811.04418/96: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 2—11 a.m.]
1. Department’s telegram 507, December 28, 4 p.m., to Paris. I am strongly inclined to support the third proposal—to allow a belligerent to buy any materials in “normal volume”. To deny him during the course of hostilities the right to buy would be unneutral. To allow him to buy in unlimited quantity might be unneutral toward his opponent. To limit purchases to ordinary quantity is substantial compliance with treaty obligations and is consonant with neutrality. I think strict adherence to a policy of neutrality is the surest way to keep out of a European war provided it be coupled with its concomitants, embargo on implements of war, warning of belligerent ships and belligerents to purchase and carry at their own risk. Other factors of the utmost importance are that this policy would bring the least disturbance to American foreign trade and American business and would minimize the danger of excessive war profits.
In my opinion, the policy of “normal volume” is far preferable to placing an embargo on the raw materials mentioned in proposal number 2. The latter would not only be (1) inconsistent with the idea of neutrality but, (2) would be practically unnecessary if the “normal volume” policy is adopted for the reason that no government can carry on a war very long on the surplus of those war materials it would buy in ordinary years of peaceful commerce. (3) Furthermore such an embargo would not only be very disturbing to American foreign trade during its life but might antagonize a belligerent and educate him to find materials in another country with a lasting adverse effect on American business. (4) One other reason is that the reciprocity of such a policy might have a harmful effect on the United States in some future war in which we might be a belligerent. While we have many raw materials the world war demonstrated that we lacked certain prime materials which we had to import, among them being nitrates, platinum, rubber and certain vegetable oils necessary for explosives. In that respect our situation is about the same today and I feel we ought not adopt a policy against others we could not respect if leveled against us by neutrals in some future war. To adopt this policy might invite reciprocal action—to our [Page 167] damage. (5) This policy would be particularly difficult to pursue without involving us to some extent in a war or in the rancorous atmosphere accompanying war if its promulgation depended upon the exercise of executive discretion rather than on mandatory law. (a) This is so for the reason that if the discretion were exercised the belligerent would necessarily feel he was being discriminated against and punished at executive will and the American Government would be considered to have taken sides against a belligerent. This will always be so in greater or less degree even if not to the marked extent which now exists because of the differences in status and equipment between the two countries presently at war. The effect of the use of discretion would be that we would align ourselves more favorably with one side and would be liable to be drawn into the circle of opposition to the other side and become a partisan to the same extent we had become a factor. (b) Furthermore, discretion would be a continuing power and if invoked during the course of hostilities would lay us open to the allegation that we had changed our status during the belligerency. It would operate to the disadvantage of one belligerent and ipso facto complicate our neutral status with the concurrent danger of bringing us into the conflict, (c) At the same time, the existence of that unexercised power would complicate the internal political situation by causing various groups to advocate and/or oppose its use during the course of a war. But I am opposed to the embargo on specified war materials policy whether it be imposed as a mandatory measure or by discrimination on four principal grounds:
Because it is, (1) inconsistent with neutrality; (2) quite unnecessary if you adopt a “normal volume” policy; (3) seriously disruptive to American trade and industry and; (4) possibly dangerous to the United States in some future war.
Again I prefer the “normal volume” policy to the first you mention, i. e., embargo all exports to belligerents. This last policy is open to most of the objections noted above in respect to an embargo on certain materials with special emphasis on the very great damage it would do to American trade and industry. Furthermore, it would be regarded as unneutral if instituted during the course of any hostilities and could only be justified if established in times of peace as a development of the law of neutrality with a view to discouraging war in general. In any event, we would be cutting off our nose to save our face and would suffer irreparable damage. We would be more sufferers than a defeated belligerent—and I understand our purpose to be to do the best we can to help America not only to be protected from the hardships of war but to preserve and increase our substantial internal development.
[Page 168]This is all predicated on the belief that it is our general policy to try to prevent the outbreak of hostilities—but once they break out we are to keep out. Any policy will be for universal application and yet will lack something in universality if it is warped by being molded for any particular situation. For that reason I hope the details of the present difficulty will not be the object at which it is directed. Any general policy, I submit, ought to be broad enough to insure our non-entanglement in a European war and should contemplate the Monroe Doctrine and our freedom of action in Latin America under that Doctrine.
The effect of the three measures if applied to the present situation would be:
- Total embargo—disastrous to American trade with Italy as of the present and in the future and provocative of an European war.
- Embargo on deemed to be war materials—the same.
- Normal volume—possibly sufficient to encourage the general emplacement of an oil embargo against Italy but probably not sufficient to ensure it; probably acceptable to Italy as consistent with our neutrality, probably not provocative of an European war.
Not repeated anywhere.