Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1145

United States Delegation Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 21, 1945, 11 a.m.²⁰

London, September 21, 1945, 11 a.m.

M. Bidault in the Chair.

Byrnes circulated a paper concerning a request of the Secretary of the Conference for instructions in regard to a possible request of the Italian representative for the text of the Yugoslav statement to the Council.

Molotov said he thought the Conference had no Secretary but did have a Senior Secretary.

Byrnes said he did not know whether the paper was signed Junior, General or what, but it made absolutely no difference to him.

Molotov said he was making no claims.

Bidault asked what the decision of the Council was on the request that had been made.

Byrnes pointed out that both sides had published in the newspapers the greater part of their statements. He preferred to let the Italians have it rather than refuse what had already been published in the newspapers.

This was agreed.

Bidault said the next question was that of their minutes.

Molotov thought they should keep minutes of the decisions reached and not of their debates, as it would take too much time to clear them.

Byrnes said that on a number of occasions they had referred questions to the Deputies to be considered in the light of the views expressed at the table.

Molotov replied that the Deputies would be guided by the minutes kept by each of them separately. It was necessary to make the work of the Council easier. He thought it was not necessary to include everything in their minutes but only what they decided to include.

Byrnes suggested that the secretaries of the various delegations form a Protocol Committee to prepare the record of their decisions.

This was agreed to.

Bidault asked if it were understood that the daily minutes would contain merely a record of decisions or a record of the debates. He understood that Mr. Byrnes wished to postpone a decision.

Byrnes said he was ready to settle the matter today. Mr. Molotov thought each delegation should keep its own record and when the Deputies met each would depend upon his own minutes of the meetings of the Council.

Bevin thought all this had been settled when they accepted the report of the Deputies on the Joint Secretariat.²¹ It was all set forth in Paragraph 5, to which they had unanimously agreed. Could they not continue that until the end of the Conference?

Molotov thought that a wider interpretation was being placed on this decision and one with which the Soviet delegation did not agree. The Soviet delegation had not committed itself to minutes. The Council had held fourteen meetings, and he inquired if they had agreed minutes on any of them.

Bevin read Paragraph 5 of the document setting up the Secretariat including the phrase stating that the arrangement was subject to review.

Molotov again inquired if they had any agreed minutes of their fourteen meetings.

Bevin asked if they could refer the question back to the Deputies and have them make a recommendation on the method of preparing the protocol.

Byrnes disliked having so much time taken up on procedure but thought they might as well decide the question now. His information was that for four days there had been agreement on behalf of four delegations but not on behalf of the Soviet delegation. The result was that there were no agreed minutes. If there was no agreement, there was no use of the Deputies’ discussing it and they might as well take Mr. Molotov’s suggestion and then when the Deputies met each would depend upon his own record of the meetings.

Bevin said two proposals had been submitted. One was to refer the matter to the Deputies. The second was that each delegation would depend on its own minutes.

Molotov said this was not correct. His suggestion was that they draw up the protocol of the decisions taken. His suggestion was not that they need not have a protocol. The suggestion was that they have minutes only of decisions. The documents circulated could be attached, if desired.

Bidault said that his remarks had related to the minutes of the meetings. He thought the Council had agreed on a daily record and not simply on a record at the end of the Conference. He understood that Mr. Molotov’s proposal in regard to decisions was accepted, that is that the minutes should only record the decisions.

Molotov said he had misunderstood, and he agreed.

Bidault said then what about the record of their discussions? Were they going to accept Mr. Bevin’s suggestion to send the question to the Deputies or would each delegation keep its own minutes? He hoped they could settle this quickly.

Bevin thought the minutes should be circulated as they now were, without committing anyone. Those delegations that could agree could have the minutes.

Molotov objected to this. Either they drew up agreed minutes or they did not. Every delegation could keep whatever record it wanted, but they should not circulate minutes that were not agreed by all. He had not delegated any such authority to the Secretariat.

Bevin said he was surprised. They had gone to the 14th meeting without having any objection. There was nothing wrong with the minutes as far as he could see.

