740.0011 European War
1939/29461
The American Political Adviser at Algiers
(Murphy) to the Secretary of State
No. 76
Allied Force
Headquarters,
March 22, 1943.
18
[Received April 7.]
Subject: Transmitting Copies of Correspondence
Exchanged between General Henri Giraud and Robert D. Murphy in
October and November, 1942.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the
Department’s telegraphic instruction no. 426 of March 1019 requesting that the
Department be supplied with copies of three letters dated November 2
exchanged between General Henri Giraud and myself.
As the Department was informed by my telegram no. 385 of March 14, 7
p.m.,19 Mr. John
McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, had already departed from North
Africa prior to the receipt of the Department’s telegram under
reference.
I enclose in original and translation copies of three informal
letters,20 the originals of which were initialled by me and
addressed to General Giraud.
I also enclose copies in original and translation of a letter of
October 27,21 and two
letters dated October 28, 1942,22 addressed to me and initialled by
General Giraud. It will be noted that the letter of October 27
incorporated part of the text of one of the letters of November 2,
and one of General Giraud’s letters of October 28 incorporates all
of the text of another of my letters of November 2. The reason for
this disparity of dates is that the rough draft, undated, of these
two communications was transmitted secretly to General Giraud by
messenger while he was still in France. His letters of October 27
and 28 constituted his approval of the drafts and at his request
these were confirmed by clean copies which I initialled.
I also enclose a copy in original and translation of General Giraud’s
letter to me of November 1, 1942,23 and of my acknowledgment of November
2.24
There is also enclosed a copy of a draft of an “Accord de
Principe”25 and
its enclosures26 initialled by General Giraud on October 27, 1942.
[Page 413]
Copies of my letters of
November 2, as well as General Giraud’s suggested “Accord de
Principe” of October 27 (which I did not initial) were forwarded to
the Commander-in-Chief, European Theater,27 via our
Naval Attaché at Tangier.28 Copies were also supplied to General
Mark W. Clark at the time of his visit to Algeria on October 22,
1942.29
The Department is informed that these negotiations were conducted
under the authorization contained in the President’s Directive of
September 22, 1942.30
Respectfully yours,
Robert D. Murphy
Chief Civil Administrator
Enclosures:31
- 1
- —Letter to General Giraud, dated November 2,
1942.
- 2
- —Letter to General Giraud dated November 2,
1942.
- 3
- —Letter to General Giraud dated November 2,
1942.
- 4
- —Letter to Robert D. Murphy dated October 27,
1942.
- 5
- —Letter to Robert D. Murphy dated October 28,
1942.
- 6
- —Letter to Robert D. Murphy dated October 28,
1942.
- 7
- —Letter to Robert D. Murphy dated November 1,
1942.
- 8
- —Letter to General Giraud dated November 2,
1942.
- 9
- —Copy of “Accord de Principe”
- 10
- —Annexe I to “Accord de Principe”
- 11
- —Annexe II to “Accord de Principe”
- 12
- —Annexe III to “Accord de Principe”
Translations attached to each enclosure.32
[Enclosure 1—Translation]
The Personal Representative of President
Roosevelt (Murphy) to General Henri
Giraud
The General: To reply to various
questions which have been put to me in your name, I have the
honor to advise you that:
[Page 414]
- (1)
- The American Government will extend the benefits of
the Lend-Lease Act33 to the orders which will be transmitted
to the United States in order to give the French Army
the means of participating in the common
struggle.
- (2)
- The American Government will facilitate the
negotiation and execution of these orders.
- (3)
- The American Government will likewise expedite orders
in the United States for, and the rapid delivery of, the
necessary foodstuffs for the civilian population in
those French territories which will be free themselves,
or will be freed from the domination of the Axis.
- (4)
- Adequate measures are already being taken to lay by,
in anticipation of these deliveries, a quantity of
commodities of which there is an especially urgent need,
not only to relieve the populations, but also to assure
a better functioning of the means of transportation, and
to aid in the resumption of local production.
