882.20/464a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)27
23. Department’s 20, May 20, 4 p.m. We have carefully examined the French plan of assistance for Liberia in consultation with the War and Navy Departments, and as a result of these studies the following observations are transmitted for the strictly confidential information of the Liberian Government. In making known these comments to President Barclay or the Secretary of State, you should point out that while this Government is unable to act as intermediary for Liberia, and has no desire to influence decisions which the Liberian Government may regard as proper in the interest of its national defense, the fact that Liberia initially requested our advice in the matter would appear to warrant our interposing such observations as might suggest themselves from a technical standpoint. These observations, as you will note, are definitely unfavorable to the French proposals.
While this Government approves of the principle of insuring Liberia’s safety through the cooperation of the French and British Governments in West Africa, we cannot escape the conviction that a Liberian force of 5,000 men, even if properly armed, trained and disciplined, would be entirely inadequate to resist attacks by a European power from sea or air, or to meet the determined aggression of a hostile [Page 591] landing force in conjunction with assistance from within the country. Moreover the financial resources of Liberia would obviously preclude the possibility of creating or maintaining a military establishment on the scale contemplated by the French. We feel also that these resources would not permit consideration of a foreign loan or any other form of external indebtedness except in a manner which would be disastrous to the country’s financial stability. Furthermore any such financial commitments would apparently be in conflict with the existing Loan Agreement between the Liberian Government and the Firestone Company, under the provisions of which all expenditures not regularly provided for in the national budget (which is barely enough to meet the most urgent necessities of the Government) or secured by surplus revenues must be approved by the American Financial Adviser. It is understood further that according to the Loan Agreement, the opportunity to subscribe to any new financing of the Liberian Government must be offered first to the Firestone Company, which so far does not seem to have been approached or consulted in the premises by the Liberian Government.
Since an overland invasion of Liberia from neighboring French or British territory can scarcely be considered a likelihood under present world conditions, the most probable danger to Liberia would arise from the strategic purpose of an unfriendly power to extend naval and air control down the West Coast of Africa over the sea routes to the South Atlantic and over the sea and air routes to South America. Any attempt to establish a base for this purpose in Liberia would undoubtedly come from a state whose aggression in the African continent would threaten the vital interests of France and Great Britain at least equally as much as those of Liberia. From a practical standpoint, the defense of Liberia would seem to be of paramount concern to the two Powers which have most at stake in this portion of Africa. From the standpoint of Liberia, on the other hand, the proposals of the French Government would appear to be seriously defective in that they do not involve any positive French commitment toward the defense of Liberia but would require Liberia to arm and defend itself at its own expense.
For your confidential information the following comments have been made in this connection by the United States War Department:
“It is hard to believe that the suggestions made by the French Government were motivated by a sincere regard for the best interests of Liberia. The presumably qualified representatives of the French Government who proposed to furnish 12 French non-commissioned officers to create a force of 5,000 men, must have been aware of the human impossibility of turning that number of primitive, untrained men, wholly lacking in the background of military organization, discipline and efficiency, into a cohesive, effective force, by the aid of such a paltry number of alien instructors. Moreover, even this corps of [Page 592] instructors is not proposed to be of the caliber of commissioned officers, who might be competent to give strategic direction to the dispositions and employment of the force as a whole, as well as to meet the intricate problems of leadership and organization from a broad background of intelligent experience.”
After careful consideration of the problem, we have come to the conclusion that while this Government cannot make the suggestion even informally, the best and simplest means of securing Liberia’s defense would be a joint declaration by the Governments of France and Great Britain to the effect that any attack on Liberian territory would be regarded as an attack on the nearby territories of the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone, respectively. As an alternative to this plan, we feel that a similar purpose could be achieved by an informal tripartite agreement between the Government of Liberia and the Governments of France and Great Britain under which the coastline of Liberia would be assimilated for defense purposes with that of the adjoining French and British colonies, while naval vessels and airplanes of those two Governments based in West African waters would patrol the coast of Liberia in the event of emergency and render such assistance as might be needed. Obviously it would be of the utmost importance to France and Great Britain in the event of hostilities to prevent the establishment of a hostile base in Liberia from which attacks might be launched against their shipping, commerce or territorial possessions in West Africa, and either of the above plans would seem adequate to accomplish that objective.
In respect to the possibility of internal attack, the Liberian Government could probably be sufficiently safeguarded at the present time by an increase in the strength of the Frontier Force to approximately 1,000 men, and by the purchase of perhaps 20 machine guns at a total cost of not much more than $10,000. The cost of such a moderate program, or a slightly more comprehensive one if conditions appeared to demand it, could for example be met by an emergency reduction in the current appropriations, while payment for military equipment could be spread over a number of years. Mr. Harvey Firestone has assured us that the Finance Corporation of America would be glad to accommodate the Liberian Government in certain details connected with the servicing of the Loan Agreement, and to cooperate in any way practicable to enable Liberia to take such measures for defense as are within reasonable bounds of its economy.
In view of the haste which the French authorities seem to have displayed in negotiating the tentative agreement, we believe it desirable for us to take up the matter directly with the French Government. Accordingly, the American Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to make known to the French Foreign Office the views of the United States Government with respect to the defensive assistance of Liberia, [Page 593] and to endeavor to persuade the French authorities to substitute for their present proposal a plan of assistance more along the lines mentioned above. Pending the outcome of these discussions it is hoped that the Liberian Government will make no move to give effect to the provisions of the tentative agreement.
The Embassy at London reports that the Liberian representative in that city has approached the British Government in regard to military assistance but that the authorities have not acted with any dispatch in the matter. A Foreign Office official has indicated confidentially that while Great Britain would probably be willing to assist in the defense of Liberia should the need arise, Liberia seemed to be in little danger of attack even if war with Germany should take place. Since the Liberians have approached both France and Great Britain and since the matter would appear to concern both Governments equally, we are suggesting that the British Ambassador in Paris might be drawn into the discussions with a view to arriving at an understanding acceptable to all sides. We shall inform you promptly as to the results of the proposed discussions in Paris.
- A similar instruction of same date was sent to the Ambassador in France as telegram No. 402.↩