740.00119 Council/9–2745
Memorandum of Conversation57
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Ambassador Gousev | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
The Secretary said that he wanted to have a further talk with Mr. Molotov regarding Japan. He said he wanted to make it plain that there was no desire whatsoever on the part of the United States to withhold any information regarding conditions in Japan from [Page 419] our Soviet friends. He said lie felt that if the Soviet representative in Tokyo was not being kept informed he would take immediate steps upon his return to have this corrected.
Mr. Molotov inquired if this was the case, why the United States was opposed to the setting up of an Allied Control Council.
The Secretary stated that last Saturday when Mr. Molotov had raised with him the question of an American-Soviet treaty directed against the revival of Japanese militarism, he had said he would return to Washington and talk the matter over with the President, and that he personally was favorably inclined to this idea. Because of this conversation he had been somewhat surprised when Mr. Molotov had raised at the Council the matter of establishment of a Control Commission, since Mr. Molotov knew that he was not prepared to discuss that question at this meeting, in the absence of the necessary information and military advisers. He pointed out that in our correspondence with the Japanese leading up to the surrender and in particular in our letter of August 1058 which the Soviet Government approved, it had been stated that the Emperor would be under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander. It was therefore a question whether or not the Emperor was bound under these terms to take orders from an Allied Commission. However, because of our interest in consulting with our Allies on these questions, we had proposed as a first measure the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Council, which would afford a convenient method of carrying out these consultations.
Mr. Molotov inquired in relation to the letter of August 10 whether the Japanese surrender was therefore unconditional or conditional.
The Secretary said that could be a point of argument. In any event, the language of the letter of August 10 still stood. He said we were most anxious to have this Advisory Council set up and the Soviets and Chinese had agreed, but the British were still holding back. He said he was quite prepared to have it meet later on in Tokyo if that was considered desirable, but Dr. Evatt of Australia had just told him yesterday that he would prefer to have it left in Washington.
Mr. Molotov inquired why it would not be possible to have a Far Eastern Advisory Council under American presidency and an Allied Control Council also under American presidency.
[Page 420]The Secretary pointed out that he thought the first step was to set up the Advisory Council and then, if they decided some further control machinery was necessary, they could so recommend to the respective Governments.
Mr. Molotov said that he had noticed that President Truman had made a statement yesterday in which he had said that he had heard of no proposal for an Allied Control Commission.59 He inquired what he should say if the correspondents should ask him if such a question had been raised here. He could keep silent, but they would all know that the question had been raised.
The Secretary replied in such cases he always told the correspondents that he had no comment to make. He added that the President was quite right, since there had been no discussion among the Governments concerning the Soviet proposal. Mr. Molotov had suggested it be included in the agenda, but for reasons he had already explained, he had not found it possible to agree to this. Therefore, the subject had not been officially discussed.
Mr. Molotov observed that their representatives in Tokyo had nothing to do; they were not being kept informed, nor were they being consulted, and he therefore thought they would probably have to come home.
The Secretary said he had already told Mr. Molotov that he thought this was wrong and that their representatives should be kept informed; and that he intended to speak to the President immediately upon his return.
Mr. Molotov said he had first drawn the Secretary’s attention to this state of affairs four days ago.
The Secretary pointed out that when Mr. Molotov had raised the question of a treaty he had promised to talk that over with the President, and Mr. Molotov had said that obviously they did not expect a quick decision from the American Government on this point.
Mr. Molotov replied he was not thinking of the treaty now—that would of course take time—but of the question of the Control Commission which he felt was very urgent and essential.
The Secretary said Mr. Molotov must understand we wanted Soviet cooperation in the Far East but that it had been impossible for him to discuss the question at this meeting.
Mr. Molotov said that only the United States appeared opposed to an Allied Control Commission for Japan, and he was unable to understand why and did not know what explanation he could give to his Government.
[Page 421]The Secretary repeated that he had merely been unable to discuss the question at this meeting.
- Authorship not indicated.↩
- Reference is to the letter from the United States Government to the Japanese Government, a draft copy of which was transmitted to Moscow for delivery to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat in telegram of August 10, to London, printed in vol. vi , section under Japan entitled “Surrender of Japan …”, Part I. This letter, Soviet approval of which was reported in telegram M 25260, August 11, from Moscow, ibid. , was communicated to the Swiss Chargé in Washington for delivery to the Japanese Government by the Swiss Government; see note of August 11, from the Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé, ibid. ↩
- Apparently reference is to a statement made by President Truman during his news conference of September 26, 1945; for the record of this conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945, p. 344.↩