Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, The Far East; The Near East and Africa, Volume IV
882.20/463
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 988 of May 23, 2 p.m.,26 reporting a conversation I had with the Liberian Minister, and to enclose herewith a copy of a despatch which the Liberian Minister in Paris addressed to the Liberian Foreign Office in Monrovia under date of May 26, 1939.
Respectfully yours,
The Liberian Minister in France (Bogaerde) to the Liberian Secretary of State (Simpson)
Your Excellency: I have the honour to confirm my cable of today’s date, the text of which was as follows:
Sending full report by air mail with regard to very important proposals made by French Colonies Minister concerning assistance to Liberia./.
I called on Mr. Georges Mandel, French Minister of Colonies, at his request and in the course of a long discussion of the problem of French aid to Liberia, he gave me his opinion of the form which this assistance ought to take. I should add here that I gathered the impression that this matter is being treated principally on the French side by the Minister of Colonies rather than the Foreign Office officials whom I have recently conferred with. Mr. Mandel said that he considered it would be more satisfactory to deal with this matter here in Paris, through his office, rather than in Monrovia. The French Government had been very gratified by the results of Governor Chazelas’ mission, but he was of opinion that future negotiations would be too long were it necessary to send a similar mission to Monrovia for each question which might arise.
The Minister of Colonies declared at the outset that he considered the present arrangement, as it is embodied in the Liberian Government’s aide-mémoire of May 9th, completely inadequate. In his opinion, one of the most important elements for the defense of Liberia in case of aggression will be the preparation of territorial forces capable of meeting and resisting attack. Aerial and naval protection [Page 587] from outside would supplement and strengthen this resistance but the brunt of an aggression, which would most likely come in the form of a surprise attack, would have to be borne by land forces trained to modern methods of warfare. The assistance which France could give to Liberia, therefore, would, at the present time, be principally in the field of training. Now, the Liberian Government have engaged to raise, as far as possible, an army of 5000 men, which Mr. Mandel considers as a strict minimum, and for the training of this army, they have asked France for 12 officers. Two points appear to Mr. Mandel as of capital importance in connection with this: 1st. If the whole training of the Liberian army is to be left to 12 French officers, the effective preparation of the Liberian forces, which would be long under the most favourable circumstances, would be indefinitely prolonged. 2nd. Should an aggression occur in the meanwhile, before any sufficient preparation has been made in Liberia; to ward it off, the country would be without any means of defense; the present Liberian force, however courageously it might resist an invader, cannot be taken into consideration; aerial and naval assistance might not be instantaneous and a surprise attack could have disastrous consequences before this assistance reached the country.
The answer to this double objection, in Mr. Mandel’s opinion, would consist in sending to Liberia a French African force amounting to one battalion. Disseminated in companies or platoons in the principal centers in Liberia and those points especially on the coast where an enemy landing could be most effectively attempted, these French troops would serve a double purpose. They would form a training corps for the Liberian army, the recruitment and preparation of which would then be infinitely more rapid than if they were under the technical supervision of 12 officers only; and they would constitute, together with the gradually increasing Liberian forces, a garrison for the protection of the country until such time as this function could be left exclusively to the Liberian army. I mentioned at this point that the presence of so important a force of French troops in Liberia could create a peculiar impression in the country as well as abroad. The French Minister replied that these troops would not, of necessity, arrive all at once nor remain together in only one or two places. Their presence there would not, then, cause anything like a sensation. Furthermore, he said, it may not yet be generally known that Liberia has asked France for military assistance, but if this assistance is accepted, the matter will eventually become common knowledge. It could hardly be kept a secret and there would, in fact, be no particular advantage in secrecy, on the contrary. (I may mention that the matter has already been referred to in newspapers in England and Germany, [Page 588] to my certain knowledge.) What would appear more natural, in these circumstances, than the presence of French troops in the country?
