740.5/2–2751
The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Director of Defense Mobilization (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Wilson: I refer to your letter to General Marshall of 16 February 1951, enclosing a memorandum of understanding to promote closer inter-agency relations on European production and aid [Page 68] programs.2 The Department of Defense is particularly concerned about paragraph III D of the paper which implies relocating in Paris those North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agencies now in London. The remainder of the document is satisfactory as a statement of objectives to be secured through Departmental action.
We have received the views of both General Eisenhower (on 24 February 1951) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (on 20 February) on this matter. They both are convinced that a move to consolidate NATO in Paris is undesirable at this time.
I wish to summarize the detailed reasons given by General Eisenhower as to why the move should not be undertaken: There is a definite and continuing security risk in the concentration of so much NATO activity in one city; there is already a serious shortage of adequate accommodations in the Paris area; concentration of NATO activities in Paris might lead to the by-passing of the Standing Group or force it to move to Paris; and finally, that retention of certain major NATO agencies in Paris, London and Washington tends to keep alive with national leaders an interest in NATO affairs.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned that the concentration in Paris would subject General Eisenhower to direct political pressure, which might well be detrimental to him militarily. Furthermore, the proximity of the Council Deputies to SHAPE would tend to prejudice the military authority of the Standing Group in which the authority of the United States is more predominant.
It is therefore quite clear that from the military point of view the move to Paris would be disadvantageous. The Department of Defense is aware that the primary reason advanced for the move is to achieve a closer NATO relationship with the OEEC. This is not a matter of our direct responsibility. It would seem, however, that this requirement could be achieved by other means, such as moving all or part of OEEC to London.
I believe the Executive Branch is faced with the problem of deciding whether or not the financial and economic aspects of the problem are of over-riding importance and therefore could only be resolved by the move to Paris despite the views of General Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It seems to me that the interested Departments should consider this matter further before introducing any proposal into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I am forwarding a copy of this letter to Messrs. Harriman, Foster and Cabot.
Sincerely yours,