- (5)
- Insofar as French North Africa is concerned, the list
of these first “needs” which the Government of the
United States agrees to satisfy as soon as possible, as
soon as the break is made between these territories and
the Armistice Commissions, appear on the attached
enclosure which is in no wise all-inclusive.
- (6)
- To hasten the arrival of these commodities the
Government of the United States expects, however, that
the French merchant ships in French North African ports
will, at the proper time aid in such
transporting.
- (7)
- These deliveries of merchandise will be considered as
official French purchases and invoiced at world-wide
rates. For the acceptance and invoicing of these
commodities, reference will be made in principle to the
rules now followed in the application of the
Franco-American Agreement of 1941 for the provisioning
of North Africa.
- (8)
- Payment will be made in kind. Credits corresponding to
the amount of the deliveries will be opened in North
Africa for the account of the American Government. These
credits will be utilized either for the needs of the
Treasury of the United States for its eventual military
expenditures and its quartermaster purchases in French
Africa, or for the payment of exports from North Africa
to the United States.
- (9)
- In case it becomes evident that American expenditures
and purchases in Africa will not cover these deliveries
for civilian needs, the question of the means of payment
to be employed will be reexamined by mutual
agreement.
- (10)
- The American Government undertakes to facilitate
insofar as it is possible to do so, the disposal of
North African products which,
[Page 415]
as a result of circumstances, are
deprived of their normal outlets. As soon as military
collaboration is accomplished, conversations will ensue
to study the conditions under which these goods could be
distributed, the list of which will be supplied by the
French authorities.
- (11)
- Being firmly resolved to do everything compatible with
the conduct of the war, to avoid aggravating the
suffering of the population of Metropolitan France,
already so sorely tried, the Government of the United
States will not raise any objections to measures of
assistance which the French people, freed from the
domination of the Axis, may desire to take to aid other
populations of the French nation. The practice of
sending “family” packages, for relief of Metropolitan
cities adopted by African cities, Red Cross gifts, etc.,
should be in its opinion, continued between North Africa
and Metropolitan France, subject to the restriction that
the necessary safeguards be taken to insure that these
parcels may not be diverted from their
destination.
[Enclosure 2—Translation]
The Personal Representative of President
Roosevelt (Murphy) to General Henri
Giraud
The General: I have the honor to
acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 28, as follows:
“I consider it of the greatest importance that in case of
combined military operations in French territories
(either in Metropolitan France or overseas) which are
not occupied under the terms of the Armistice
Conventions by the Axis Powers, that the Expeditionary
Corps of the United Nations which would come to
collaborate with the local French troops should be an
essentially American expedition placed under American
command.
There should be no participation of dissident French
elements.
It is only later, and after an understanding between the
local French and American authorities that, in case of
need, non-American Allied, or dissident French
formations may be sent into these French
territories.”
[Here follows last paragraph of French text omitted from the
enclosed translation:
I am glad to assure you that your point of view is
perfectly in harmony with the point of view of my
government.]
[Page 416]
[Enclosure 3—Translation]
The Personal Representative of President
Roosevelt (Murphy) to General Henri
Giraud
The General: Referring to the
declaration made on several occasions by President Roosevelt,
and the obligations already undertaken by the American
Government as well as by the British Government, I am able to
assure you that the restoration of France to full independence,
in all the greatness and vastness which it possessed before the
war in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the war aims of the
United Nations.
It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be
reestablished as soon as possible throughout all the territory,
metropolitan and colonial, over which flew the French flag in
1939.
The Government of the United States considers the French nation
as an ally and will treat it as such.
May I add further that in case of military operations in French
territory (whether in Metropolitan France or in the Colonies) in
all instances where French collaboration may be found, the
American authorities will not intervene in any way in those
affairs which are solely within the province of the national
administration or which have to do with the exercise of French
sovereignty.