Molotov replied that they had a Joint Secretariat, and that it should only work jointly. They could not entrust it with work in which the Soviet secretariat did not participate.

Byrnes said that he had been discussing procedure in the Council about fifty percent, of the time here. He held no strong opinions, because they had to work by unanimous agreement. He disliked to turn over to the Deputies some controversy they had had and waste their time.

Bevin said he did not press it, and withdrew the proposal. He said he would give Mr. Byrnes a solemn pledge that he would not discuss procedure again during this Conference.

Draft Treaty With Rumania

Bidault said they were discussing Paragraph 2 of the American draft directive,²³ to which he had an amendment which he proceeded to read. It was as follows:

The frontier with Hungary shall be, in general, the frontier existing in 1938; however, as regards Transylvania the ethnic situation shall be examined with a view to determining whether the award of a small part to Hungary would materially reduce the number of persons to be subjected to alien rule.

This was agreed to.

Bidault proposed they take up the draft treaty with Bulgaria.

Molotov asked if the American delegation withdrew its proposals for Rumania.

Byrnes replied in the negative but said that in the Soviet paper²⁴ and in the British paper²⁵ most of the items of the American proposals had been covered, and it would not be helpful to go over them again. He did not ask for further consideration.

Molotov remarked that this was so much the better. He went on to say that he was entitled to revert to the statement made at the beginning of the discussion of the Rumanian treaty. He proposed to make a declaration in regard to the note contained in the American Memorandum. The American delegation had thought it proper to make a reservation in regard to the present Rumanian Government. The American delegation had stated that it considered the present Rumanian Government as not being representative of all democratic elements and that it would wait until such time as a more democratic government was established in Rumania before concluding a treaty. The Soviet delegation considered that for some reason the American delegation did not indicate the true reasons for their reservation. If they listened to such a note, and it was circulated in writing, they must understand its meaning. The Soviet delegation must not pass by this note in silence.

He wanted to compare the Rumanian and Italian Governments. It was said that the Rumanian Government was not democratic, but who could say that the Italian Government was more democratic than the Rumanian Government? The American Government found it possible to maintain diplomatic relations with the Italian Government and to conclude a peace treaty with it. With Rumania they did not want to conclude a peace treaty or to have diplomatic relations with the Rumanian Government. There was no doubt but that the Rumanian Government was more democratic than the Italian Government. Let them take the example of Spain. The Government of Spain was Fascist, yet the United States Government was able to maintain diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government and had its diplomatic representative there. It had not been said that the United States Government could not maintain diplomatic relations with Spain because it was Fascist. The reasons given for the American note were not the true reasons.

There was a Fascist government or a semi-Fascist government in Argentina, nevertheless the United States did not refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with Argentina or to conclude agreements with it.

In Greece the Greek Government was suppressing by terroristic methods elements in the country with which it had concluded an agreement. Nevertheless the United States continued relations and agreed that the Greek Government hold elections and then change the Government. For some reason a different procedure was being suggested for Rumania. In Rumania there existed a government hostile to the Soviet Union under General Rǎdescu²⁶ which had brought about the threat of civil war. The United States did not raise the question of this government being unsuitable. The characteristic feature of the Rǎdescu Government was that it was hostile to the Soviet Union and did not carry out the armistice terms. Now in Rumania there was the Groza Government²⁷ which enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the population, and no one could deny this. There was a government which was honestly carrying out the armistice terms. He asked, was not the reason why the American Government was opposed to this Government because it was friendly to the Soviet Union? No one required the United States Government to like what it did not like. That was its right, and it was free to say so. But this was not the question. The United States accused the Rumanian Government of being undemocratic and refused to have any dealings with it. This did not correspond with the facts. The Rumanian Government was liked by the Rumanian population, but not by the American Government. What should be done? Should they overthrow it because it was not liked by the United States Government and set up a government that would be unfriendly to the Soviet Union. In such an undertaking the Soviet delegation would not be able to assist the American delegation. Molotov said he made no suggestion because Mr. Byrnes had also made none; but he had replied, as this note in the American Memorandum represented a thrust not only against the Rumanian Government but also against the Soviet Union.

