740.00119 Council/9–2045
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Ambassador Gusev | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
The Secretary said he had come to see Mr. Molotov to discuss with him a matter he had had on his mind for some time. He said he [Page 268] recalled very well a statement in regard to Poland that Marshal Stalin had made at the Yalta Conference. He had been particularly impressed with the Marshal’s observations that twice in twenty-five years Poland had been a corridor for German attack on Russia, and also his statement that there was always the danger that, as after the last war, the United States might return home and withdraw from European affairs, at which time the danger of a recrudescence of German aggression might become real. He added that, as Mr. Molotov knew, historically the United States was reluctant to enter into political treaties with foreign governments, but he wished to ask Mr. Molotov whether the Soviet Government would consider a treaty between the Four Principal Powers for the demilitarization of Germany to run for twenty or twenty-five years, would be a good thing. He went on to say that if the Soviet Government thought that this was a good idea, he would be prepared to recommend it to the President, and both of them could recommend it to the Congress. He said the details could, of course, be worked out later, but he would like to know Mr. Molotov’s views as to whether such a treaty would be a real contribution toward removing fear of a recrudescence of German aggression. He felt that this fear played a large part in the policies of various European states. He said he had discussed it with the President before he left, and although it was a new idea for the President, he had been interested, and his first reaction had been favorable.
He concluded by saying that if the Soviet Union thought well of the idea, they could then talk to the French and British.
Mr. Molotov replied that he could not give the Secretary the definite views of his Government, but personally he thought it was a very interesting idea, and he would report to his Government, and they could discuss it again in a few days.
Mr. Molotov then went on to say that he wished to talk with the Secretary about our paper on Rumania.2 He said he had the impression that the United States was seeking to oppose the Soviet Union in every way, and the note contained in our memorandum on Rumania was in effect a challenge directed against the Soviet Union, and to which he would be forced to reply.
The Secretary said it was not intended as a challenge nor directed in any way against the Soviet Union. It was merely, as he had told Mr. Molotov privately, for the purpose of making clear that our participation in the working out of a treaty with Rumania could not be construed as an indication of our willingness to recognize the present government of Rumania.
[Page 269]Mr. Molotov asked why it had been necessary to put that statement in writing, and that as written it was in a very different spirit from what the Secretary said he had in mind.
The Secretary replied that at Potsdam it had been agreed that each government would investigate the question of recognition, and that that was what the United States was still engaged in doing. He added that in his view the statement contained nothing new as to our position, which had been fully expressed by the President at Potsdam.
Mr. Molotov then said he would suggest that the United States Delegation withdraw the note, and the Secretary orally say what he had just told him. An oral statement making clear our position without attacking the Rumanian Government would be all right.
The Secretary replied that he had no objection to stating what he had orally, but that he felt that he would have to give the reasons.
Mr. Molotov replied that that was, of course, the Secretary’s business. If these attacks on the Rumanian Government were made by the United States Delegation, he would be forced to answer. He repeated his suggestion that the Secretary withdraw the note and confine himself to an oral statement that our participation in the drawing up of the treaty should not be construed as recognition.
The Secretary said he was unable to withdraw the note under the circumstances.
Mr. Molotov replied, in that case he would have to come to the defense of the Rumanian Government and reply to the attack on the Soviet Government.
The Secretary said that was Mr. Molotov’s right, but that he in turn might find it necessary to reply to Mr. Molotov. He expressed regret that Mr. Molotov chose to take our position in such a wrong way.
- Presumably reference is to the memorandum by the United States delegation, C.F.M.(45) 36, September 19, supra.↩