Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

840.50 UNRRA/8–645: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, August 10, 1945—5 p.m.

6758. For Clayton. The Secretary has now had an opportunity to consider your 7910 of August 6 and 8010 of August 9. He agrees that to increase the prospective operating budget of UNRRA by $700,000,000 for Soviet relief would make the US contribution beyond what could be obtained from Congress. For us to agree to such a budget in London would be to undertake something which we could not accomplish. You should stress that as we have repeatedly said to Congress UNRRA funds are not regarded by us as compensation for suffering or effort in the war but to furnish the necessities to liberated areas where, except for UNRRA assistance, they would not be available.

The Soviet Union has already had vast assistance from the United States and the Ex-Im Bank and Bretton Woods legislation both contemplate substantial US dollars being available for Soviet purchases. These steps, taken together with the Soviet foreign exchange position, make it clear that imports from the west to the Soviet Union do not in any way depend upon the furnishing of UNRRA relief. Furthermore, if the Soviet Union is regarded as a nonpaying country, then the whole conception becomes meaningless.

The Soviet position, which is the same as that taken by them at Atlantic City⁶² and Montreal,⁶³ is that they are entitled to relief because of the greatness of their sufferings and contribution to victory. A discussion along these ideological lines has always proved fruitless. The point as we see it is that certain imports have to be furnished by UNRRA or they will not be furnished at all. The burden of these is chiefly on the US and is already greater than we may be able to meet. To add more, which is not necessary, may well bring about the collapse of UNRRA. This we are unwilling to risk. We are all the more unwilling to do this since we have already passed the financial legislation which makes it entirely possible to finance Soviet needs.

Your reference to the undesirability of eliminating Russia as a limited UNRRA beneficiary leads us to suggest that the Russian position might be met by including in the maximum UNRRA program as hitherto conceived a much smaller sum, say fifty to one hundred million for emergency relief in Soviet territory under the resolutions adopted by the Central Committee last spring.⁶⁴ This would leave for the future the question of whether the Soviet Union would be called upon to repay. Taken together with the willingness of the Ex-Im Bank to negotiate this proposal might enable the Russians to withdraw from this present position.

Byrnes

62. Reference is to the first meeting of the UNRRA Council, November 10–December 1, 1943. For documentation on U.S. participation in the establishment and operation of UNRRA, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 851 ff. and pp. 1014 ff.
63. Reference is to the second meeting of the UNRRA Council, September 15–27, 1944. For documentation on U.S. participation in the work of UNRRA, see ibid., 1944, vol. ii, pp. 331 ff.
64. Presumably reference is to the Resolution for Emergency Relief Programs, adopted by the UNRRA Central Committee, February 26, 1945; see telegram 1492, February 27, 6 p.m., to London, p. 966.