740.5/12–2851: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State
2948. Fol is résumé Embs views on problem NATO and arrangements Greece and Turkey. Emb aware current thinking in Wash which advocates separate NATO command a C-in-C East under Brit commander who in turn wld be under SACEUR. Emb recognizes general question US–UK relationships and allocation regional military commands on world-wide basis play predominant part in determining final solution. Nevertheless Emb feels compelled review some of reasons [Page 614] for which from Embs more parochial point of view proposed solution seems undesirable.
Grk reluctance accept Brit commander has been strongly stated and frequently reiterated even by King. Brit prestige in Greece today may well be at lowest ebb in history of Grk-UK relationships. Not only is feeling running high in connection Cyprus issue1 but has been aggravated by fundamentally opposing Grk-UK interests with regard to recognition of Farouk as king of Sudan2 and has reached climax as result unfortunate UK handling Grk candidacy for SC.3 Under these circumstances there is tendency some elements reopen old accounts and hold Brit liable for what they regard as past sins such as UK policy in Greece during and immed after occupation, etc. Announcement withdrawal Brit police and prison mission and eventual announcement withdrawal Brit milit mission will reduce even further Brit prestige in Greece.
Fact that in view all these circumstances Grk forces placed under command Brit NATO commander coupled with fact that Amer econ assistance has been materially reduced is likely to be interpreted as an abdication of Amer position and influence in Greece in particular and in NE area in general. Consequently our ability effectively develop and direct US policy in Greece and area will be correspondingly diminished.
It is important Amer influence in Greece be maintained at highest possible level not only because of strategic position of Greece but also because it is essential that diminishing level of US econ aid be used with greatest possible effectiveness if grave econ and polit consequences are to be avoided. We must not forget that Greece continues to be primary example of effectiveness of Amer fon assistance techniques. This is a polit fact of major importance particularly in Middle East, South Asia and other underdeveloped areas of the world.
[Page 615]If command responsibility under NATO milit organization implies auth for proposed C-in-C East review troop dispositions equipment program, etc., we have serious reservations as to effect which may be produced on work accomplished here under milit assistance program and as to milit missions continued effectiveness. Both Grks and to certain extent our own milit people mistrust Brit motives in establishing C-in-C East. They fear interests of this area may ultimately be incorporated with and subordinated more basic Brit interest in Suez area and Mid East. On Grk side this goes so far as to anticipate that requirements may be made on Grk milit forces for service in Mid East. This they wld stoutly resist. There is also apprehension that equipment requirements of Grk forces as developed under Brit regional commander might well be designed primarily to serve possible Brit interests in Mid East.
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We believe possible domestic US polit repercussions of submitting tremendous US investment in Greece and Turkey to considerably greater measure Brit control must be carefully appraised. Assistance of Greece and Turk continues receive wider margin of bipartisan polit support than almost any other aspect our fon policy. We have been impressed by fact that almost every congressional party visiting Athens has expressed keen interest and dissatisfaction at any intimation that Brit influence this area exceeds degree of Brit financial participation.
In summary we do not believe there is any US interest in this area which will be served by placing Grk and Turk NATO forces under Brit command. We realize ultimate decision this matter will probably be taken on basis of world-wide considerations our relations with UK. Even in this respect however we question whether US actually serving Brit interests (and presumably therefore our own) by imposing British leadership in this strategic area where it will in fact be resented. Moreover it wld seem dangerous employ Brit as an instrument US policy in those areas where UK hegemony has been rejected and UK [Page 616] prestige irrevocably damaged. It is extremely doubtful whether in light serious reverses to Brit prestige in area and extreme Brit sensibility to their position Brit policy can under present circumstances provide balanced leadership which is so vitally needed. Foregoing pertains principally to problem command relationship as it affects Greece. It does not purport examine problem as it pertains to Turk which US attempting develop into factor great positive strength or need for continued dynamic US leadership in ME area as whole where Brit policy has proved barren and inflexible. While it is obviously in US interest to shore up Brit prestige and authority whenever and wherever feasible I do not believe US interests can be advanced over long term by pretending internatl position of UK is more powerful than it actually is or by conferring upon UK measure of authority which can be exercised only with active US support and through sufferance of other powers. I believe US interests wld be best served by continued discharge of responsibilities which US has already accepted in this area.