740.0011 EW/6–2846: Telegram
The Military Adviser on the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Lincoln) to the War Department86
top secret
Paris, 28 June 1946.
TT 6575. For Norstad87 from Lincoln.
- 1.
- This concerns Warx 9265888 which contained substance of Naf 1166. Byrnes views are:
- a.
- As to Pola our forces should remain there since sudden withdrawal would cause disorders and also since such action would in effect prejudge the issue. However Byrnes pointed out U.S.-British and French have already indicated acceptance of a line which would give Pola to the Yugoslavs. Hence no responsible person should mislead the people of Pola on this point or interpose obstacles in the way of Italians who wish to leave the city.
- b.
- As to the Yugoslav detachment in Zone A which is an integral part of the Morgan agreement, Byrnes considers it diplomatically infeasible to press Yugoslavs on this matter at this time.
- c.
- As to move of regimental combat team (RCT), Byrnes considers that some definitive action on Trieste, either disposition or deadlock, will occur here in a short time. Hence he wishes no action for 2 or 3 days. From the political standpoint he now considers he could probably sustain such a movement. His thought is that he would tell Molotov personally and the press exactly what we were doing and that the purpose is to handle possible disorders, in the area of our responsibility which are most likely to arise in the period immediately after a reasonably firm decision is taken.
- 2.
- From the political standpoint Byrnes does not agree that in case negotiations break down the situation would be unmanageable in immediate future, as indicated in last sentence of paragraph 1 a of Naf 1166.
- 3.
- Byrnes proposes to tell Bevin that movement of Poles from Italy should be slowed during this period of tension and that it should be made clear to Morgan that these troops are available in case of emergency.
- 4.
- I have made clear to Byrnes that his solution in paragraph 1 above, even if eventual action is to move RCT from USFET does not meet minimum requirements which Morgan is now seeking to avoid “grave military risks”, and that the line now being taken by AFHQ requires that we look into the future as to troops and other resources in relation to our future intentions in the Trieste area. This point will probably come up in 48 to 72 hours when Byrnes indicated he would probably give an answer on the 14th Regimental Combat Team. At that time it may be most desirable to indicate to Byrnes the extent of the military commitment in men and money which different policies and actions will involve and the requirement for specific State Department support in obtaining them.