Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/3–151: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
priority

London, March 1, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 576. Appreciate opportunity given by Todep 272² to comment on Lovett letter³ before final decision reached and trust you will both weigh following discussion in reaching it.

It is, of course, true that operational phase is just beginning and that much valuable experience will be gained in coming years. However, several considerations militate against solution a.

One point I wish to emphasize is that present reorganization proposals do not involve change from one hard and fast arrangement to another which will last indefinitely but represent rather one step in an evolutionary process. Further changes will undoubtedly be necessary in light of further experience. This was recognized in first sentence of second paragraph D–D1/1⁴ “Organization established under NAT should be operated with as much flexibility as possible and be subject to review from time to time.”

Original organization was blueprinted without benefit of experience by political WG before first meeting of council. I am advised that Defense and JCS representatives in those preliminary discussions then expressed concern over “can of worms” of twelve-nation committees which were then considered politically necessary if otherwise unfortunate. Experience has subsequently shown need for reduction in number of twelve-nation committees and increasing use of operating staff agencies. This has been reflected in establishment of SHAPE and DPB and in recognized need for a FEB.

In this evolutionary process, in parts of which we have exerted effective leadership, we can accomplish little by attempting to convince others that no improvement is needed at this time. Eleven other governments and substantial part of US officials concerned hold opinion which I share that further improvement can and should be made at this time. Should we follow solution a, most we could do would be to frustrate others temporarily by refusing to budge. Aside from abandonment of US leadership in this field, ill will which would be caused would react unfavorably in other fields in which we are seeking to stimulate action.

One of the most important considerations to my mind is that of giving Eisenhower, Herod and Batt most effective political support from outset. Do not consider present structure adequate to obtain for them supporting action by other NAT governments to degree and with speed which will be necessary. Believe we owe it to them to develop most effective possible instrument for obtaining requisite governmental support and that this should be sought now with such further changes in future as experience may indicate.

I accordingly recommend strongly against solution a.

Solution b seems much more realistically in accord with US interests. If instructed to proceed vigorously along lines b believe we can obtain agreement and that end product will be better instrument for US leadership than we now have. I have following specific comments:

What Council is called or whether it is retitled at all seems of minor importance, although my preference would be to retain present title “North Atlantic Council”. What is important is concept. I am puzzled by statement it should not be “considered as a council of governments” and assume this not intended to imply members would not speak for their governments (as they always have). Such implication would make Council merely impotent debating society and deprive whole organization of central authority.

Military side of organization is obviously matter for discussions by military authorities and we have accordingly avoided deputies’ consideration of Portuguese and similar proposals⁵ pending such action if any as SG might wish to take. Our main interest in this field is to ensure governmental action adequate to implement agreed military decisions.

Agree with paragraph a except question need for any change in title and believe participation by Finance and other ministers if agenda requires should not be excluded.

Fully agree with paragraph b but if MilCom is to be retained would suggest additional provision such as is implied in DC 24/3⁶ whereby decisions of SG which require governmental approval could be transmitted direct by SG with agreement of Military Representatives Commission to deputies for final governmental action. Would welcome representative of Defense Department on my staff and would be glad to work out with State and Defense arrangement for channels for instructions of such representative, etc.

Re paragraph d, we will undoubtedly have difficulty with smaller nations. However, USmil must undoubtedly be best judges as to what best serves US interests in this field both as to substance and timing and we will continue to resist pressure for any changes unless and until US agrees that they are desirable.

Fully agree with paragraphs c, e and final paragraph. Would appreciate definite instructions soonest.

Spofford

1. Repeated to Paris for MacArthur. Beginning almost immediately after an instruction from Spofford on March 1 (telegram 1610 to Paris, Depto 571 to Washington), all telegrams from his office to Paris were assumed to be made available to MacArthur and were no longer marked for him. (740.5/3–151)
2. Dated February 26, p. 65.
3. Quoted in telegram Todep 272, ibid.
4. Council Document D–1/1. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iv, pp. 330–337.
5. The reference here is to a proposal of late 1950 by the Portuguese Representative on the Council Deputies for a wartime NATO Supreme Cabinet of five members and a five-member Standing Group. This suggestion was described and charted in an appendix to Defense Committee Document DC 24/1, October 26, 1950. The Belgian Representative at about the same time proposed a different formula for composition of the Standing Group. For reference to the discussion of such proposals, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
6. Defense Committee Document DC 24/3, “Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Defense Committee on the Creation of an Integrated European Defense Force, the Establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe, and the Reorganization of the NATO Military Structure,” distributed in the Defense Committee with a covering note by its Secretary on December 12, 1950, approved by the North Atlantic Council as Document C 6–D/7 on December 18, 1950. For text of DC 24/3, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 548 ff.