Byrnes said the note at the beginning of the United States paper explained the American position. It had been submitted because the United State delegation had wished to proceed with drafting the peace treaty with Rumania but did not want the American position to be misunderstood or to mislead anyone into believing that the United States could conclude a treaty with the present Rumanian Government. At Yalta the heads of government agreed to do their best to allow the peoples of the liberated areas to determine on governments of their own choosing. They had agreed to favor interim governments that would be broadly representative of all elements and committed to the holding of early elections. At Potsdam the President of the United States had stated not once but a dozen times that the United States would not recognize the present governments of Rumania or Bulgaria. There was a difference of opinion between the President of the United States and Marshal Stalin, but Marshal Stalin had never questioned the motives of the United States Government. That was left to Mr. Molotov. He did not believe that the hope expressed at Yalta that the Allies would concert their policies with regard to the provisional governments was helped by such action on the part of Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Molotov insisted on telling the United States Government what governments it would recognize. The United States Government did not tell the Soviet Government that it should recognize the governments which we recognize. It was needless for him to say that it was untrue that the United States declines to recognize the Rumanian Government because it is said that the Rumanian Government is friendly to the Soviet Union. After Yalta²⁸ when the situation in regard to the Provisional Government in Poland was improved the United States was very happy about this and its relations with the Polish Government were excellent, although we knew of things about which we were surprised and which we hoped would be remedied.²⁹ The Government of Finland was friendly to the Soviet Union and the United States had recognized the Finnish Government.³⁰ The Government of the United States believed in keeping pledges. When at Potsdam the United States had said it would examine each question separately, it kept that pledge and he pointed out that no reservation was made by the United States delegation in regard to the Hungarian Government. As a result of its investigation, the United States had concluded that while the Government of Hungary was not a perfect government, such improvements had been made in the situation that the United States had instructed its representatives in Hungary that if the Hungarian Government would pledge itself to hold free elections in accordance with Yalta the United States would recognize Hungary.³¹ It was therefore shown conclusively by our actions in regard to Finland, Poland and Hungary that statements made by Mr. Molotov regarding the motives of the United States Government were both unfair and untrue. They must consider each case separately.

The United States knows that the Groza Government was established when Mr. Vyshinski told the King [he] had two and a half hours to establish that government.³² That action was not quite in accord with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter or any other declaration of their purposes in the days following the war. The United States had to rely on their reports in regard to Rumania, and these reports had shown that men were not free. The government was not representative of the people in the language of the Yalta agreement. Officials of the United States had been forced to delay for weeks before they could enter the country. Entry of the United States press representatives was delayed, and when they did enter their reports were censored. Any election held under a provisional government of that character would always be questioned by the free peoples of the world.

In his criticism of the United States Government Mr. Molotov had referred to its action in regard to other governments. In Italy, as in Finland and as now in Hungary, the governments of those countries were unlike the government of Rumania. He made no statement in regard to the government of Greece, except to say that when Mr. Molotov had mentioned observers, he wished to point out that they were going to Greece on the invitation of the Greek Government. He asked if anyone could imagine the Groza Government sending anyone to Rumania to observe the election.

He would not discuss Franco³³ and the Argentine as Molotov knew that at Potsdam the United States Government had expressed itself in regard to the government of Franco and the Argentine, and Mr. Byrnes was the man who had framed the language concerning the Franco Government.³⁴

They had been dealing with a situation regarding which at Yalta, when there was no such attitude on the part of Mr. Molotov, there was agreement on common action toward the peoples of liberated Europe and the establishment of democratic governments.³⁵ Mr. Molotov asked if the Rumanian Government should be overthrown because the United States Government did not like it. The United [States] Government made no such request. The United States Government could do nothing about the government of Rumania except to say that with its ideas of freedom it did not think that in Rumania there was freedom, or freedom of religion or democracy. In any action which it took the United States had to keep in mind its responsibility before the peoples of the world. The Government of the United States was satisfied that the Soviet Government did not really believe that the United States Government wanted in Rumania a government unfriendly to the Soviet Union. Nothing would make the United States Government more unhappy than to think such motives could seriously be attributed to it, because the United States Government wanted Governments in the Balkans friendly to the Soviet Union. The Government was concerned also not only that the Balkan governments would be friendly but it was our hope that the peoples as well as the governments would be friendly to the Soviet Union, just as the people of the United States wanted to be friendly with the Soviet Union.

