Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Minutes

Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 20, 1945, 4 p.m.

London, September 20, 1945, 4 p.m.

C.F.M.(P) (45) 14th Meeting

Present

U.K.	U.S.A	U.S.S.R
Mr. Bevin	Mr. Byrnes (Chairman)	M. Molotov
Sir R. I. Campbell	Mr. J. Dunn	M. F. T. Gousev
Sir A. Clark Kerr	Mr. B. V. Cohen	M. K. V. Novikov
Mr. A. Duff Cooper	Mr. J. F. Dulles	M. S. A. Golunski
Sir Orme Sargent	Mr. C. E. Bohlen	M. V. N. Pavlov

France	China
M. Bidault	Dr. Wang Shih Chieh
M. Couve de Murville	Dr. Wellington Koo
General Catroux	Dr. Victor Hoo
M. Alphand	Dr. Hollington Tong
	Mr. Yang Yun Chu

1. Finland: Peace Treaty

(Previous Reference: C.F.M.(P) (45) 13th Meeting, Minute 2)

The Council continued their discussion of the procedure for further consideration of the draft Peace Treaty with Finland.

M. Bidault said that, as he understood it, all subjects on the Agenda of the Council were open to discussion by all Delegations. He would not like consideration of the Finnish Peace Treaty to reach its final stages without the French Delegation having an opportunity to state their views. If the Council accepted the proposal of the Soviet Delegation that this subject should be referred for detailed study to an Anglo-Soviet Commission, he would not wish that their report should be submitted directly to the Council, but rather that there should be some intermediate stage at which the French Delegation could express their views.

After further discussion the Council agreed to postpone further consideration of the procedure for dealing with the Finnish Peace Treaty.

2. Roumania: Peace Treaty

The Council had before them memoranda on this subject by the Soviet Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 8), the British Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 21) and the United States Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 36).⁸

Mr. Byrnes drew attention to the note prefixed to the memorandum by the United States Delegation declaring that the United States Government would not negotiate a Peace Treaty with Roumania until a broadly representative government had been established in that country. This note had been prefixed to the memorandum in order that no misunderstanding should arise from the fact that the United States Delegation had participated in discussion of the draft Treaty. With this reservation, however, he was ready to proceed with the discussion of the memoranda before the Council.

M. Molotov said that while he could not ignore this statement he was willing to deal with it when the question of recognising the Roumanian Government came up for discussion.

He suggested that, as a basis for their discussion of the draft Treaty for Roumania, the Council should take the Soviet Delegation’s proposals (C.F.M.(45) 8), and the modifications and additions suggested by the British Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 21) and should then consider the proposals of the United States Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 36).

Armaments (Paragraph 3 of C.F.M.(45) 21).

M. Molotov said that, unlike Italy, Roumania was not a great Power. She was a neighbour of the Soviet Union, and had fought only against the Soviet Union. She was not capable of maintaining a large army or a large war potential which might threaten the peace of Europe. Why then was it necessary to impose special restrictions on Roumania’s military establishments? To restrict her armaments and, still more, to impose on her an Allied Inspectorate, would restrict her sovereignty and hurt her pride, without bringing any special benefit to the Allied cause.

Mr. Bevin said that an Allied Inspectorate was proposed in order to ensure that the peace conditions were complied with. The Soviet Union was not Roumania’s only neighbour, and many of Europe’s troubles had begun in the Balkans. These smaller nations should not be allowed to maintain armed forces larger than their economy could support. Incidents in these countries had too often been used by the larger Powers as the occasion for major conflicts. Serbia in 1914, Poland in 1939 were examples of this. The sale of arms to small countries was also a potential source of danger. Limitation of the armaments of the smaller powers would not only assist the national economy in those countries, but would limit the possibilities of another world war.

He did not, however, insist on the wording used in the British draft on this point, and was prepared to accept Section IV of the United States memorandum (C.F.M.(45) 36).⁹

Mr. Byrnes said that the United States Delegation attached very great importance to this proposal. The whole world was weary of war and was looking to this Conference to lay the foundations of a lasting peace.