Insofar as the command is concerned, the Government of the United
States has no other thought or desire than to place the military
command of this area in the hands of the French as soon as
possible. However, during those phases of the operation
comprising the debarkation, establishing the security of French
North Africa, and supplying the necessary base, it is considered
essential that the American command and the organization which
has been set up with such effort and difficulty, especially for
this operation, remain unchanged. (The above clause is a result
of the recent conference between the American and French
representatives. It was drawn up before the receipt of your note
of October 2734
reading as follows:
“It is altogether normal, and it is understood, that all
the operations of debarkation will be controlled by the
General Staff of the American Army.
“The Inter-allied Command will begin to function after
the debarkation, that is to say, for each point of
debarkation, forty-eight hours after the hour set for
the beginning of the initial landing operations of the
first convoy. With respect to subsequent operations, the
American troops will come under the Inter-allied Command
as soon as they are landed.”
[Page 417]
I am communicating your suggestion to the General Staff of the
American Army and I am certain that an agreeable solution will
be found.) During this period, the Government of the United
States will make every effort to supply the French forces with
modern arms and equipment. While the equipping and organizing of
the French Army will thus be accomplished, the details
concerning the command can be completed so that the French will
be in a position to take over the Supreme Command at the proper
time.35 It would be
desirable, in order to facilitate the direction of the
operations, to have a General of the French Army attached as
Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief immediately after the
debarkation.
[Enclosure 4—Translation]
General Henri
Giraud to the Personal Representative of
President Roosevelt (Murphy)
Mr. Counselor of Embassy: You have
been good enough to write me as of today’s date, the following
letter:
“Referring to the declarations made on several occasions
by President Roosevelt, and the obligations already
undertaken by the American Government as well as by the
British Government, I am able to assure you that the
restoration of France to full independence, in all the
greatness and vastness which it possessed before the war
in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the war aims of
the United Nations.
“It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will
be reestablished as soon as possible throughout all the
territory, metropolitan and colonial, over which flew
the French flag in 1939.
“The Government of the United States considers the French
nation as an ally and will treat it as such.
“May I add further that in case of military operations in
French territory (whether in Metropolitan France or in
the Colonies) in all instances where French
collaboration may be found, the American authorities
will not intervene in any way in those affairs which are
solely within the province of the national
administration or which have to do with the exercise of
French sovereignty.
“The Government of the United States is ready to aid,
with abundant supplies of all the necessary materials,
the rapid rebirth of a French army under French
command.”
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of this communication of
which I have taken due note.
[Page 418]
[Enclosure 5—Translation]
General Henri
Giraud to the Personal Representative of
President Roosevelt (Murphy)
Mr. Counselor:
[Here follows the quoted text of Enclosure 2, page 415.]
[Enclosure 6—Translation]
General Henri
Giraud to the Personal Representative of
President Roosevelt (Murphy)
Mr. Counselor of Embassy: You have
been good enough to write me, as of today’s date, the following
letter.
[Here follows the text of Enclosure 1, page
413.]
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of this
communication, of which I take due note.
[Enclosure 7—Translation]
General Henri
Giraud to the Personal Representative of
President Roosevelt (Murphy)
Mr. Counselor: I thank you for your
confidence. You will not be disappointed.
I am certain that the armies of America and France, acting in
close conjunction, will insure ultimate victory. You will have
been one of the good artisans.
Please accept [etc.]
[Enclosure 8—Translation]
The Personal Representative of President
Roosevelt (Murphy) to General Henri
Giraud
The General: I am very grateful for
your letter of November 1 and I am in entire accord, as is
President Roosevelt, with your feeling that the French and
American Armies, operating in close conjunction, will assure
final victory.
[Page 419]
The thoroughly unsatisfactory means of communication at our
disposition have unfortunately hindered a more satisfactory
correspondence between us. I hope that they will soon be
remedied. We could accomplish so many things more quickly with a
better liaison.