Molotov said that in regard to Mr. Byrnes’ remarks he could only state two elementary facts. Mr. Byrnes had tried to make clear that the Government of the United States did not regard the Rumanian Government as democratic. No single fact had been produced to prove the dissatisfaction of the Rumanian people with the Rumanian Government. There had been some statements made that United States correspondents were not friendly with the Rumanian Government. What was more important, that the Rumanian people had not expressed dissatisfaction with their government or that U. S. correspondents were dissatisfied with the Rumanian Government because it had failed to comply with their caprices? If the Rumanian people were satisfied with their government, the correspondents would come to understand this and would not demand a change.

Mr. Byrnes had referred to the fact that the Soviet representative had intervened in modifying the Rumanian Government. This was repeated hearsay of the so-called two hours in which this change was effected. Why repeat hearsay? It would be better to deal with facts. He had already noted that the situation in Rumania had been such that semi-Fascist elements headed by General Radescu had brought the country to the brink of civil war. At that time the American representative had not expressed his dissatisfaction with the Rumanian Government. As soon as order had been established in the country and it had begun faithfully to fulfil the armistice terms, their American friends had taken advantage of the famous two hours—which would probably soon become two minutes—to discredit the Rumanian Government. What was the use of all this? He knew the government of Franco was not liked by the American Government, nor was the government of the Argentine; yet the United States maintained diplomatic relations with them. Mr. Byrnes did not speak of the present Greek Government, and he did not know whether the American Government liked it or not, Perhaps American correspondents liked it. He knew that many democratic elements in Greece did not like the present Greek Government. The fact that American correspondents liked the Greek Government enabled the United States to maintain relations with Greece. The United States maintained relations with governments of these countries not because they were democratic. Mr. Byrnes had referred to the fact that the American Government had decided to recognize the government of Hungary. Who could prove by facts that the Rumanian Government was less democratic than the Government of Hungary? Nevertheless the American Government said what it liked. It was a question of taste. What had democracy to do with this? The Soviet attitude toward all the satellites of Germany was the same. Now that victory was won, they thought it possible to have dealings with any government which did not cause dissatisfaction among the people and which carried out the armistice terms, regardless of whether such government was entirely satisfactory. This was not a reason for overthrowing a government.

He asked if it were possible to substitute for such a government as that to which he had referred a government which would cause dissatisfaction on the part of the people and would not carry out the armistice terms but which would be liked by foreign correspondents.

Mr. Byrnes had spoken of Poland and had said that they had done well in this case. But in this case there were two Polish governments, and it had been necessary to end this situation.³⁶ There were not two governments in Rumania. They should not create another government in Rumania which would be hostile to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Byrnes had said that they were basing themselves on the Yalta Declaration. That was absolutely right. It provided a basis for their joint work. The Yalta Declaration stated that their purpose was to destroy the last vestiges of Naziism and Fascism and to allow the peoples of these countries to select governments of their own choosing. The Soviet Union maintained this position. He wondered if the United States delegation had changed its attitude. In any case the Soviet Union had not changed. The Soviet Government maintained its attitude in this as in other cases, but he would like it to be made clear whether the American Government had changed its attitude.

At San Francisco the American Government had said in writing that it agreed to support the Soviet proposals, in particular those relating to Tripolitania. It was clear that there was no reference in the correspondence to Tripolitania, but there was reference to trusteeship territories in general. The American Government had informed them through the Secretary of State and Commander Stassen³⁷ that they would support the Soviet proposal to have a trusteeship. As soon as the question was raised at the Conference, the Soviet Delegation had encountered a different attitude on the part of the American delegation. Perhaps they had forgotten. However, he had given copies of the correspondence to Mr. Byrnes in London. This was an-other example that the attitude of the United States Governments had changed.

