864.00/10–1946: Telegram
The Minister in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received 3:51 p.m.]
1972. Mytel 1970, October 18.82 Prime Minister told me last night demands served on him yesterday by Leftist bloc embodied many points already accepted or acceptable for his political program to be discussed October 20 in his speech marking sixteenth anniversary establishment Smallholders Party. Leftist demands as submitted, he said, contrasted with dire expectations in view of vociferous build-up since prior to Communist Congress last month. He said it is fact Leftists are honestly fearful of possible counter revolutionary action by certain elements which do exist and must be guarded against. On other hand overwhelming majority Hungarian people just as deeply fear Communist domination. He recalled that in 1919 Communist regime was installed here by 150 armed sailors and that while he might be able once a year, as he did last month, to summon 300,000 peasants to Budapest Leftists could take control any day with 10,000 armed men.
Nagy continued that middle of road progress towards real democracy as desired by majority Hungarian people requires avoidance own [open?] conflict with Leftists pending further consolidation of democracy in Europe generally of which he sees increasing signs. It was also necessary to escape fate of Rumania where democratic facade thinly veils Communist control. These aims would be jeopardized by yielding to those in Smallholders Party who want to force issue with Leftists at this time. His hopes were now directed to possibility of securing agreement among coalition parties on a one year political program. If he could get such agreement recurring crisis within coalition might be minimized for that period while stabilization of wider European democracy makes further progress.
Prime Minister said obviously success of any such policy depends on Soviet attitude and therefore he had tried recently to ascertain Soviet intentions from Pushkin and Sviridov during Hungarian [apparent garble] party to which he invited them. Russians had given him to understand they were not disposed to interfere on behalf [Page 339] of Communist Party. Nagy thought such Soviet restraint was attributable in part at least to developments at Paris Conference which if it did not mark turning point of world wide significance had at least given Soviet momentary pause.
Prime Minister asked me again whether US would stand on its position re Danube question which he thought might soon become principal issue of European politics. I expressed opinion US would stick to position clearly expressed at Paris. Nagy intimated doubt US could count on unwavering British support on controversial issues vis-à-vis USSR. I suggested some European statesmen who had based policy on their interpretation of cleavage between US and British Commonwealth in matters of principle had proved to be ill-advised.
Nagy gave impression of being relieved by moderation Leftist demands though ever aware precarious equilibrium local situation. He evidently intends to press for [a?] year’s agreed inter-party program.
Repeated London 278 and Moscow 287.
- Not printed; in it Schoenfeld reported that the bloc of left-wing Hungarian political parties were making the following demands on Prime Minister Nagy: measures to help workers and peasants, including a 25 per cent reduction in industrial prices; state control of all banks; democratic reform of the public administration; state monopoly of school book publication; expulsion from the National Assembly of Smallholder deputies who had injured coalition discipline, agitated against democratic institutions, or injured relations with friendly powers (864.00/10–1846).↩