Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume II

711.60D/187a

Memorandum for Admiral Standley⁹⁶

undated

I. Our Policy Toward Finland

(a) Immediate Considerations

This Government’s estimate of the present situation in Finland, which is based upon reports over the past year from the American Legation in Helsinki and upon conversations with other competent observers who have recently come from Finland after several years stay in the area, is as follows:

1. German forces now in Finland seem unwilling to attempt fresh advances into Soviet territory north of Leningrad unless they are aided by Finnish armed forces.

2. Neither the Government nor the people of Finland desire to mount fresh military offensives against the Soviet Union.

3. There is reason to believe that German pressure on Finland to furnish further military aid has been heavy in recent months.

4. Given the foregoing situation it has been the short term aim of the American Government to exert pressure on the Finnish Government as a counter to the German pressure.

It is the opinion of all American observers in Finland that the Finnish people and certain officials of the Finnish Government place great value on maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States, and that the maintenance of such relations acts as a strong deterrent to any Finnish inclination to increase substantially aid to Germany. These observers feel that, conversely if we should break relations with Finland under existing conditions, the last political weapon in the hands of the United Nations with which to counteract German pressure on Finland would be destroyed, and increased Finnish military aid to Germany, perhaps of a decisive character along the northern front, would probably result. It is also felt by these observers that, instead of creating disunity among the Finnish people, the immediate effect of a severance of relations with Finland on the part of the United States would be to increase the influence and power over the Finnish people of the pro-German elements in Finland, a development almost certain to lead to more extensive Finnish military collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union.

5. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the American Government that in the absence of any practical possibility of opening substantial military operations in the area, there has been and continues to be a definite military advantage to the Soviet Union in the maintenance of Finnish-American relations under present circumstances. (It should be pointed out in this connection that the maintenance of American relations with Finland in no way precludes, under present circumstances, military action against Finnish territory by any member state of the United Nations.)

(b) General Considerations

It is the view of the American Government that it is in the interest of the United Nations generally and of the Soviet Union in particular that Finland be gotten out of its “co-belligerency” with Germany.

Aside from the obvious military advantages to the Soviet Union, the psychological effect of a Finnish withdrawal from the hostilities would be very great on:

(1) Sweden, where present nervousness over the fate of its eastern neighbor distracts Sweden from complete opposition to German encroachments.

(2) Rumania, where, should it be demonstrated that Finland was able to withdraw from the war on equitable terms, the opposition to continuing military operations against the Soviet Union would, it is believed, substantially increase.

(3) The United States, where a substantial Scandinavian population remains skeptical of the sincerity of the Atlantic Charter because of fear that the Soviet Union intends to occupy and annex Finland.

(4) The Axis countries, where it is reasonable to assume the dissidence of Finland would have a strongly adverse effect on morale.

II. Procedure

(a) It is suggested that you explain to high Soviet officials as soon as practicable, the immediate considerations involved in American policy toward Finland. In doing so, it would be advantageous, for the record, to obtain the Soviet Government’s specific approval of the policy which the American Government has followed so far in regard to Finland.

(b) If, on receiving the explanations of the immediate considerations involved in the American policy toward Finland, the Soviet Government should show an inclination to discuss its own attitude toward Finland, you might find it feasible also to go into the question of general considerations in American policy toward Finland; but, if the Soviet Government should show no inclination to discuss Finnish matters further with you, it might be best not to pursue the matter for the time being.

The Department inclines to the opinion that the Finnish Government would not be receptive at this time to the character of peace terms which it is thought the Soviet Government might feel disposed to offer.^* Hence, it would seem undesirable in any event for this Government to press the matter of a peace offer from the Soviet Government until the situation in Finland appears more propitious, which may be expected when the results of the North African campaign and the Soviet winter offensive are apparent to the Finnish Government.

96. Handed to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, William H. Standley, while in Washington on December 18, 1942. by Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.
97. Note. In a conversation on December 14, President Ryti of Finland informed the American Minister that so far from taking a negative and defeatist attitude toward problems of the world war, he fully intended, as soon as in his judgment opportunity offered, to take positive measures, implying that these measures would be designed to terminate the conflict with U. S. S. R. The Department is inclined to believe that President Ryti expects the Soviet Union in due course to become much weaker militarily, and that he intends to wait for such a development before taking “positive measures”. However, if the military situation of Germany in relation to the Soviet Union deteriorates as we expect, he may be moved to take “positive measures” for consideration contrary to those he now expects. [Footnote in the original. The conversation with President Ryti on December 14, 1942, was reported in the Minister’s telegram No. 1230 of the same date, p. 108.]