793.94/8149: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State
266. 1. The Japanese Ambassador came to Nanking September 13 accompanied by his Military and Naval Attachés and opened yesterday at 4 p.m. negotiations on the Chengtu incident in conference with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Both the Foreign Office and Japanese Embassy deny that the Pakhoi incident was discussed.) Prior to coming to Nanking, Kawagoe informed press correspondents that he would conduct the negotiations “on a lofty plane.” According to a Foreign Office communiqué issued last night which was substantially duplicated by Japanese Embassy spokesmen in statements to press correspondents, the Japanese Ambassador inquired during the conversation concerning the Chinese Government’s attitude toward the Chengtu incident and the Foreign Minister expressed “deep regret” and “gave a detailed account of the measures taken by the Chinese Government both before and after the incident and expressed the hope that a satisfactory settlement would soon be reached.” The communiqué added “opinions were subsequently exchanged on general Sino-Japanese problems, the special bearing on the Chengtu incident” and that the conversation was concluded in 2½ hours with no arrangements for subsequent conversations having been made.
2. Both Chinese and Japanese officials deny that the Japanese Ambassador presented any demands or made any threats and we believe this is true.
4 [3?]. An officer of the Embassy has been confidentially informed by a responsible official of the Foreign Office:
5 [4?]. That the Japanese Ambassador called the attention of the Foreign Minister to the extreme gravity of the Chengtu incident and [Page 295] the situation in general. The informant denied a report that the Japanese Government had set a limit to the time within which the Nineteenth Route Army must be withdrawn from Pakhoi but handed the officer a Reuter telegram just received from Tokyo stating that (1) the Japanese Cabinet deliberated yesterday on the movement of the Chinese squadron and the Navy Minister and Naval Chief of Staff handed the Emperor a report to the effect that shallow waters in the neighborhood of Pakhoi necessitated the use of Hoihow, Hainan Island, as rendezvous for the Japanese fleet and (2) “this foreshadows the possibility of Hainan becoming Japan’s base of operations in the event of actual hostilities.”
6 [5?]. The obvious and extraordinary caution with which the Japanese are proceeding in their negotiations with the Chinese Government over the Chengtu and Pakhoi incidents is causing much speculation. One explanation is that the Japanese are genuinely concerned lest impossible demands or overt action on their part cause a widespread outburst of anti-Japanese agitation and they wish, because of the domestic situation in Japan and the unsatisfactory state of Soviet-Japanese relations, to preclude developments which might involve Japan in a major conflict.
7 [6?]. The refusal of the Chinese military at Pakhoi to permit Japanese investigators to land has created a situation from which such developments might flow and which is becoming more delicate by reason of a growing belief held by more than one highly placed and responsible official that the stationing of the Nineteenth Route Army at Pakhoi, its reinduction into the national forces and the subsequent incident were deliberately engineered by Li Tsung Jen and Pai Chung Hsi with a view to placing Chiang Kai Shek in an inextricable position vis-à-vis Japan and bringing about his political downfall.
8 [7?]. Repeated to Department and Peiping.
- Telegram in five sections.↩