740.00119 Council/9–2845
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Ambassador Harriman | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Golunski | |
| Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Bevin | |
| Sir Alexander Cadogan | |
| Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | |
| Mr. McAfee |
The Secretary said that he had been going over the various proposals in regard to procedure, and he had a new suggestion which he hoped Mr. Molotov would consider very seriously. He would see that the first paragraph was the acceptance of his position in regard to the preparation of the treaties, and in the second paragraph he had made some amendments to his original proposals so that now there would be one conference for, all these peace treaties, to which, in addition to the five members of the Council, all European states members of the United Nations would be invited, and non-European members of the United Nations who had contributed appreciable military contingents in the war against the European Axis. (Copy attached).
He went on to say that he realized that Mr. Molotov would not like to have a large number of states with no particular interest in these treaties participate in this conference, and that was why he was proposing the present formula which would eliminate non-European states which had not been active belligerents. He said he thought the present formula was a sensible one, and would commend itself to the world since it would follow that, while we were narrowing the basis of preparation in deference to Mr. Molotov’s position, we were at the same time widening participation for the purpose of the conference, and show the world that we did not intend to exclude any nation, no matter how small, if it had a legitimate interest in these treaties.
Mr. Molotov said he had no authority to depart from the Berlin decision, and that he would request permission to report this proposal to Moscow on his return.
The Secretary asked in what manner his proposal differed from the Berlin decision.
Mr. Molotov said he would have to study the document and consult with his colleagues before he replied.
Mr. Bevin remarked that his Government still considered that the September 11th decision was right, if the Berlin decision as a whole was taken.
[Page 436]Mr. Molotov disagreed. That, he said, would be up to the three of them to decide what questions [nations?] should be regarded as chiefly interested.
Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin agreed.
Mr. Molotov inquired how a European country which had not declared war against the satellite countries in question could participate in the drawing up and conclusion of the peace treaty.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that if Poland, who had not declared war against Italy, was regarded as interested, how could they exclude other European countries.
Mr. Molotov said he would have doubts as to whether Poland would have any rights to participate in peace treaties with Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland, but in Italy it was different since Polish divisions had fought there.
The Secretary pointed out that the Berlin decision merely spoke of chiefly interested states and said nothing about declarations of war.
Mr. Bevin pointed out that France, for example, had only declared war on Germany, and nevertheless had fought through the Free French in many theatres of the war.
Mr. Molotov said he did not wish to challenge France’s role in the war. In some ways France helped Germany, in other ways they helped the Allies.
The Secretary pointed out that some countries, for example, Poland, which were overrun at the beginning of the war were not in a position to declare war, and that France had been in this category.
Mr. Bevin said his first objection to Mr. Molotov’s proposals were that it broke up the Council by suggesting different conferences in London and in Moscow.
Mr. Molotov said amendments could be added, and he would not insist on Moscow, although he did not see why it was unsuitable.
Mr. Bevin replied that he felt that the Soviet language in naming specific members of the Council as those to convoke the conferences broke up the sense of the Council.
Mr. Molotov said he could not agree, since this was in accordance with the correct interpretation of the Berlin decision.
Mr. Bevin then proposed that there be eliminated from Mr. Molotov’s draft all mention of the members of the Council, and merely say “the Council shall call a conference in London on such and such a date for consideration of a peace treaty with Italy to consist of the following countries”. He added that the actual names of the countries could be included.
Mr. Molotov said that there might be something in Mr. Bevin’s suggestion, and then the question would be as to who would be invited—would China, who had not declared war on Italy, be invited? He said he saw no reason.
[Page 437]Mr. Bevin replied that that was a question for them to decide—that under his formula the Council would only be the instrument to call the conference. After that it would be a conference.
The Secretary said he agreed with Mr. Bevin that it would be a mistake to give the appearance that our three countries were taking everything into their own hands and convoking conferences without reference to the other members.
Mr. Molotov said he felt he could accept Mr. Bevin’s proposal if Mr. Byrnes was agreeable.
The Secretary said that he would have to think it over. He added he felt that they had met Mr. Molotov’s desires in the first paragraph, that he was chiefly anxious to have some formula for the second which would show that we were not trying to keep matters in our own hands, but wanted to bring in any countries with a legitimate interest.
Mr. Molotov then said how would we propose a conference for Rumania if we did not talk with the present government.
The Secretary said he had already told Mr. Molotov of our position, and that he was convinced that by the time the treaties were ready, the Soviet, American, and British Governments would have found some way out of the difficulty. After all, they had been confronted with an equally difficult problem in Poland, although he realized the circumstances were different, yet they had found a solution.
Mr. Molotov said he could not agree on this question, and that without the government of Bulgaria as well, the decisions of the Council would be utterly meaningless. Why could not the American and British Governments do in regard to Rumania and Bulgaria what they had done in regard to Hungary?76
The Secretary said this was a good instance in which we had done what we said we were going to do. The President at Potsdam had announced that he would consider in each individual case the question of recognition. We had looked into the matter of Hungary, and had found on the basis of our information that it was possible to recognize the Government. He repeated that he thought we could find some way to get out of this difficulty.
Mr. Molotov said, why not agree to recognize these governments after their elections which would be held sometime this fall.
Mr. Bevin inquired on what basis these elections would be held.
Mr. Molotov replied, democratic basis, better than that of Greece, and even Italy. He said in Finland satisfactory elections had been held without any outside interference. He said in regard to Rumania and Bulgaria the same would be the case if no one interfered from without.
[Page 438]The Secretary said the other day that Mr. Molotov had inquired about two Rumanian political figures, but he had told him that the United States was not interested in any particular person or party. He wondered, however, if Mr. Molotov did not have a list of Rumanian political figures not included in the present government. Such a list might give them a basis to start from.
Mr. Molotov said that he had no list, and that he did not consider that that was his business.
The Secretary said he understood this, but nevertheless in the case of Poland we had been successful in considering lists.
Mr. Bevin then proposed that three leading ambassadors who had not been connected with these countries might go there to look into the situation and report to their Governments.
Mr. Molotov said it was not a question for ambassadors, but for governments.
The Secretary said he favored Mr. Bevin’s suggestion because, after all, each government could only rely on the reports of its representatives, and that sometimes people who had stayed too long in a spot developed personal sympathies to one side or another, and that Mr. Bevin’s suggestion would afford an opportunity of clarifying that information and possibly of uncovering new facts which would permit some decision.
Mr. Molotov said he thought Mr. Byrnes was a disinterested person, and that he could give his government good advice. He repeated that without some solution of this question, the decision of the Council would have no meaning.
It was agreed that they would study the latest proposals on procedure.
- Presumably reference is to the steps taken by the United States to establish diplomatic relations with Hungary, news of which had reached the newspapers by September 26. For documentation on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 798 ff.↩