I may add that upon my departure from Washington, the President
of the United States instructed me to convey his regards and
good wishes for the success of our collaboration.
I beg you to accept [etc.]
[Enclosure 9—Translation]
General Henri
Giraud to the Personal Representative of
President Roosevelt (Murphy)36
Agreement in Principle
The projected operation presents the greatest chances for success
from the strategical point of view.
It calls for considerable effort which will not be easily
renewed. It is, therefore, necessary to insure every chance of
success and to eliminate as much risk as possible.
The more rapid the progress of the operation, the more complete
will be its success.
A landing is always a difficult operation. It is of utmost
importance to make sure that throughout the duration of the
operation there will be no resistance either on sea, land, or in
the air. Only the people on the spot can indicate the moment of
maximum security.
It would be extremely desirable for the French fleet in
particular not only to refrain from hindering the operation, but
to regard it favorably. A similar hypothesis would have been
impossible to envisage a few months ago. An evolution of opinion
is now going on which can make it possible within a period of
time difficult to specify, but perhaps not too far distant.
On land, bloodshed must be avoided at all costs between troops
destined later to labor for the common cause. There also a
favorable spirit is developing. It would be
heartbreaking to jeopardize it by an untimely haste.
The reasons given for an immediate attack have much value.
However, they are not all equal. It is necessary, above all, to
forestall any enemy initiative. Intelligence work well done and
completely objective in France, in Italy, in Tripolitania and in
Spain, will keep the Allied General Staff fully advised of the
possibilities
[Page 420]
of the
adversary. The strategic stake is so important that political
motives must remain secondary.
The means have been fully calculated and should suffice. It will
necessitate an enormous tonnage which is supposed to exist, but
which will inevitably suffer a certain percentage of loss. If
one concedes the normal ratio of five tons as the minimum
required to transport one man, it means that for the force
envisaged, the General Staff must be assured of a minimum total
of twenty-five million tons before launching the operations.
The protective cover, naval and aerial, appears to be sufficient.
It can not, however, pretend to prevent all submarine or aerial
torpedo attack. The less time the transports lie abreast of the
coast of French North Africa, the better.
It is quite normal and it is understood, that all the landing
operations will be regulated by the General Staff of the
American Army.
The Inter-allied Command will begin to function after the
landing, that is to say, for each point of debarkation,
forty-eight hours after the hour set for the beginning of the
initial landing operations of the first convoy. With respect to
subsequent operations, the American troops will come under the
Inter-allied Command as soon as they are landed.37
Fundamentally, the operation must aim at the total occupation of
French North Africa, first to forestall any German-Italian
reaction, then to prepare the march toward the East and
liquidate the question of Tripolitania.
But the importance of this tremendous effort does not end there.
It must afford the American army a chance to get a footing on
the European Continent. It is therein that, in the final
analysis, lies the real strategic stake of the operation. It is
vital for the American Army.
That part of the European Continent not yet subjected to Axis
occupation, that is to say, the Iberian Peninsula and the French
Mediterranean Coast, must engage our attention. The French
seacoast between Port-Vendres and Toulon, if one assumes that
Nice will fall immediately into the hands of the Italians, seems
at present to offer the maximum chances of success. On the other
hand, the security of the operations envisaged in French North
Africa requires that Axis troops be prevented, as long as
possible, from using the ports and the flying fields of the
French Coast. The maintenance of a bridge-head on the
Mediterranean Coast could be achieved by the Metropolitan French
forces, on condition that they be assured of American support
both of matériel and personnel.