Mr. Byrnes had made no specific proposals nor did he, but if it had not been for the United States note on this paper on Rumania he would not have been compelled to reply. He had been compelled to reply in view of the United States note.

Byrnes said he would not reply to anything Mr. Molotov had said in regard to Rumania. They did not and could not agree. He was always sorry when he could not agree with any of his colleagues. Mr. Molotov had made a statement in regard to a letter written to him by his predecessor, Secretary Stettinius, which Mr. Molotov said was a promise to support the Soviet proposal to receive a trusteeship, and had mentioned Tripolitania. He wanted the Council to know the facts. The letter Mr. Molotov had given him recounted in its first paragraph a statement made to Secretary Stettinius by Commander Stassen to the effect that the Soviet Government wished to know if a favorable attitude would be taken by the United States if in the future the Soviet Government made a proposal to receive a trusteeship. He had added that the Soviet Government did not have in view any concrete territory but had hoped that the two governments might reach agreement in principle.³⁸ Secretary Stettinius’ reply was as follows:

(Mr. Byrnes read the letter.³⁹)

That is all the Secretary of State said. Mr. Byrnes had known nothing about it but he found no fault with it. He thought that if he said he considered the United Kingdom eligible as a trusteeship power he would not be accused of breaking his word if he did not support them if they asked for the trusteeship of the moon and the sun.

Bevin said that British ambitions had never reached so high.

Molotov said he would like to enjoy more sunshine.

Byrnes observed that Mr. Molotov was responsible for most of the gloom at their meeting.

Molotov rejoined that he would share the blame fifty-fifty.

The meeting adjourned.

20. For the list of participants at this meeting, see the Agreed Record of Decisions, supra.
21. C.F.M.(45) 12, September 13, p. 155.
23. C.F.M.(45) 36, September 19, p. 266.
24. C.F.M.(45) 8, September 12, p. 149.
25. C.F.M.(45) 21, September 17, p. 219.
26. Gen. Nicolai Rǎdescu, Rumanian Premier from November 1944 to March 1945.
27. Petru Groza, Rumanian Premier in a Soviet-oriented government installed on March 10, 1945, in succession to the Rǎdesu government. For documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the downfall of the Rǎdesu government and the installation of the Groza government, under Soviet pressure, see vol. v, pp. 464 ff.
28. The Conference at Yalta between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, February 4–11, 1945.
29. For documentation regarding the efforts by the United States to assure the fulfillment by the Polish Provisional Government of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements regarding Poland, see vol. v, pp. 361 ff.
30. For documentation regarding the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Finland on August 31, 1945, see vol. iv, pp. 624 ff.
31. The instruction referred to here was contained in telegram 4, September 18, from the Secretary of State in London to the American Representative in Hungary; see ibid., p. 872, footnote 75. Additional documentation regarding the question of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Hungary is printed ibid., pp. 798 ff.
32. For a report on the meeting between King Michael of Rumania and Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky on February 28, 1945, see telegram 146, February 28, from Bucharest, vol. v. p. 487.
33. Generalissimo Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, Chief of State and President of the Spanish Government.
34. Apparent reference by the Secretary of State to the expression of disfavor of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to any application for membership in the United Nations on the part of Spain, contained in section X of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1510. Regarding the discussions at the Conference incident to this expression of disfavor, see ibid., p. 1637, index entries under Spain: United Nations, unfavorable attitude toward admission of Spain.
35. For text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, see section V of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 971.
36. The second Polish Government referred to would presumably be the Polish Government in Exile at London. For documentation regarding the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, see vol. v, pp. 110 ff.
37. Comdr. Harold L. Stassen, member of the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference.
38. For text of the letter of June 20, from the Acting Chairman of the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference (Gromyko) to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Chairman of the United States delegation, see vol. i, p. 1398.
39. For text of the letter of June 23, from the Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the Soviet delegation (Gromyko), see ibid., p. 1428.