Italy had been an ally of Germany, and Roumania too had fought by Germany’s side. The Council had already agreed on a directive which would ensure that Italy could not rearm for offensive purposes. He could see no reason why the same policy should not be applied to Roumania. Even if they were satisfied that the present Government of Roumania had no warlike intentions, they could not know how long it would remain in power. He feared rivalry in armaments among the small nations, which would eventually lead to larger conflicts in which millions might be involved. Limitation of armaments would be the greatest boon to the Balkan peoples, whose economic condition was such that they could not maintain large armies and at the same time restore the peace-time production which was essential to their economic health and happiness. If the great Powers fulfilled their promise to prevent aggression through the United Nations Organisation, these countries would have no need of large armies.

M. Molotov said that, in the light of the exchange of views which had taken place, he was ready to agree that Section IV of the United States memorandum (C.F.M.(45) 36) should be taken as a basis for detailed consideration of the restriction of Roumania’s military establishments.

Mr. Bevin said he would like to make clear the views of the British Government on the Balkan area as a whole. Some of the States in this area were ex-enemies, other were Allies. It was the objective of the British Government to remove the threat of aggression throughout the whole area by securing the limitation of armaments in Allied, as well as ex-enemy, countries, so that security in this area could be based, not on competitive armaments, but on a sense of confidence.

M. Molotov said that, in agreeing to accept the United States draft as a basis, he had not intended to imply that the issue was finally decided. He thought that further detailed study was needed, and he would himself prefer that this should be carried out, not by the Deputies, but by a Committee consisting of representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. Secondly, he thought it was a matter for further consideration whether an Allied Inspectorate or other enforcement machinery would be required, or whether it would be possible to dispense with any machinery for enforcement.

After further discussion, the Council:—

(1) Agreed that Section IV of C.F.M.(45) 36 should be accepted as a basis for detailed study of this question, and that this study should include the question whether any machinery was required (whether in the form of an Allied Inspectorate or otherwise) for enforcing any restrictions which it might be decided to impose on Roumanian’s military establishments.

(2) Agreed to adjourn to a later meeting further discussion of the procedure by which detailed study of these and other proposals for inclusion in the Treaties with the ex-enemy satellite States should be carried out.

Soviet-Roumanian Frontier (Paragraph 4 of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that Article 4 of the Armistice Terms should be accepted as a basis for discussion.

Return of Allied Vessels (Paragraph 5 of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that this question should be referred for detailed study and report to the Council.

War Crimes (Paragraph 6 of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that Article 14 of the Armistice Terms should be accepted as the basis for dealing with the question of apprehending and trying persons accused of war crimes.

Fascist organisations (Paragraph 7 of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that Article 15 of the Armistice Terms should be accepted as a basis of discussion for dealing with pro-Hitler, pro-Fascist and other organisations in Roumania conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations, on the understanding that the examining body would consider whether, in view of the action already taken by the Roumanian Government under Article 15 of the Armistice Terms, it was necessary to make any provision for this point in the Treaty.

Withdrawal of Allied Forces (Paragraph 8 of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that, on the conclusion of the Peace Treaty all Allied forces would be withdrawn from Roumania (except as might be provided for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Red Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria) and that all unused currency and goods would be returned to the Roumanian Government.

Transylvania (Paragraph 9 of C.F.M.(45) 21)

The British and United States Delegations proposed that the frontier with Hungary should be, in general, the frontier existing in 1938, except that as regards Transylvania determination regarding the whole or the greater part to go to Roumania should be made after examining the respective claims of the two States.

M. Molotov said that the task of the Council was to liquidate the Vienna Award^9a and restore the award of the Treaty of Trianon.¹⁰ He thought that this decision could be taken without further enquiry.

Mr. Bevin recalled that Article 19 of the Armistice Terms provided that “Transylvania (or the greater part thereof) should be returned to Roumania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement”. All that the British Delegation wanted was to get a just and equitable frontier so that future conflict might be avoided.

M. Bidault suggested that in this matter the Council should follow the policy which they had adopted with regard to the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and seek, after investigation on the spot, an ethnic line which would leave as few Hungarians as possible in Roumania and as few Roumanians as possible in Hungary. Special provisions were required to protect national minorities.

