874.00/11–2346: Telegram
The Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received November 24—7:28 a.m.]
1101. Before considering recommendations which follow, Dept should be familiar with General Schuyler’s carefully documented report telegraphed as his 130 of November 23,47 based on observation of American officers throughout Rumania on election day; Mr. Holman’s telegram on November 22 to London repeated to Washington,48 based upon British observations on election day, the press reports of American correspondents in Rumania; my preliminary reports, including Rumanian press reports of Government statements, notably mytels 1089, November 20; 1094, November 21; 1095, November 21; 1088, November 22; and 1099, November 22.49 Dept also should have seen mytel 1097, November 22, concerning King Michael’s predicament.
I feel it would only be tedious to summarize here what has already been reported. Suffice to say Groza govt carried through elections in same spirit as it prepared for elections—in utter disregard for promises given and for elementary decency. In fact Govt established new low level for Balkan elections. It blatantly falsified returns, mocking the carefully phrased suggestions of Anglo-American notes. Such action makes it impossible for us to accept election results. We are forced to modify our attitude toward Rumanian Govt to meet new conditions. In view of this I offer the following minimum recommendations based on what I believe we can do rather than what I would like to see done.
- (1)
- American Government, preferably with parallel British action, should state that it considers Rumanian elections were not the free [Page 656] and unfettered elections anticipated by Moscow decision and promised by Groza govt. Such statement will be given widest local circulation if it is a part of note to Rumanian Govt. I suggest such note include no statement about recognition of Govt, leaving it understood by fact that we address note to Govt that we will continue normal business with it. Since new Parliament meets on December 1, our note should be delivered not later than Friday, November 29.
- (2)
- As elections, normal final step in implementation of Moscow decision, ended in fiasco, I recommend Rumanian question be discussed again as early as possible on same level as that which produced Moscow decision. Because of Soviet attitude, I am no longer hopeful this will bring much improvement locally, unless there is general improvement in American relations with Soviet Union, but I believe effort must be made. We then will have supported Rumanian democratic elements by all means presently within our grasp, and record will show that we exhausted every such means to fulfill commitments we assume towards Rumania at Yalta, Potsdam and Moscow. Responsibility for failure then is the Soviets. Nevertheless, they secure all their Rumanian objectives and can realize their further plans such as break-up of opposition on present form and elimination of monarchy.
- (3)
- I recommend before end of calendar year I be transferred. Although my relations with all political leaders have never been better, I am convinced they will begin to bring a diminishing return. Having been so active politically during the past 2 years, it will be impossible, with elections what they were, for me to be close to Govt without incurring enmity of opposition, or close to opposition without incurring enmity of Govt. Because of important political implications, I am making transfers subject of my next following telegram.50
- (4)
- I suggest officer Dept has in mind to become Chief of Mission in Rumania proceed in near future to Bucharest. Whether he arrives at end of December or early in January, shortly before or shortly after my departure, is immaterial. Upon his taking over I suggest Mission assume status of Legation, inasmuch as there is now Rumanian Legation in Washington, and by that time treaty should be initialed. I feel we could indicate disapproval of Govt by making that officer Chargé d’Affaires with personal rank of Minister. The Rumanians would be sensitive to such move and at same time flow of our information will not be interrupted nor will it be difficult to name officer Minister Plenipotentiary at more propitious moment. I believe this will require no change in article 35 of draft Rumanian treaty.51
- (5)
- I have given very much thought to King Michael’s predicament, discussing it thoroughly with members of my staff, and have come to conclusion that we should offer him no advice as we are not in position to back our advice with other than moral support. It is true situation offers King perhaps last opportunity to proclaim his position and to rally national sentiment before becoming engulfed, since question of changing “basic establishments of state” is unlikely to be presented publicly to him as clear-cut issue.
I expect he will ask me to come and see him late in week, at which time he will certainly wish to know American Govt’s attitude towards elections. I propose to limit myself to stating my attitude and, if asked, say General Schuyler and I will not be present at opening of Parliament as that would give impression American Govt had accepted results of election.
- Not printed.↩
- Telegram 9706, November 22, from London, not printed; it reported that a British Foreign Office official had commented that the reports from the British Mission in Bucharest made it clear that the Rumanian elections were “a complete fake”. (871.00/11–2246)↩
- None printed.↩
- Telegram 1102, not printed.↩
- For text of the draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, see vol. iv, p. 63.↩