Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/12–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by C. R. Moore of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs¹

secret

[Washington,] December 19, 1951.

Subject: Turkish Views on the NATO Command Relationship

Participants:	Mr. W. M. Rountree, Director, GTI
	Mr. Melih Esenbel, Counselor, Turkish Embassy
	Mr. C. Robert Moore, GTI

Problem: The Turkish Government reiterates its position on the NATO Command relationship.

Action Required: None, unless some change in the present United States position seems imminent.

Prior to this meeting Mr. Esenbel informed Mr. Moore that Ambassador Erkin had been instructed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry to transmit to Secretary Acheson the Turkish Government’s views on the NATO Command relationship. As the Ambassador is on leave and some time may elapse before he has an appointment with the Secretary, Mr. Esenbel thought it advisable to convey the message to the Department and arranged to see Mr. Rountree for this purpose.

Mr. Esenbel stated that the Turkish Government had taken note of the impending visit of Prime Minister Churchill to the United States² and felt it quite likely that among the questions to be discussed at meetings in Washington would be that of Command arrangements for Turkey as a NATO member. The Government wanted to make its position very clear on this subject, as it had already done in the aide-mémoire which it submitted to the American, British and French Governments in late October,³ i.e., it should have in NATO equal responsibilities and equal rights and should be attached to the same Command (the Eisenhower Command) as the other NATO participants. The Turkish Government believes that its NATO Command relationship must be worked out first and that only after this has been done will it be able to consider what additional responsibilities it may be able to undertake in the Middle East Command. Mr. Esenbel added that it may be some time before the Middle East Command can be effectively organized and that the primary problem now is to solve the problem of Turkey’s position in SACEUR, which, from the military as well as the political point of view, makes the best logic.

Mr. Rountree stated that our military and political people were very aware of the Turkish position on this issue. Secretary Acheson, he recalled, had indicated to Ambassador Baydur in Rome that we had sympathetically studied the Turkish aide-memoire and that he felt a solution along the lines of Turkey’s inclusion in an existing NATO Command under General Eisenhower would ultimately be developed. Mr. Rountree added that there has been no change in the United States position since that conversation.⁴

1. Copies to EUR; Division of Research, Near East; Executive Secretariat; Policy Planning Staff; Deputy Under Secretary of State; Defense; and the Embassies in Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom.
2. Prime Minister Churchill visited Washington between January 5 and 18, 1952.
3. See memorandum of November 26, p. 608.
4. On December 27, Turkish Ambassador Erkin returned to the Department of State for a further conversation on the NATO-MEC Command relationship with Messrs. Berry and Moore. The Ambassador reiterated his Government’s view that Turkey belonged to the NATO community and that Turkey’s place within the command structure should be determined prior to the actual establishment of a Middle Eastern Command. Berry “assured the Ambassador that there had been no change in this Government’s position.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 27, 740.5/12–1951)