740.00119 Council/6–1349: Telegram
The Member of the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Acheson) to President Truman and the Acting Secretary of State
Actel 67. Eyes Only for President and Webb. This telegram supplements my Actel 65 June 12.1 Texts of two papers handed Vishinsky last evening have now been transmitted Delsec 1888 June 13 and Delsec 1891 June 13.2
Our modus vivendi paper was drafted to capitalize on what appears to be very serious Soviet desire reestablish participation in four power activities. At same time, for reasons frankly explained by us in CFM, it is not now possible to establish formally Allied Control Council or Kommandatura in Berlin since we would either have to accept old basis of operation, which is not now feasible, or else spend endless time working out modified arrangements. Accordingly, our plan contemplates accepting principle of continued quadripartite talks but without any formalization in definite organizations at this time. Similarly, in connection with participation of Germans in future discussons of expansion of trade, we have avoided setting up any such formal body as Vishinsky originally proposed but have provided that Germans can discuss these matters under the auspices of the occupation authorities.
We anticipate that Vishinsky will come back with suggestion that paragraph four of our proposal be expanded into something approaching [Page 993] his original suggestion for all-German state council. We are making anticipatory studies to see if we could accept any language which might meet him part way but we are clear that his proposal, in its present form, would be equally unacceptable to us and to the Western Germans. The Soviets may contemplate that if they can get us to agree to establishment of some such formal German body, we would then have to agree to some reestablishment of Allied Control Council to control Germans. We shall avoid falling into this trap.
In regard to paragraph five of our modus vivendi proposal, we have felt the final paragraph regarding transfer to Western operation and maintenance of Helmstedt–Berlin autobahn was worth trying out although we have very little expectation that Vishinsky would accept it. We do think that if he declines this proposal we will be in more advantageous position to ask him what alternative he suggests to give us the assurances we require concerning access.
I emphasized in our secret meeting last night that all of our proposals were part of one package. Particularly with reference to point 5, I made clear that we can make no agreement regarding future contacts and cooperation or regarding increased East-West trade unless we have satisfactory assurances on communications with Berlin. Actually, if Soviets unwilling fully accept paragraph five our proposal, we would consider watered-down version first four paragraphs eliminating, for example, paragraph 3(a) item.
At meeting last night Vishinsky gave no hint of his reaction to our proposals on modus vivendi but, as indicated in Actel 65, his response on Austrian treaty was encouraging. After emphasizing the justice of the Yugoslav claims to compensation from Austria and the justice of the desire of the Slovenes and Croats to join Yugoslavia, he said that we cannot postpone Austrian treaty indefinitely, and that problems which present difficulties cannot be a permanent obstacle to a settlement. He went on to say that we must, therefore, shunt the obstacles aside in order to prevent further delays in the conclusion of the Austria peace treaty. He raised some details concerning the transfers of German assets, but all three Western Ministers said they were sure deputies could agree on these details if agreement reached on total amount to be paid to Soviet in complete satisfaction their claims. Again we made it clear that our agreement to their demand for $150 million was tied in with their agreement on the other two principal points. In answer to a question of Vishinsky’s Bevin assured him that the offer made at Moscow regarding surrender of Austrian property in Yugoslavia still stands. In answer to another question of Vishinsky’s on the Slovene and Croat minorities, Schuman said that this could be handled by [Page 994] direct settlement between the Austrian and Yugoslav Governments which the Austrian Government was ready to make. Vishinsky did not dissent on any of these points but, on the other hand, did not commit himself finally.
Have included some of the above details to give you the flavor of these private talks which we plan to continue tomorrow. We are taking every precaution to prevent leaks to the press. At this moment we are inclined to think that there is reasonable chance of winding up CFM Thursday with an agreement on the three Austrian treaty points and on some kind of modus vivendi along lines which we suggested.