Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.MA Palestine/2–2249

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

secret

Tel Aviv, February 22, 1949.

No. 46

Sir: In answer to the Department’s telegram 91 of February 15, 1949,¹ in reference to Palestine war refugees, I have the honor to submit in this communication an analysis of the elements of the problem and some factors in its possible solution.

[Here follow sections on “Summary,” “Background,” and “Present Obstructive Tendencies.”]

The Israeli Official Position

There is no evidence that the Israeli Government through action by the Cabinet or the State Council has as yet defined an official position towards the problem of Palestine refugees. None of the few public or semipublic statements by the Foreign Minister have been comprehensive or authoritative. On several occasions, I have talked at length with Mr. Shertok (my last talk was today) and on two or three occasions with the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Gurion, about the problem. The general impression I gather is that no one here has yet thought the matter through. Nonetheless, what is known of Israel’s position at this time I summarize as follows:

1. Sole responsibility for the creation of refugees rests upon the Arab states who, in violation of the UN November 29th recommendation on partition, began and continued an offensive war against Israel. All other factors which may have played a part in the exodus are secondary and comparatively unimportant. Had there been no Arab attack upon Israel there would have been no Arab refugees.

2. Israel will gladly make available technical assistance and personnel in planning the resettlement of refugees outside of its territory.

3. It will consider sympathetically financial contributions towards such resettlement either in the form of compensation for Arab properties left behind by the refugees or as direct governmental grants.

4. There can be no formal consideration of Israel’s role in such resettlement except as an integral part of peace negotiations and settlements with the several Arab states.

5. To allow any substantial return of refugees prior to peace would be to impose upon the Israeli military and police authorities an unbearable and wholly unacceptable responsibility.

6. Though the Israeli spokesmen do not say so, the unprecedentedly rapid influx of Jewish refugees during 1948 and the plan to admit a quarter of a million more in 1949 will, if carried out, fill all or almost all of the houses and business properties previously held by Arab refugees. Arab unoccupied farms will similarly, though not to quite the same degree, be occupied by the recent or expected Jewish refugees. Hence, there will be almost no residence or business property and only a limited number of farms to which the Arab refugees can hope to return.

Recommendations

On the basis of the above analysis of governmental attitudes in general and of those of the Israel and Arab governments in particular, I recommend:

1. The immediate supplying of Ambassador Griffis and his colleagues with the resources necessary to keep the refugees alive pending their resettlement. The appropriation by Congress of the full amount of $16,000,000 requested by President Truman as our Government’s contribution will, I trust, have been passed before this despatch is received by the Department, for without this American example of generosity, Mr. Griffis’ drive for essential relief funds must fail.

2. Constant and concerted pressure on both Israel and the Arab states to eschew politics in their thinking and planning about refugees and to take account of humanitarian considerations. Emphatically these governments should be told that in the long run the human approach will be the best policy.

3. Israel be urged to accept the principle that:

• a. The serious and sympathetic study of plans for the return of those refugees who wish to return be not postponed until formal peace has been made or peace negotiations begun;
• b. Permission to return be not tied up with such extraneous problems as permission to Jews now living in Arab countries to leave in order to enter Israel.

4. The Arab states be urged to recognize that to make the prior return of the refugees a sine qua non of peace negotiations would be to destroy any chance of concession by Israel and instead would tend to protract indefinitely the present twilight which is neither peace nor war. It should be obvious to the Arab governments, if not to their peoples, that it is impracticable if not impossible for Israel to open its doors to the returning refugees before its enemies have agreed to begin peace negotiations.

5. Fundamental to any resettlement plan will be large capital funds. No estimate of the amount required can, however, be made until there has been a detailed study of the number to be resettled and where.

6. The required resettlement funds might be obtained from these sources:

• a. Compensation by Israel for refugee property taken over by the state or by private individuals or corporations.
• b. Lands suitable for resettlement made available by the Arab governments.
• c. An international loan similar to that which under League of Nations auspices made possible the transfer of more than a million Greeks from Smyrna and vicinity to their motherland.

7. Comprehensive but general recommendations by the Palestine Conciliation Commission of an Arab refugee resettlement program is the obvious next step. Any plan to be acceptable in Tel Aviv must make provision for resettlement of the larger proportion of the refugees outside of Israeli territory.

A Definite Plan Now?

Nothing would be easier—or less useful—than for me, or any other informed person, to attempt to draw up now a detailed plan of resettlement, including adequate financing. Any such plan might appear to be sound and just, but in reality it would be so theoretical as to be almost worthless. There are still too many unknown factors to permit the preparation of a sound program.

Here are some of the unknowns:

1. The number of refugees—the estimates still vary by hundreds of thousands.

2. The real attitudes of the governments directly concerned;

• a. How many refugees will be permitted to return to Israel? The sooner armistices with the neighboring states have been concluded, the sooner there can be an approximate answer to this question.
• b. How many will be permitted to be resettled in the Arab states? I anticipate (despite present Arab public statements) that this number will be very large if adequate funds are made available.

3. The degree of unity of the states in UN in support of a resettlement program.

4. The degree of willingness of such states to make sacrifices toward a comprehensive solution.

This incomplete list of unknowns suggests that at most the Palestine Conciliation Commission can at the present time probably do no more than draft a very general outline of a possible program, or programs, for the refugees. The Commission’s present tour of all the capitals will have supplied it with political background against which a refugee scheme can be realistically envisaged. Perhaps the Commission might at the outset limit itself to the drawing up of a set of principles upon which basis a group of technicians could then be authorized to begin the preparation of a more definitive scheme.

Meantime—and this I regard as the essence of the matter—all possible friendly influence should be brought to bear upon all the states involved to study sympathetically ways in which each can make its maximum contribution to an agreed solution—a solution which would over the years be advantageous to all.²

Respectfully yours,

James G. McDonald

1. Not printed; it expressed the Department’s belief that prospects for early approval of the refugee bill were favorable (501.BB Palestine/2–1349).
2. The Department, in reply on April 1, stated that “This timely and objective report has had an important influence upon the formulation of the Department’s long-range policy towards the Palestine refugee question, particularly with regard to the definition of the objectives of this Government. The Department is in accord with your recommendations … and would welcome your more detailed comments on means by which your recommendations number 2, 3, and 4 can be implemented.” (airgram 55, 501.BB Palestine/2–2249)