Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

840.50 UNRRA/8–645: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

London, August 6, 1945—8 p.m.
[Received 9 p.m.]

7910. For the Secretary, Acting Secretary and Acheson from Clayton.⁴² The delegation has been giving attention to the Soviet request for $700,000,000 of UNRRA assistance and has been advised that the Soviets have stated informally to UNRRA that they have made this request because Lend-Lease and credit negotiations have “failed”.⁴³ We have reviewed the course of discussions on Lend-Lease and credits from incomplete files which Collado⁴⁴ brought along and have requested Ambassador Harriman to advise us specifically as to the status of his talks with Mikoyan.⁴⁵

The text of Resolution 76 of the UNRRA Council, designating Korea and Formosa as areas in which UNRRA should operate, is given in Woodbridge, UNRRA, vol. iii, p. 145.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I should like your views with respect to the $700,000,000 request. The weight of opinion within the delegation is against any such use of UNRRA funds. It is argued that the approval of such a program would require the contributing countries to furnish that much additional money. The British have indicated pretty clearly that they are not prepared to do so. A number of members of the delegation feel that the Congress would be unlikely to approve additional funds for the purpose. The extension of long-term credits for capital goods through the Export-Import Bank and eventually the Bretton Woods Bank⁴⁶ should fully meet Russia’s financial needs. It is unlikely that the type of supplies which Russia is requesting could be furnished in large volume in any event without taking needed supplies from other European countries.

Other members of the delegation argue also convincingly that UNRRA was established to provide relief and emergency rehabilitation for devastated areas. The possibility of obtaining reconstruction credits was not supposed to be a barrier to the receipt of UNRRA assistance. Russia has been more extensively devastated than any other country in the world. While her reconstruction potentialities are very great her reconstruction relief and rehabilitation needs are also very large. Russia’s sacrifices in the war have been enormous and her standard of living always low is probably as low or lower than that of any other European nation. Her case for aid differs from that of China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and even Greece and Italy only in degree and a committee set up under Resolution 23⁴⁷ might find it difficult to pronounce Russia a paying country in view of the recent Chinese case and in fact all the earlier precedents. Moreover, the Soviets will probably compare unfavorably the proposed treatment of Italy an ex-enemy with that of Russia.

It is believed here that the Soviets will attempt to force a decision of the Council at this meeting. It is our belief that we should try to leave the matter open rather than to try to achieve a flat turn down at this time. If the matter is left open we may be able to achieve a successful meeting of the Council and the request may possibly be subsequently withdrawn or sidetracked in view of the credit negotiations.

Our present thinking suggests the immediate appointment of a Resolution 23 committee to meet with the Russians at once and request a presentation as to need and ability to pay. This may in itself result in the desired postponement until after the Council meeting is over.

I should appreciate an urgent expression of the Department’s views both with respect to the credit procedure and to the UNRRA procedure. I have repeated this to Ambassador Harriman requesting that he send the Department and me his views.

Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow as 274. [Clayton.]

Winant

42. Assistant Secretary of State Clayton was in London for the Third Session of the UNRRA Council, August 7–25, 1945.
43. For documentation concerning United States aid for the Soviet Union and discussion of credit arrangements, see vol. v, pp. 937 ff.
44. Emilio G. Collado, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy; Adviser, U.S. delegation, Third Session of the UNRRA Council.
45. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade.
46. The Bretton Woods Agreement Act was approved on July 31, 1945; 59 Stat. 512.
47. For text, see Woodbridge, UNRRA, vol. iii, p. 67. This resolution provided for the setting up of a subcommittee which would “advise the Director General relative to determining whether a government is in a position to pay. …”