Mr. Mandel then said that he realized that no small country could look quite serenely on the arrival of troops of a large neighbour in her territories, without sufficient guarantees that this in no wise constituted an army of occupation. He felt certain that the Liberian Government would have the greatest confidence in the disinterestedness of the French Government’s motives in this respect. But assurances on this score should be given completely to disarm any suspicion that France’s action was based on anything other than the most friendly motives. I asked Mr. Mandel what form such assurances might take and he replied that the French Government would be willing to give whatever guarantees the Liberian Government might require. To his way of thinking, an agreement with regard to the presence of French troops in Liberia might take some such form as the following, to the satisfaction of all concerned:
A written declaration could be drawn up and signed in which the number of these troops would be specified and the object of their presence defined. It could be stipulated that these troops would withdraw automatically if an improvement in the international situation removed the present danger, or at the moment when the Liberian army has reached a point of development considered sufficient for the defense of the country. The French Government would further take an engagement to withdraw these troops upon a simple request from the Liberian Government to do so. To give full force to these guarantees, the American Government could be asked to sponsor the arrangement, either through a declaration made by the French Government to the Government in Washington, or by having a representative of the United States sign the agreement in the name of his Government.
This Mr. Mandel considers to be a minimum form of assistance. France is naturally prepared to answer Liberia’s request for assistance in the manner in which the Liberian Government desire it. But he considers that to limit this assistance to the loan of 12 officers and a promise of help by air and by water in case of attack would not be a satisfactory reply to the Liberian Government’s appeal. Speaking with great frankness, Mr. Mandel said that, although the element of friendly solidarity and desire to protect a small neighbour did, of course, enter into France’s wish to be of assistance to Liberia, he would not conceal from me that this desire was very largely motivated by the realisation that in protecting Liberia, France would be defending her own interests as well. Hence his anxiety that this assistance should be effective. The best way to ward off an act of aggression, he said, would be to have it known that such an act would be effectively resisted; it would always be better to prevent the enemy [Page 589] from landing in one’s territory at all than to expel him afterwards with the assistance of outside naval and aerial forces.
I took occasion at this point to refer to the participation of Great Britain in the measures of assistance to Liberia. Mr. Mandel told me that he had no information concerning the attitude of Britain. He could conclude from her general policies and from the understanding between the French and British Governments, as well as from the point of view of her own interests, that Great Britain would cooperate in assisting Liberia in case of attack, but not by virtue of any special agreement or in any greater measure than that of the aid the two countries are engaged to give one another in case the territories of one or the other should be attacked. He had had no contacts with British authorities in his study of this problem. In a general way, he thought that Liberia should rely on Great Britain principally for aerial and naval assistance, whereas the assistance of France, while including the latter as well, would take the form principally of territorial help, the means of which he had already indicated. On land Great Britain’s cooperation could not be compared to that of France which can, at a moment’s notice, raise an army of 700,000 men in West Africa alone. Mr. Mandel said that he would be prepared, if the Liberian Government desired it and accepted his proposals with regard to territorial preparation, to negotiate with the British authorities the coordination of a plan for British aerial and naval assistance conjointly with French aid on land, and to whatever degree might be possible and necessary, on sea and in the air. This, I might add, would have the effect of rendering British help more certain and more effective.
Referring to the Liberian Government’s suggestion that the Officers to be sent by France to assist in the training of the Liberian army should be Africans, Mr. Mandel said that the French Government were quite prepared to accede to this, but he would give other advice himself. The French Government had the very highest regard for the quality and the capacity of their African cadres, but the training of these latter was not generally so thorough as that of French officers who had gone through higher studies in the War College here. To perform the task of training the Liberian troops with a maximum of efficiency and in a minimum of time, he felt that French officers would be superior to African ones, having themselves a more complete knowledge of modern technique. He would advise therefore that at least a portion of these 12 officers should be French.
Mr. Mandel then asked me if I would communicate his observations to my Government and stress principally his proposal with regard to the sending of a battalion of French African troops and the manner in which he would suggest that this could be guaranteed. He said [Page 590] that as he considers that not a moment should be lost in completing the measures of preparation, expecting as he does that a conflict might break out at almost any time, he would like to have an answer from the Liberian Government as rapidly as possible. He asked me if I thought I could obtain a reply by next week, and I said that I would urge upon my Government the desirability of reaching a decision.
I would suggest, therefore, that Your Excellency be kind enough to give me instructions by cable with regard to an answer for the French Minister of Colonies as early after the receipt of this note as may be possible.
I should add that I am communicating the principal points of my interview with Mr. Mandel to the American Ambassador here in order to have the benefit of his opinion and to permit him, should he judge it opportune, to report on this matter to his Government. I shall not fail to keep you informed in this regard.
Be pleased to accept [etc.]
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