M. Molotov said that the bulk of the population of Transylvania was Roumanian, though there were many Hungarians and some Germans. These nationalities were closely intermingled, and it was impossible to draw a line which would not leave many Roumanians in Hungary and many Hungarians in Roumania. He quoted the letter which M. Millerand, then Chairman of the Paris Peace Conference, had addressed to the head of the Hungarian Delegation in April, 1920, to the following effect. “The frontiers established for Hungary by the Trianon Peace Treaty are the result of painstaking study of ethnological conditions in Central Europe and of national aspirations”.¹¹ It was common knowledge that the transfer of Transylvania to Roumania in 1919 had the approval of the United States, British and French Governments. The Soviet Government agreed with that decision. Hitler had disagreed with that decision and cancelled it. Their duty was to reverse Hitler’s decision and restore their own. The wording of Article 19 of the Roumanian Armistice Terms had been carefully chosen so as not to tie their hands in case any new circumstances should arise. But nobody had suggested that new circumstances had arisen, and he recommended that the Trianon decision should be approved.

M. Bidault said that the French Delegation objected to nothing that M. Molotov had said. The Vienna Award should be cancelled and the Trianon decision confirmed.

Mr. Byrnes said that in 1919 the United States had tried for several months to secure a different line from that which was ultimately adopted; and, at the time when M. Millerand’s letter was written, the United States had only an observer present at the Conference. He thought that by a slight change in the Transylvania frontier it would be possible to restore half a million Hungarians to Hungary. In the area which he had in mind there was a considerable Hungarian population, whose railway connections were almost entirely with Hungary, and to put them into Roumania would contribute neither to their happiness nor to the happiness or prosperity of Roumania. The total area of Transylvania was 39,600 square miles and the change which he had in mind would not affect more than 3,000 square miles. Where the lives of individuals were concerned, he would feel happier if the decision could be made after a detailed examination on the ground.

After further discussion Mr. Byrnes handed in the following revised draft of paragraph 2 of Section I of the United States memorandum (C.F.M.(45) 36).—“The frontier with Hungary shall be, in general, the frontier existing in 1938; however, as regards Transylvania the ethnic situation shall be examined with a view to determining whether the award of a small part to Hungary would materially reduce the number of persons to be subjected to alien rule”.¹²

The Council agreed to resume consideration of this question at a later meeting.

Resumption of Diplomatic and Consular Relations (Paragraph 10(i) of C.F.M.(45) 21)

Mr. Bevin withdrew the second sentence of this paragraph of the British draft; and it was agreed that a provision should be included in the Treaty covering the resumption of diplomatic and consular relations with Roumania.

Position of International Organisations (Paragraph 10 (ii) and (iii) of C.F.M.(45) 21)

M. Molotov said that the proposals that Roumania should accept the arrangements made by the United Nations for the liquidation of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice and should recognise the authority of the United Nations organisations, were in his view covered by the Soviet proposal that Roumania should be required to cooperate with the Allied Powers and execute such measures as they might adopt for the maintenance of world peace (paragraph 4 of C.F.M.(45) 8).

Mr. Bevin agreed that the proposals in paragraph 10 (ii) and (iii) of C.F.M.(45) 21 should be considered in connection with the proposal in paragraph 4 of C.F.M.(45) 8.

Mr. Brynes said that he had no strong objection, as the signature of the Treaty assumed prior recognition of a Government with satisfactory qualifications for admission to the United Nations.

International Control of Danube (Paragraph 19(iv) of C.F.M.(45) 21)

The British and United States Delegations proposed that Roumania should accept any arrangements agreed for the international regime of the Danube.

M. Molotov said that Roumania should not be asked to accept an obligation of this nature when she did know what was involved. No regime for the Danube had been agreed to, as far as he knew, and it was too much to demand acceptance of an agreement which did not even exist.

Mr. Bevin said that this proposal was not intended to prejudge the question of the administration of the Danube. All that was proposed was that, when an agreement was reached, Roumania should be required to co-operate in giving effect to it. Roumania would be a sovereign power when she signed the Treaty, and unless some such provision was included in the Treaty she would be in a position to sabotage any international agreement which had been made in respect of the Danube.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that there could be no agreement on the administration of the Danube without the agreement of the Soviet Government and they ought to ensure that Roumania would not be in a position to prevent the operation of any agreement entered into by the Soviet and other Governments.

After further discussion the Council agreed to adjourn consideration of this proposal.

Position of Existing Treaties (Paragraph 19(v) of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that further consideration should be given to this proposal, in order to specify which Treaties Roumania should be required to keep in force and which Treaties she should abrogate.

