready to accept present Russian texts of all outstanding articles for sake of treaty and if Sovs are prepared for serious negots, US-Brit-French elements in Aust wld recommend such action only as last resort in order to achieve treaty during forthcoming mtgs.
• 3. In any case we shld so steer matters that if Sovs refuse to sign treaty it will be quite clear that this is not because of Allied disinclination to make concessions, but because Sovs, directly or indirectly, by raising extraneous issues, will not sign even on their present terms for unagreed articles.
• 4. If no progress is possible despite repeated efforts, we recommend that negots shld be adjourned (not terminated) in order to enable deps to report back to their govt.
• 5. It will be desirable that next chairmanship shld be in Western hands.
• 6. It will also be desirable at this point for free consultation with Aust Govt about next step in light of what has actually happened at deps mtgs. Aust Govt has made it clear that it wld want to be able to carry Parliament and public opinion with them.
• 7. At this stage, question of publicity, including release of proposed US White Book, wld be considered by Western powers and the Aust Govt in light of developments.
• 8. If clearcut position has been reached that Sovs refuse treaty even on their present terms for unagreed articles, there wld appear to be three main courses open.

  A. To do nothing;

  B. To take matter before United Nations;

  C. To endeavor to obtain Sov acquiescence in some form of instrument, such as US proposed abbreviated treaty, main object of which wld be to evacuate Aust in accordance with Moscow declaration of 1943.

• 9. We know from Austs that it wld be profoundly discouraging for them if course A were adopted. Outlook wld be hopeless for Austs and Western powers wld be shown to be defeatist and without ideas. All Western elements in Aust are against this.
• 10. All Western elements are equally against course B as next step. Submission of treaty to United Nations at this stage wld lead to no practical result, and such a failure wld have almost as depressing effect upon Aust public opinion as course A.
• 11. Austs are now in favor of course C. If this were agreed, new instrument cld either be presented by Western powers in Moscow in notes to Sov Govt, or cld be introduced at mtg of deputies convened for that purpose. We agreed with Aust Govt’s preference for this course, provided that care is taken in way in which instrument is presented to Sovs. Any impression that it was “diktat” shld be avoided, and it shld be presented for discussion after an interval of not more than 10 to 14 days so that initiative remains in Western hands.
• 12. It is of course unlikely that Sovs, having refused to sign present draft treaty, wld agree at once to an instrument less favorable to them. But provided it is made plain from start that document is draft for negot, there is no reason why we should volunteer concession, and three Western elements here see no local objection to starting on lines of US proposed abbreviated treaty. If there are later to be concessions, it wld be up to Sovs to seek them.
• 13. As long as Sov refusal of present draft treaty was clearcut, there wld be no necessity to define our position toward that draft beyond saying that Sovs themselves were not prepared to complete it. If asked, by Sovs or elsewhere, what our attitude wld be if Sovs wished to take up discussion on present draft again, we cld reply that this was hypothetical question and problem wld be treated on merits if it arose. It shld, however, be clear that once Sovs have shown their refusal to accept present draft even on their present terms for remaining articles, only way of reviving present draft wld be direct Sov request. That wld effectually create entirely new situation, which wld have to be considered on its merits at the time.
• 14. Meanwhile present draft treaty wld be regarded as withdrawn from further discussion. Indeed, provided that we cld show that Sovs had themselves refused to complete it even on their present terms for unagreed articles, there wld be no other logical or dignified course.
• 15. In event of Sovs accepting treaty or new instrument, some consideration shld be given to ratification clause, i.e., we shld consider laying down that ratifications shld be exchanged within blank period of time.”

Foregoing recommendations were discussed by three HICOMs with Reber in preliminary form, and in fact he participated in formulation. As will be apparent, they have been drafted from our local point of view, and we have not endeavored to assess other elements in situation. We believe it will be equally apparent, however, that they have been framed to refute what we understand to have been principal objections of Brit and French Govts to introduction of US abbreviated treaty (Secto 112, Nov 29³).

By way of explanation, it wld be stated that by phrase “present Sov terms” used above is meant Sov text of unagreed articles as they stood immed prior to Sov introduction of Trieste and other extraneous issues into negots. Further in explanation we wld like to point out that we regard course of action outlined in paras 2, 3 and 4 above as essentially that suggested in Paris tel [3030], Nov 20⁴ to Dept rptd Vienna 95. While we recognize risk of such action, we regard it as calculated one we cld take, as some such bold step is needed for introduction of abbreviated treaty.⁵

Donnelly

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn for Reber.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 5, Document 590.
4. Document 584.
5. In telegram 1553 to Vienna, December 19, the Department of State informed Donnelly that it accepted the recommendations of the three Western High Commissioners as presented in this telegram. (663.001/12–1551)