[Page 421]
It is quite logical that the American General Staff should not
wish to divert a part of the forces coming from America for this
operation, but it should be relatively easy to accomplish this
with units stationed in Ireland and transported by plane to the
Coast, while the matériel previously stored at Gibraltar would
be brought at the first signal into the designated ports. This
means, besides the armament proper of the American forces,
anti-tank and anti-aircraft matériel, pursuit planes, fuel and
munitions, totalling some 40,000 tons not counting the fuel. If
one admits that it requires 100,000 tons of supplies of all
kinds for the American troops arriving by air, it is evident
that the maritime tonnage to be reserved at Gibraltar is
insignificant compared with the total.
This question is closely related to that of the landing in
Africa, for it is certain that this debarkation will immediately
bring about the occupation by the Germans of that part of France
still free. She may resist, and will, if she is sure of
immediate American support. This support is possible if it is
foreseen and preparations made therefor. It is necessary in
order that the Franco-American union may be complete and
fruitful.
Regarding aviation, the total contribution of 2,000 planes seems
insufficient. There should be an ample supply of pursuit planes
in particular. It is necessary to earmark at least 250 planes
for the defense of the Metropolitan bridge-head. As to transport
planes, first based in Ireland, it is understood that they will
be available for the African operation as soon as they have
disembarked their passengers on the Mediterranean Coast.
Two other points still remain to be clarified, both from the
diplomatic as well as the military point of view, that is the
attitude of Spain on the one hand, and of Italy on the
other.
It would be of the greatest importance to have Spain on our side.
In any case it is hazardous to plunge into an operation in
winter in Spanish Morocco. There is the risk of losing men,
matériel, and above all, time. It is expedient in this
connection to remain on the defensive, strongly fortifying the
border with mines and anti-tank cannons so as to bring to bear
the full force of the effort as soon as possible against
Tunisia, particularly on Bizerte and Cape Bon. On the other
hand, the entrance of the Germans into Spain (in a race to the
free continent) might justify an operation into Spanish
Morocco.
As to Italy, it will be necessary to persuade her that her best
interest lies in remaining quiet, lacking a subsequent adhesion
not to be eliminated, in the face of a specifically
German-American struggle.
The evolution of the situation in Egypt and the losses sustained
in Russia are sufficient reasons for Italy to be unwilling to
play Germany’s game in this adventure.
[Page 422]
To sum up, the Inter-allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa
accepts the propositions of the American General Staff for the
debarkation in Algeria and Morocco, provided that he himself set
the date for the landing, following American advices that
preparations are completed.
He desires that this African operation coincide with the landing
on the French Coasts of the Mediterranean of American personnel
coming from Ireland—50,000 men in principle—and of matériel
coming from Gibraltar,—140,000 tons in principle—upon radioed
request from the French command.
At the same time British attacks on the Atlantic Coast, in the
English Channel and the North Sea, Russian attacks on the
Eastern Front and an attack on Rommel’s Army should bring about
the dispersal of the enemy’s reserves, and prevent in particular
concentrations of planes and Panzer Divisions both in the
Mediterranean and in Unoccupied France.
All these efforts taking place simultaneously will guarantee
success.
October 27,
1942.
H[enri] G[iraud]
[Enclosure 10]
Annex I
[Here follows an Intelligence Plan to detect efforts of the enemy
in French North Africa and in the Free Zone. The preface
statement, “Plan d’opérations du Général Giraud pour une tête de
pont française sur la côte méditerranéenne (27 octobre 1942),”
was not included in this despatch. It is published in General
Giraud’s memoirs, Un seul but, la victoire:
Alger, 1942–1944, with Annex I, on pages 336–339.]
[Enclosure 11]
Annex II
[Here follows the text of “Material Required—1st Urgency to be
stocked at Gibraltar and to be transported upon request.” This
annex is published in General Giraud’s memoirs, Un seul but, la victoire: Alger,
1942–1944, p. 340.]
[Enclosure 12]
Annex III
[Here follows the text of “Material—2nd Urgency to be transported
between D–2 and D–10.” This annex is published in General
Giraud’s memoirs, Un seul but, la victoire:
Alger, 1942–1944, p. 341.]
