Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Council/6–1449: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
priority
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Paris, June 14, 1949—3 p.m.

Actel 69. Eyes Only Webb and Rusk. Re Telac 81, June 13.¹ Following indicates development of draft modus vivendi paper (see Delsec 1888²) and our general thinking on problem you raise.

Earlier drafts this paper contained explicit references to “established right of access” or “right of access”. Bevin and Schuman, however, strongly opposed such references on grounds (1) we might seem to question validity of our right by making point of its reaffirmation, in this document and (2) what we are chiefly interested in is not theoretical assertion of right but practical performance. Schuman even wished to omit paragraph 5 from this paper and submit it as separate proposal which would not be tied to trade and machinery for continuing consultation.

Over and above opposition of British and French, we were impressed by following considerations. If reference to “established right of access” is included in document it seems unlikely, in view of Stalin’s attitude last August,³ Vishinsky would agree and we would risk losing any CFM decision whatsoever on access. Moreover, if reference to “right of access” were included in Western proposal, it would be impossible to drop reference during negotiations without giving impression we were uncertain of right. Best solution, all things considered, seemed therefore to omit explicit reference at outset.

Our conviction is that, if Soviets accept paragraph 5, even excluding reference to autobahn, this will in fact constitute recognition of our right of access and tacit abandonment of Stalin’s contention we had lost our right. We consider this would be significant and valuable step even if terms of paragraph are vague. On this point we felt (1) that it would be impractical for Foreign Ministers to negotiate here detailed agreement which would cover all desiderata regarding movement of persons and goods to and from Berlin, and (2) that no matter how detailed agreement might be Soviets can, if they wish, find means of evading its implementation. Reduction to writing of agreement with Soviet is illusory victory and definitely dangerous inasmuch as it might mislead our Congress and public to believe all difficulties removed and therefore no need maintain state of readiness. We believe, therefore, that paragraph 5 represents approximate extent of agreement Foreign Ministers could hope to reach at this meeting. We recognize moreover that paragraph on autobahn, which was included over strong objections of British and French, will probably not be accepted by Soviets and may have to be substantially modified or dropped altogether.

You will have received from Berlin through Army text of statement handed Russians in Berlin at conclusion of negotiations there, yesterday.⁴ While Berlin negotiators failed to secure any Soviet signature to a document, we believe outcome of those talks is of definite value. Supplementing New York agreement,⁵ which in itself is partial reversal of Soviet position that we have lost our rights, it constitutes further acknowledgement and implementation. If supplemented by negotiations contemplated in paragraph 5 our paper, it might well produce actual operating situation which would give us as much satisfaction as the situation makes possible.

Reference your specific questions about our draft, paragraph 5(1) is intended to cover requirements of occupying powers only and paragraph 5(2) supplies for Berlin population. Distinction is based on fact that requirements of former are limited and can be precisely calculated, whereas in case of latter “requirements” are flexible and we desire Soviet agreement to facilitate whatever volume of goods it may prove physically possible to move. As to other “agreements and arrangements” British pressed hard for specific reference New York agreement but we felt it wiser to keep language general in order to cover both earlier agreements on access and any understandings which might emerge from current negotiations in Berlin.

We definitely want to maintain our original position that our right in Berlin and therefore our right of access does not depend on any agreement but on our common conquest of Germany.

Statement made in Actel 31, June 2⁶ expressed a hope the fulfillment of which now seems impossible for reasons already indicated. Although the proposed modus vivendi would be a very modest outcome of CFM, we do not think it would be a damaging result and that in many ways it would represent a disinct advance.

In small secret meeting scheduled 3:30 this afternoon, if Vishinsky indicates general favorable attitude toward modus vivendi paper as a whole but flatly rejects autobahn provision under paragraph 5, I intend to ask him what alternative he suggests to safeguard our requirement. If he has nothing to offer, I intend to ask him whether he intends to deny our right of access and to assert a right to reimpose the blockade. Depending on actual situation, I may continue to state that, if that is Soviet position, I had to warn Vishinsky that they were creating very serious situation in regard to which we reserve right to take such measures as may be necessary. I would further say that I shall be compelled to state this position publicly in the plenary session. If Vishinsky is completely negative on whole modus vivendi proposal, we shall probably not introduce the paper but in final plenary will indicate the agreement we have tried to reach. We would say that, while we have not reached agreement here, we are ready, any time Soviet changes mind, to consult with them on (1) East-West trade, (2) situation in Berlin, (3) facilitation of access. We would then reassert our rights in Berlin and right of access. Would conclude by suggesting that any time Soviets wish to discuss these matters if they will so inform us we will enter discussions.

1. Not printed; in it the Department expressed its concern about the modus vivendi and particularly paragraph 5 which seemed vague, adding “If your estimate is that Soviets are seriously seeking some modus vivendi and that we can therefore rely upon loosely worded general agreement as face-saving for them, such consideration not generally understood here and would require careful public treatment to avoid impression that we have not sought much less obtained clear definition and reaffirmation of our right of access to Berlin.” (740.00119 Council/6–1349)
2. Not printed; it transmitted the text of the draft tripartite modus vivendi which is printed on p. 1051.
3. For documentation regarding the tripartite talks with Stalin and Molotov in Moscow during August and September, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii , chapter 4.
4. Under reference here is the report of the Western Occupation Authorities on the Berlin Discussions on Transport and Trade, June 13. For the text of this report, see p. 815.
5. For the text of the communiqué issued at New York on May 5, 1949, see editorial note, p. 750.
6. Not printed; in it Acheson had stated that he would make every effort to obtain a clear definition and reaffirmation of the United States right of access to Berlin. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–249)