Bill of Rights (Paragraph 10(vi) of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that Roumania should be required to maintain a Bill of Eights on the lines already accepted for inclusion in the Italian Peace Treaty. The details of such a provision would require examination.

Reception of Roumanian Nationals (Paragraph 10(vii) of C.F.M.(45) 21)

Mr. Bevin agreed to withdraw the proposal that Roumania should be required to receive Roumanian nationals returning from abroad and to accept full responsibility for them.

War Graves (Paragraph 10(viii) of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that detailed consideration should be given to the proposal that the Peace Treaty should contain provisions regarding the war graves of Allied nationals in Roumania.

Financial and Economic Clauses (Paragraph 11 of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed that the proposals in paragraph 11 of the memorandum by the British Delegation should be referred for detailed consideration in connection with paragraph 2 of the memorandum by the Soviet Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 8).

Admission to United Nations Organisation (Paragraph 12 of C.F.M.(45) 21)

It was agreed to postpone further consideration of the proposal in paragraph 4 of the memorandum by the Soviet Delegation (C.F.M. (45) 8) regarding the candidature of Roumania for membership of the United Nations Organisation.

The Council agreed to consider at their meeting on the following day the further proposals in the memorandum by the United States Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 36) on the provisions of a draft Peace Treaty for Roumania.

8. C.F.M.(45) 8, September 12, p. 149; C.F.M.(45) 21, September 17, p. 219; and C.F.M.(45) 36, September 19, p. 266.

9. The United States delegation minutes of this meeting of the Council record the following exchange at this point in the discussion:

   “Molotov said that so far as he personally was concerned, the thought that if one disarmed a state it could lead a quieter life had never occurred to him. Perhaps it was correct. Bevin’s remarks were correct in many ways, but he had said nothing about the defense of Rumania. The Soviet Delegation proposed in regard to Rumania that they should contemplate its eventual entry into the United Nations. If they contemplate that, why plant an inspectorate in Rumania? He wondered if this were not artificial. Did they really have so many people in their countries to be sending them as inspectors, to inspect war graves, as consuls, et cetera. If these states asked for people, they could send them.

   “Bevin asked if they had asked for all the people they had there now.

   “Molotov replied that these people were their guests.

   “Bevin said he thought that they were hosts.

   “Molotov said that anyway they felt like guests.

   “Bevin said he could not understand why the Soviet Delegation opposed all of these proposals in regard to inspection.” (740.00119 Council/9–1145)

10. Reference is to the arbitral award by an Italian-German Commission regarding the cession of Transylvanian territories by Rumania to Hungary, made at Vienna, August 30, 1940; for documentation on this award, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 501–503, and Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. x, pp. 581–584.
10. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, signed at Trianon, June 4, 1920; for text, see Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. iii, p. 3539.
11. The quoted portion appears to be a paraphrase of a statement in the letter of May 6, 1920, from the President of the Paris Peace Conference, Millerand, to the President of the Hungarian Peace Delegation. For text of the letter, in French, see Papers and Documents relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, vol. i: 1919–1920, edited by Francis Deák and Dezsó Ujváry, published by the Royal Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Budapest, 1939), p. 287.

12. The American minutes do not record the presentation of the revised draft of paragraph 2, Section I of the United States Memorandum, but they contain the following exchange at this point in the discussion:

    “Molotov asked if they could have Mr. Byrnes’ proposal in writing.

    “Byrnes said he did not know where the line should be. The total area of Transylvania was 39,686 square miles. Our proposed change in the line would not affect more than 3,000 square miles or less than one-tenth the area of Transylvania. People would feel better if our decision was made after the question had been studied on the spot.

    “Molotov asked what was proposed.

    “Bevin said he was ready to accept paragraph 2 of the American paper, (at this point a map showing the line under consideration by the American Delegation was shown to Mr. Molotov).

    “Molotov said that the wording of the American paragraph 2 seemed to give an exaggerated idea of what was proposed on the map shown him by Mr. Byrnes. He thought it better to study the matter and to revert to it in a day or two.

    “Byrnes said he agreed that they pass it over until they could find language to express the United States idea better.” (740.00119 Council/9–1145) The map produced at the meeting at this time not found in Department files.