740.00119 Council/9–2745
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State
| Participants: | ||
| The Secretary | Mr. Molotov | Mr. Bevin |
| Mr. Dunn | Mr. Golunski | Sir Alexander Cadogan |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Pavlov | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr |
| Mr. McAfee |
Mr. Molotov said he had some new proposals to make concerning the procedural questions. These proposals were of a preliminary nature, and he could not give a final decision on them until tomorrow. He said they related to the second part of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal of yesterday69 in regard to summoning the conferences. By these proposals he was suggesting that the various peace treaties be considered in separate categories, i.e. one procedure for Italy, another for Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and a third for Finland. He said he must add in regard to Italy that the Soviet Delegation could not guarantee [Page 426] that they would be ready during 1945 for the proposed conference. (Copies of Mr. Molotov’s three proposals attached.) Under Mr. Molotov’s proposals conferences would be held in Moscow for the Finnish, and for the Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Hungarian treaties, and in London for the Italian treaty.
Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin said that they would have to have some time to study these new proposals.
Mr. Bevin asked why Mr. Molotov thought the Soviet Government would not be ready for a conference on the Italian treaty during this year.
Mr. Molotov replied that if the United States could agree to the setting up of an allied control council for Japan, it would be easier for the Soviet Government to be ready for the Italian treaty. He said all the other nations were for the setting up of a control council, but the United States alone was against it.
The Secretary asked what connection there was in any way between the question of Japan and the Italian treaty.
Mr. Molotov replied that there were some questions which the United States wished to postpone, and there were others which the Soviet Delegation wished to postpone.
The Secretary pointed out he had already told Mr. Molotov many times that he was prepared to take up this matter of a control council with the President when he returned to the United States.
Mr. Bevin then inquired whether Mr. Molotov’s proposals meant that he would not be inclined to continue the work of the Council on the basis of the September 11th decision.
Mr. Molotov said this was correct, since the September 11th decision provided no basis, and he could not be a party to the violation of the Berlin Agreement.
Mr. Byrnes inquired what Mr. Molotov had in mind with regard to Italy—what would he consider as “chiefly interested states”.
Mr. Molotov said preliminarily he would consider that it meant the three great powers, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Ethiopia, Albania, the British Dominions, Poland, White Russia, and the Ukraine.
The Secretary pointed out that the Berlin decision did not specify exactly what nations were to be regarded as “chiefly interested”.
Mr. Molotov agreed that it was up to the three of them to decide that.
Mr. Bevin inquired if Poland was to be regarded as interested in the Italian treaty, what about France in the Balkan treaty?
Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Government could not accept France’s interest.
[Page 427]Mr. Bevin pointed out it would be difficult to explain the participation of Poland in the Italian treaty while excluding France from the Balkans.
Mr. Molotov said that the list of countries would be discussed. Mr. Molotov suggested that they take the question up separately and begin with those who should be invited under his proposal to the conference on the Italian treaty.
The Secretary pointed out that under the Berlin decision we were bound to submit these treaties to all the United Nations, and that his proposal had been designed to simplify the process of submission. He said that it was true that there was some South American countries that had only a very limited interest, but Brazil, for example, had had two divisions on the line in Italy for more than a year.
Mr. Bevin inquired whether it would not be possible to add some language in regard to the fact that these conferences were held without prejudice to the rights of other United Nations to examine these peace treaties before final signature.
Mr. Molotov replied that he did not take the Berlin decision to mean that the treaties would be submitted to all the United Nations, for example, the Soviet Government would never have any dealings with the present Argentine Government and would not come within a stone’s throw of them. He also said he did not see what Honduras and Haiti had to do with the matter.
The Secretary replied that he agreed with Mr. Molotov in regard to the Argentine, and felt that their admission to San Francisco was more than enough for them. He said one way out was to regard the term “United Nations” as meaning only those who had signed the Declaration of January 1, 1942. This would exclude Argentina.
The meeting broke up with the understanding that the various proposals would be studied further, and they would meet again tomorrow.